Syllabus for Economics 414


    Daniel R. Vincent: Fall, 2023



 

The University of Maryland



 

Tuesday and Thursday, 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm, in Tydings 0102.

 


Required Texts

The class text is:

        Joseph Harrington, Games, Strategies and Decision Making,  2nd Edition, Worth Publishers, 2015, ISBN-10:1-4292-3996-4    (JH)

Also recommended but not required is

        Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists, 1992 (or any later edition), Princeton University Press. ISBN-10: 0521551846    (RG)

        Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, The Art of Strategy, (2008 or any later edition), W.W. Norton. ISBN978-0-393-06243-4  (DN)

Course Description

This course studies the competitive and cooperative behavior that results when several parties with conflicting interests must work together. We will learn how to use game theory to study situations of potential conflict -- situations where the eventual outcome depends not just on your decision and chance, but the actions of others as well. Applications are drawn from economics, business,and political science. Typically there will be no clear cut "answers" to these problems (unlike most single-person decisions). Our analysis can only suggest what issues are important and provide guidelines for appropriate behavior in certain situations. 


On the one hand, competitive analysis is subtle, ambiguous, and often counter-intuitive; but on the other hand, it is fascinating, challenging, and a good deal of fun. I hope to broaden your exposure to and improve your understanding of competitive situations. 

Prerequisites: A minimum grade of C- in either ECON306 or ECON326 and a minimum grade of C- in either ECON230, BMGT230, or ECON321. Restriction: Must be in Economics Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science program. Credit only granted for: CMSC474, ECON406, ECON414, GVPT399A or GVPT390.


PLEASE NOTE: Problem Set 1 is due on ELMS, Friday, September 8, 11:59pm. That will give you a sense of if this course is appropriate for you.
 

Course Logistics

Problem sets for this course can be found on ELMS as well as at  http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/econ414PS.html. This site also has some past exams and tests.  Please let me know if you find any bugs in the page and please send me suggestions on ways to make it more useful. Note that while there are links to the lecture slides in this syllabus, they are for the most part to older versions. Updated versions will be on ELMS.
 
Assignments include problem sets, two mid-term and a final exam.
 
Lectures will be given in Tydings 0102 on Tues-Thurs at 2:00pm.  The first lecture is Tuesday, August 29.
 

My office hours are Mondays, 2:00 – 3:00 in Tydings 4130B. However, I generally respond quickly to email questions as well. Please include ECON414 in the subject line.


The TA for this course is Sarah Webb. Office hours: Wednesdays. 9-10am, Tydings 4110.


Zoom and Attendance

While attendance at all lectures is not mandatory, I strongly encourage students to attend lectures in person. Because of the recent upsurge in Covid, I will try to stream and record lectures on ZOOM for the first two weeks, however, I give no assurances that this will continue through the remainder of the semester.


In order to encourage attendance, I will take a roll call three times at random over the semester. Any student who is present (or who has registered a valid excuse beforehand) will receive one bonus point for each of the times I conduct the roll call, for a maximum of three possible points to be added to the cumulative course score.

Course Outline

PART I: Introduction

                 1. What is Game Theory?

                              ·  Strategic Thinking
                              ·  Rationality
                              ·  Common Knowledge
                              JH Chapter 1.
                             http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(1)Intro.pdf


2.  A brief review of the mathematics required in this course:

                              ·  Solving for solutions to multiple equations.
                              ·  Finding the maximum of a quadratic function.
                              ·    Some basic probability theory
                                JH Chapters 7.2, 11.5.                            

 http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(2)math.pdf                     

3.  The various ways to represent a game:

                    · Game Trees -- "Games in Extensive Form".

                    · Simultaneous Move Games -- "Games in Strategic Form".

                                        Matrix Representations.

                                        Mathematical Representations.

 JH Chapter 2.
            http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(3)REP.pdf

 

PART II: Extensive Form Games of Perfect Information.
            1. Single Person “Games”:

                    ·  Back to front reasoning.

                    · Multiple personalities and commitment.                             

http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(4)SPDP.pdf

2.  Multi-person games:

                    · Backward induction.

                    · Examples: Stackelberg Games, Bargaining Games.

                    · Rationality again.

             JH Chapter 8

                     http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(5)GameTrees.pdf


 

PART III: Simultaneous Move Games
            1. Representations and Examples:
            2. Strict and Weak Dominance, Strictly andweakly dominated:

· Definitions.·

· Sequential Deletion of Dominated Strategies as a Solution

JH Chapter 3.

http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(6)SIMMOVE.pdf

       3.  Examples

JH Chapter 3.
            http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(7)SIMEX.pdf

 

PART IV: Nash Equilibrium In Pure Strategies

1. Best responses and definition:

                                    · Matrix Games.                                     
                                    JH Chapters 4, 5
                                    http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(8a)NASHEQUIL.pdf                                    
                                    ·  Market games – Cournot and Bertrand Games.                           
                                    JH Chapters 4,5,6 (pp. 194-197, Appendix)
                                    http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(8)MARKETG.pdf

2.  Multiple Nash Equilibria, No Nash Equilibrium (in Pure Strategies)

JH Chapters 4,5,6.

PART V: Nash Equilibrium In Mixed (Random) Strategies

1. Definition.

     2. Techniques
                                    · Graphical.
                                    · Mathematical JH
                                    Chapter 7.

http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(9)EXIST.pdf

http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(9)EXISTPt2.pdf

3. Zero-sum games and the minimax theorem.                           
                                   http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(10)MINMAX.pdf

PART VI: Extensive Form Games of Imperfect Information

          1. Games and subgames.

      2. Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
                                · Definition.
                                · Examples.                           
                                 JH Chapter 9
                                 http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(11)SGP.pdf

Part VII: Games of Incomplete Information (Privately informed players)

1. Bayesian Games.

2. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

            JH Chapter 10.
            http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(12)BNE.pdf

3. Signaling Games

           JH Chapter 11.2
           http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(12a)BNE.pdf



Part VIII: Auctions

1. The symmetric Independent Private Values model

2. Two types of auctions

3. Applications

           JH Chapters 3.2.3, 10.4,10.7.
           http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(13)AUCTIONS.pdf
           http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(13a)RWAuctions.pdf

Part IX: Repeated Games

            1.  Finitely repeated games and subgame perfection
                                   JH, Chapter 13
                                   http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(14)REPEAT.pdf



            2.  Infinitely repeated games.
                                    JH, Chapter 13
                                    http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(15)INFINITE.pdf

Part X: Matching Algorithms

            1.  A Brief Introduction to Matching Theory
                                   http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(16)TCKidney.pdf


Grading:

Your grade will be determined as follows:
 
4 Problem Sets   (Best 3 scores)                                  21points
 
Midterm Score  (Two Tests Equally Weighted)          34 points
  
Final exam                                                                   45 points
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total                                                                           100 points
 
 
The University policy on grading requires me to use the grading system I announce at the beginning of the semester in all cases.  I cannot make any exceptions to that rule. I assign Letter Grades using +/-.
 
Assessments
You are allowed to work with other students in completing the problem sets, however, you must submit your own individual answer file.


The schedule for the course assessments is as follows:
 
Problem Set 1 is due September 08 online.
Problem Set 2 is due
September 26 online.
Problem Set 3 is due  October 17 online.
Problem Set 4 is due  TBA online.

Due dates for the final two Problem Sets will be confirmed in class.
Midterm 1                                Thurs., Sept.. 28,                    2:00pm
Midterm 2                                Thurs.,  Nov. 02,                    2:00pm
Final Exam                               TBA                       
  
NOTE: Students who have a University-recognized conflict should let me know right away. It is your responsibility to ensure you are available for the midterms and final exam. 
 

Campus Policies

The university’s Code of Academic Integrity https://policies.umd.edu/academic-affairs/university-of-maryland-code-of-academic-integrity states that academic dishonesty includes any of the following acts:
  1. Cheating: attempting to gain an unfair advantage and/or intentionally using or attempting to use unauthorized materials, information, or study aids in any academic course or exercise.
  2. Fabrication: falsification or invention of any information or citation in any academic course or exercise.
  3. Facilitating Academic Dishonesty: intentionally or knowingly helping or attempting to help another to violate any provision of this Code.
  4. Plagiarism: intentionally or knowingly representing the words or ideas of another as one’s own in any academic course or exercise.

The university’s Non-Discrimination Policy https://president.umd.edu/sites/president.umd.edu/files/documents/policies/VI-1.00B_2.pdf prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, marital status, age, national origin, political affiliation, physical or mental disability, religion, protected veteran status,genetic information, personal appearance, or any other legally protected class. This applies to discrimination, harassment or retaliation “that adversely impacts the education...of a member of the University community regardless of where the conduct occurred.”

 

As you use a group chat for this course, keep in mind that it is unacceptable to have another person do your own work.You must write up your own answers in your own words, unless the assignment is a designated group activity.If others post information on the group chat, you should verify that it is correct and complete so that it helps your understanding rather than hinders it.You should never copy the work of another person or other source without quoting it, citing it, and providing a full reference, because otherwise that is plagiarism.

 

It is our shared responsibility to know and abide by the University of Maryland’s policies that relate to all courses.  Please visit https://www.ugst.umd.edu/courserelatedpolicies.html for the Office of Undergraduate Studies’ full list of campus-wide policies and follow up with me if you have questions.


 
Course Experience Survey*

Your opinion about the course is important and will be heard. I look forward to receiving your feedback on the course, both during and at the end of the semester. Please submit a Course Experience Survey (www.courseexp.umd.edu) in order to help faculty and administrators improve teaching and learning at Maryland. All information submitted is confidential.


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