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Tuesday and Thursday, 2:00 pm to 3:15 pm, in Tydings 2109.
The class text is:
Joseph Harrington, Games,
Strategies and Decision Making,
2nd Edition, Worth Publishers, 2015,
ISBN-10:1-4292-3996-4 (JH)
Also recommended but not required is
Robert Gibbons, Game Theory
for Applied Economists, 1992 (or any later edition), Princeton
University Press. ISBN-10: 0521551846
(RG)
Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, The Art of Strategy, (2008 or any later edition), W.W. Norton. ISBN- 978-0-393-06243-4 (DN)
This course studies the competitive and cooperative behavior that results when several parties with conflicting interests must work together. We will learn how to use game theory to study situations of potential conflict -- situations where the eventual outcome depends not just on your decision and chance, but the actions of others as well. Applications are drawn from economics, business,and political science. Typically there will be no clear cut "answers" to these problems (unlike most single-person decisions). Our analysis can only suggest what issues are important and provide guidelines for appropriate behavior in certain situations.
On
the
one hand, competitive analysis is subtle, ambiguous, and often
counter-intuitive; but on the other hand, it is fascinating,
challenging, and a good deal of fun. I hope to broaden your exposure to
and improve your understanding of competitive situations.
Prerequisites: A minimum grade of C- in either ECON306 or ECON326 and a minimum
grade of C- in either ECON230, BMGT230, ECON321 or STAT401.
Restriction: Must be in Economics Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of
Science program. Credit only granted for: CMSC474, ECON414,
GVPT399A or GVPT390.
PLEASE NOTE: Problem Set 1 is due on ELMS, Friday, September 6, 11:59pm.
That will give you a sense of if this course is appropriate for you.
Past midterms and exams for this course can be found
on http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/econ414PS.html.
The password will be given out in class. Please let me know if you
find any bugs in the page and please send me suggestions on ways to make
it more useful. Note that while there are links to the lecture slides in
this syllabus, they are for the most part to older versions. Updated
versions will be on ELMS as will problem sets.
Assignments include problem sets, two mid-term and a final exam.
Lectures will be given in Tydings 2109 on Tues-Thurs at 2:00pm.
The first lecture is Tuesday, August 27.
My office hours are Mondays, 2:00 – 3:00 in Tydings 4130B. However, I generally respond quickly to email questions as well. Please include ECON414 in the subject line.
The TA for this course is Sarah Webb. Office hours: Wednesdays. 9-10am, Tydings 4128.
I will not take attendance, however, you are expected to attend lectures in person. Because of the recent upsurge in Covid, I will try to stream and record lectures on ZOOM for the first two weeks, however, I give no assurances that this will continue through the remainder of the semester.
To encourage attendance and attention, part of your grade will be determined by spot quizzes that will be administered randomly via ELMS in class. Therefore, you must come to class with the capability of logging onto the course ELMS site to take the quiz. No makeups are allowed for this part of the assessment, however, your 7 best scores of 10 or 12 quizzes are counted.
PART I: Introduction
1. What is Game Theory?
2. A brief review of the mathematics required in this course:
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(2)math.pdf
3. The various ways to represent a game:
· Game Trees -- "Games in Extensive Form".
· Simultaneous Move Games -- "Games in Strategic Form".
Matrix Representations.
Mathematical Representations.
JH Chapter 2.
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(3)REP.pdf
PART II: Extensive Form Games of Perfect
Information.
1. Single Person “Games”:
· Back to front reasoning.
· Multiple
personalities and commitment.
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(4)SPDP.pdf
2. Multi-person games:
· Backward induction.
· Examples: Stackelberg Games, Bargaining Games.
· Rationality again.
JH Chapter 8
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(5)GameTrees.pdf
PART III:
Simultaneous Move Games
1. Representations and Examples:
2. Strict and Weak Dominance, Strictly andweakly dominated:
· Definitions.·
· Sequential Deletion of Dominated Strategies as a Solution
JH Chapter 3.
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(6)SIMMOVE.pdf
3. Examples
JH Chapter 3.
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(7)SIMEX.pdf
PART IV: Nash Equilibrium In Pure Strategies
1. Best responses and definition:
· Matrix Games.2. Multiple Nash Equilibria, No Nash Equilibrium (in Pure Strategies)
JH Chapters 4,5,6.
PART V: Nash Equilibrium In Mixed (Random) Strategies
1. Definition.
2. Techniqueshttp://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(9)EXIST.pdf
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(9)EXISTPt2.pdf
3.
Zero-sum games and the minimax
theorem.
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(10)MINMAX.pdf
PART VI: Extensive Form Games of Imperfect Information
1. Games and subgames.
2. Subgame Perfect Nash EquilibriumPart VII: Games of Incomplete Information
(Privately informed players)
1. Bayesian Games.
2. Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
JH Chapter 10.
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(12)BNE.pdf
3. Signaling Games
JH Chapter 11.2
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(12a)BNE.pdf
Part VIII:
Auctions
1. The symmetric Independent Private Values model
2. Two types of auctions
3. Applications
JH Chapters 3.2.3, 10.4,10.7.
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(13)AUCTIONS.pdf
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(13a)RWAuctions.pdf
Part IX: Repeated Games
1.
Finitely repeated games and subgame perfection
JH,
Chapter 13
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(14)REPEAT.pdf
2.
Infinitely repeated games.
JH,
Chapter 13
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(15)INFINITE.pdf
Part X:
Matching Algorithms
1. A
Brief Introduction to Matching Theory
http://econweb.umd.edu/~vincent/econ414/Lecture414(16)TCKidney.pdf
Your grade will be determined as follows:
4 Problem Sets (Best 3 scores)
21points
In class, mini-quizzes (Best 7 of 10 or 12) 7 points
Midterm Score (Two Tests Equally Weighted)
30 points
Final
exam
42 points
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Total
100 points
The University policy on grading requires me to use the grading
system I announce at the beginning of the semester in all cases.
I cannot make any exceptions to that rule. I assign Letter
Grades using +/-.
Assessments
You are allowed to work with other students in completing the problem
sets, however, you must submit your own individual answer file.
The schedule for the course assessments is as
follows:
Problem Set 1 is due September 06
online.
Problem Set 2 is due September
24 online.
Problem Set 3 is due
October 17 online.
Problem Set 4 is due
TBA online.
Due dates for the final two Problem Sets will be
confirmed in class.
Midterm
1 Thurs.,
Sept..
26,
2:00pm
Midterm
2
Thurs.,
Oct. 31,
2:00pm
Final
Exam
TBA
NOTE: Students who have a University-recognized conflict should let me
know right away. It is your responsibility to ensure you are available
for the midterms and final exam.
Campus Policies
The university’s Code of Academic Integrity https://policies.umd.edu/academic-affairs/university-of-maryland-code-of-academic-integrity states that academic dishonesty includes any of the following acts:The university’s Non-Discrimination Policy https://president.umd.edu/sites/president.umd.edu/files/documents/policies/VI-1.00B_2.pdf prohibits discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex, gender identity or expression, sexual orientation, marital status, age, national origin, political affiliation, physical or mental disability, religion, protected veteran status,genetic information, personal appearance, or any other legally protected class. This applies to discrimination, harassment or retaliation “that adversely impacts the education...of a member of the University community regardless of where the conduct occurred.”
As you use a group chat for this course, keep in mind that it is unacceptable to have another person do your own work.You must write up your own answers in your own words, unless the assignment is a designated group activity.If others post information on the group chat, you should verify that it is correct and complete so that it helps your understanding rather than hinders it.You should never copy the work of another person or other source without quoting it, citing it, and providing a full reference, because otherwise that is plagiarism.
It is our shared responsibility to know and abide by the University of Maryland’s policies that relate to all courses. Please visit https://www.ugst.umd.edu/courserelatedpolicies.html for the Office of Undergraduate Studies’ full list of campus-wide policies and follow up with me if you have questions.
Course Experience Survey*
Your opinion about the course is important and will be heard. I look
forward to receiving your feedback on the course, both during and at
the end of the semester. Please submit a Course Experience Survey
(www.courseexp.umd.edu) in order to help faculty and administrators
improve teaching and learning at Maryland. All information submitted
is confidential.
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