

Review Lecture

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Lecture One

⌘ *Opportunity Cost:*

- ☒ There ain't no such thing as a free lunch.
(TANSTAAFL)

⌘ *Fixed Cost and Variable Cost*

⌘ *Marginal Cost*

⌘ *Sunk costs*

⌘ *The Sunk Cost Fallacy*

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Lecture Two

- ⌘ Using Marginal Analysis to guide decisions.
- ⌘ Decision Trees
- ⌘ How to draw
- ⌘ Why they are useful (good to organize data, simplify the decision process. Communicate decisions to others)
- ⌘ Examples:
 - ☒ Sunk cost dilemma
 - ☒ Nebraska versus Miami (1984 Orange Bowl)
- ⌘ Thinning Strategically games against yourself. 3

Lecture Three

- ⌘ Decision Trees again
 - ⌘ Games against Nature?
 - ⌘ Solving games back to front
 - ⌘ Fredo and Charlie Brown
 - ⌘ Examples:
 - ☒ Line Item Vetoes
 - ☒ The game of NIM.
 - ☒ Ultimatum games and "Bargaining"
 - ☒ Dictator games
 - ☒ Cut and choose
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Lecture Four

- ⌘ Commitments, Threats and Promises.
- ⌘ Fredo and Charlie again.
- ⌘ Predatory Pricing.
- ⌘ "If you do not do your homework, you are NOT going to sleep-away camp this year!"
- ⌘ Reconstructing the game:
 - ☒ Contracts
 - ☒ Reputation,
 - ☒ Burning Bridges
 - ☒ Cutting off communication
 - ☒ Incrementalism (small steps)
 - ☒ Teamwork and agents.

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Lecture Five

- ⌘ Simultaneous versus Dynamic Games
- ⌘ Simultaneous? Not necessarily
 - ☒ examples
- ⌘ Strategies
- ⌘ Dominant and dominated strategies
 - ☒ examples
- ⌘ Eliminating dominated strategies
- ⌘ Solving or simplifying games.

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Lecture Six

- ⌘ <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S2iNGFRtLkI>
- ⌘ Best Responses.
- ⌘ The “Beautiful Equilibrium”, Nash Equilibrium
 - ☒ defining the NE
 - ☒ finding NE -examples
 - ☒ How many?
 - ☒ Are there any?
- ⌘ Randomizing behavior
 - ☒ Motivation
 - ☒ explanation
 - ☒ computation.
 - ☒ examples.

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Lecture Seven

- ⌘ Two main types of private information: knowledge (information about type) and intent (information about action).
- ⌘ We focus on the first
- ⌘ When does private information matter?
- ⌘ Screening versus signalling
- ⌘ Separating versus pooling
- ⌘ Semi-separating?

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Lecture Eight

- ⌘ Auctions as a “screening” device
 - ☒ example
- ⌘ The many uses of auctions
- ⌘ Four examples of “Simple” auctions
- ⌘ How to bid in a Second Price auction.

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Lecture Eight B

- ⌘ The Independent, Private Values Assumption
- ⌘ Optimal behavior In Auctions
 - ☒ second price auctions
 - ☒ first price auctions
- ⌘ Equivalence of FP and Dutch Auctions
- ⌘ “Equivalence” of SP and English Auctions
- ⌘ “Equivalence” of Expected Revenues
- ⌘ The Winner’s Curse and the Dependence of Values.
- ⌘ Real World Application: The FCC Spectrum Auctions

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Lecture Nine



- ⌘ Some information, p , is common knowledge when it is the case that, for all the agents involved,
 - ⊡ each agent knows p ,
 - ⊡ each agent knows that each agent knows p
 - ⊡ each agent know that each agent knows that each agent knows p
 - ⊡ ad infinitum
 - ⊗ The email game
 - ⊗ The anthropologist
 - ⊗ The surprise quiz.

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