

**SVETLANA PIVOVAROVA**

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**PLACEMENT DIRECTORS**

|                         |  |                |
|-------------------------|--|----------------|
| Prof. Guido Kuersteiner | <a href="mailto:kuersteiner@econ.umd.edu">kuersteiner@econ.umd.edu</a> | (301) 405-3493 |
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**EDUCATION**

|       |  |
|-------|--|
| Ph.D. | Economics, University of Maryland at College Park, expected May 2019 |
| M.A.  | Economics, New Economic School, 2008                                 |
| B.A.  | Mathematics, Moscow State University, 2006                           |

**FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION**

Primary: Industrial Organization  
Secondary: Computational Economics

**DISSERTATION**

*The Role of Information in Private Value Auctions*  
Committee: Prof. Andrew Sweeting (Chair), Prof. Ginger Jin, Prof. Daniel Vincent

**JOB MARKET PAPER**

“Autocorrelated Costs and Information in Repeated First Price Procurement Auctions”

I study the effect of transparency on bidder behavior and optimal auction design in repeated procurement auctions. Specifically, I consider the effects of the common practice of releasing information on bids in previous auctions in a setting where bidders' costs are serially correlated over time. I extend the standard framework for the estimation of firm costs in asymmetric first price auctions to settings where information on firms' past bids is publicly available. Using the data on two types of highway procurement auctions in Oklahoma, I show that the bids appear to react to the information in competitors' previous bids. I find that, from the researcher's perspective, the effects of accounting for the presence of the signal depend on the value of the observed past bids. I find that the standard model overestimates the expected costs of procurement, especially when the prior information is indicative of the low costs of the regular bidder. If the auctioneer takes the public nature of information into account when setting the optimal reserve price, she can reduce expected procurement costs up to 2%.

## **OTHER RESEARCH PAPERS**

“The Role of Information in Repeated Procurement Auctions: Monitoring and Entry,” *work in progress*

“Imperfect Formal Contract Enforcement: The Case of Russian Public Procurement”, 2010, IPPC 2010 Proceedings

## **TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

Instructor, Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Winter 2015, Summer 2015, Winter 2016, Summer 2018

Instructor, Principles of Macroeconomics (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Winter 2014, Summer 2017, Summer 2017

Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomic Analysis (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Fall 2013, Fall 2014, Spring 2015, Fall 2015

Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomic Theory and Policy (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Spring 2016

Teaching Assistant, Principles of Microeconomics (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Fall 2012, Spring 2014

Teaching Assistant, Principles of Macroeconomics (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Spring 2013

## **RESEARCH AND RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE**

Consultant, The World Bank, September 2016 – August 2018

Research Assistant, Center for Global Development, September 2016 – August 2017

Junior Researcher, Laboratory for Institutional Analysis of Economic Reforms, Higher School of Economics, December 2008 – July 2012

Research Assistant, Prof. Andrei Bremzen, New Economic School, November – December 2007

## **GRANTS AND AWARDS**

Graduate Assistant, University of Maryland, Fall 2012-Spring 2016

Nazarbayev University Social Policy Research Grant, 2015

## **LANGUAGES**

Russian (native), English (fluent), French (basic)

## **REFERENCES**

|                       |                        |  |                |
|-----------------------|------------------------|--|----------------|
| Prof. Andrew Sweeting | University of Maryland | <a href="mailto:sweeting@econ.umd.edu">sweeting@econ.umd.edu</a> | (301) 405-8325 |
| Prof. Ginger Jin      | University of Maryland | <a href="mailto:jin@econ.umd.edu">jin@econ.umd.edu</a>           | (301) 405-3484 |
| Prof. Daniel Vincent  | University of Maryland | <a href="mailto:dvincent@econ.umd.edu">dvincent@econ.umd.edu</a> | (301) 405-3485 |