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PLACEMENT DIRECTORS

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EDUCATION

Ph.D.	Economics, University of Maryland at College Park, expected May 2019
M.S.	Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation Graduate School of Economics, 2013
B.S.	Economics, Federal University of Ceara, 2010 (Magna cum Laude)

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Primary: Industrial Organization, Applied Information Economics
Secondary: Game Theory, Computational Economics

DISSERTATION

Essays on Information Manipulation and Optimal Decision Making
Committee: Prof. Lawrence Ausubel (Chair), Prof. Daniel Vincent, Prof. Emel Filiz Ozbay

JOB MARKET PAPER

“On Incentives to Manipulate Online Ratings”

With the proliferation of online rating platforms, there has been an increasing concern over the authenticity of reviews posted online. While much effort has been dedicated to improving fake review detection algorithms, little attention has been spent on understanding the incentives that drives some sellers to solicit fake reviews. To fill this gap, this paper develops a theoretical model in which sellers dynamically choose the effort spent on review manipulation. Among other things, the model predicts that sellers' optimal investment in fake reviews is not a monotone function of their reputation. More precisely, sellers that currently possess a very good or very bad history of past reviews have less incentives to solicit fake reviews praising their own products, the intuition being that, for sellers with very bad reputation, it is too costly to pretend that they are high quality sellers; while sellers that have already accumulated a very good reputation do not need to spend much effort in convincing buyers that they are high quality sellers. Another prediction from the model is that, in order to maximize the impact from each fake review, sellers tend to concentrate review manipulation at the initial stages after they have entered the market. Using data collected from Amazon, I was able to observe those two features from the model on the empirical level by estimating a logit regression that predicts the probability of a review being fake as a function of the product's reputation and the time it took for the review to be posted since the seller entered the market.

OTHER RESEARCH PAPERS

“Polarized Opinions under the Presence of Fake and Biased News,” working paper

“An Improved Bound to Manipulation in Large Stable Matches,” working paper

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Game Theory (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Spring 2015, Summer 2015, Fall 2015, Spring 2016, Summer 2016, Spring 2017, Summer 2017, Fall 2017, Winter 2018, Spring 2018, Fall 2018

Teaching Assistant, Advanced Microeconomics (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Fall 2016

Teaching Assistant, Intermediate Microeconomic Theory (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Spring 2014

Teaching Assistant, Principles of Microeconomics (undergraduate), University of Maryland, Fall 2013 and Fall 2014

Instructor, Introduction to Statistics (undergraduate), Federal University of Ceara, Spring 2013

Teaching Assistant, Analysis 2 (graduate), Getulio Vargas Foundation Graduate School of Economics, Spring 2012

Teaching Assistant, Linear Algebra (undergraduate), Federal University of Ceara, Spring 2010

GRANTS AND AWARDS

eBay Research Policy Scholarship, Fall 2018

PIBIC-CNPq Research Scholarship, Federal University of Ceara, Spring 2007–Fall 2009

LANGUAGES

Portuguese (native), English (fluent), Spanish (basic)

COMPUTATIONAL SKILLS

Python, R, Matlab, Stata, HTML

REFERENCES

Prof. Lawrence Ausubel	University of Maryland	ausubel@econ.umd.edu	(301) 405-3495
Prof. Daniel Vincent	University of Maryland	dvincent@umd.edu	(301) 405-3485
Prof. Emel Filiz Ozbay	University of Maryland	filizozbay@econ.umd.edu	(301) 405-3474