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PLACEMENT DIRECTORS

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EDUCATION

Ph.D. Economics, University of Maryland at College Park, expected May 2019
M.A. Economics, Universidad de los Andes, 2012
B.A. Physics, Universidad de los Andes, 2010

FIELDS OF SPECIALIZATION

Primary: Mechanism Design
Secondary: Behavioral Economics/Industrial Organization

DISSERTATION

Essays on Centralized Market Allocations
Committee: Prof. Erkut Ozbay (Chair), Prof. Andrew Sweeting, Prof. Lawrence Ausubel

JOB MARKET PAPER

“Overcoming the Rural Hospital Theorem: Compulsory Social Service Allocation in Colombia”

A long-standing policy concern in many countries is the difficulty of filling medical positions in rural areas. In Colombia, the Ministry of Health requires newly-graduated health professionals to work in a rural or marginalized urban area for a year in order to receive professional certification. The decentralized mechanism used until 2013 to allocate graduates to slots was one that health professionals could manipulate to avoid an assignment. In 2014, a single-offer centralized mechanism that cannot be similarly manipulated, based on Gale and Shapley's deferred acceptance algorithm, was adopted. Following a revealed preference approach, I estimate health professionals' hospital preferences using the 2014 data. Using these estimates and the fact that under the decentralized mechanism health professionals were able to avoid positions that fell below their acceptance threshold, I obtain the average marginal utility a health professional would require to accept a position by simulating the outcome had the decentralized mechanism still been in use. Then, I simulate the outcome of the centralized mechanism in the absence of the requirement that students accept the assignment determined by the mechanism. I find that, given the choice, about 33% of physicians would reject their hospital assignment, implying that it is important for the policy's success that assignments be mandatory. One feature of the centralized mechanism is that, in the case of multiple individuals having the same priority for a particular position, the tie is broken randomly. I show that breaking the ties in favor of those who listed a specific hospital as preferred can yield welfare gains of up to 17%. Finally, I show that moving from the random lottery to a merit-based tie-break, based on the results of the examination that health professionals take at the completion of their studies, would reduce the quality of health professionals allocated to rural areas compared to the quality of those allocated elsewhere.

OTHER RESEARCH PAPERS

“Non-monetary Incentives on Traffic Congestion,” work in progress, with Ian Chadd and Erkut Ozbay

“Matching Problems with Priorities and Preferences: Compulsory Social Service Allocation in Colombia,” work in progress, with Paula Jaramillo and Cagatay Kayi

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Assistant, Advanced Microeconomic Theory (graduate), University of Maryland, Fall 2017, Spring 2018, Fall 2018

Instructor, Math Camp (graduate), University of Maryland, Summer 2017

Assistant Instructor, Math Camp (graduate), University of Maryland, Summer 2016

Teaching Assistant, Advanced Microeconomic Theory (graduate), Universidad de los Andes, Spring 2014

RESEARCH AND RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant, Prof. Erkut Ozbay, University of Maryland, Fall 2015–Spring 2017

GRANTS AND AWARDS

Scholarship from the Colombian Central Bank (Beca Banco de la República de Colombia), 2017

CONFERENCE AND SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS

2018: Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA)

2016: 5th World Congress of the Game Theory Society (GAMES)

LANGUAGES

Spanish (native), English (fluent)

REFERENCES

Prof. Erkut Ozbay	University of Maryland	ozbay@econ.umd.edu	(301) 405-8325
Prof. Andrew Sweeting	University of Maryland	sweeting@econ.umd.edu	(301) 405-8325
Prof. Lawrence Ausubel	University of Maryland	ausubel@econ.umd.edu	(301) 405-3495