ECON 451: Public Choice
Professor Peter Coughlin


Single-Peakedness

The background readings are:

1) J. Kelly, Social Choice Theory: An Introduction

From the beginning of "Chapter 3: Single-Peakedness" (on p. 23) through "...paradox occurs." in the 3rd line of the 2nd paragraph after the exercises on p. 29


2) A. Feldman and R. Serrano, Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory, 2nd edition

i) From "The next proposition..." in the 3rd line after the proof of Proposition 4 through "... the economist's trade." at the end of the 2nd-to-last paragraph on p.18
ii) From "If majority rule..." at the beginning of the 1st paragraph in the section "The Majority Voting Criterion" (on p. 254) through "...relation." at the end of that paragraph (on p. 254).
iii) The question at the beginning of the 4th paragraph in the section "The Majority Voting Criterion" (on p. 254) and the two questions at the end of that paragraph (on p. 255)
iv) From "Unfortunately, the ..." at the beginning of the 1st full paragraph on p. 255 through "... distributional problem." at the end of the 1st paragraph on p. 256
v) From the beginning of the section "Majority Voting & Single-Peakedness" on p. 256 through "...works well" in the 4th line of the 2nd paragraph on p. 263

3) A. Taylor & A. Pacelli, Mathematics and Politics, 2nd edition

From "Example: ..." in the 3rd line on p.237 through "... P is transitive." at the end of the Theorem on p. 239

The following item is a recommended reading (which supplements the background reading):


Jean Hendriks and Gareth D. Myles, Intermediate Public Economics, 2nd edition, The MIT Press, 2013.

In Section 11.4.3: starting on p. 351, stopping with the sentence in the 1st full paragraph on p. 354 that ends with "...has a single dimension."



All of these items are available through Course Reserves at ELMS.