

**ON THE EDGE OF PEACE:
THE INCREASING TRENDS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST
COLOMBIAN SOCIAL LEADERS**

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ABSTRACT. The aftermath of the peace agreement between the FARC and the Colombian government has been followed by a sharp increase in the assassination of social leaders in the country. I replicate and extend on Prem, Rivera, Romero, & Vargas (2018) investigation and corroborate that the demobilization the FARC has prompted other armed groups to take control over the areas they controlled. Further analysis is conducted in relation to the availability of resources and the relationship with the killings. The results reveal a possible effort by FARC dissidents to take control over the areas previously occupied by the FARC that are rich in resources such as gold and coca. In terms of the implications of the results, government control over the territory and protection of social leaders in pro of the democratic process are crucial to continue advancing in the peace process.

KEYWORDS: Social Leaders, Peace Agreement, Resources, Dominion

1. INTRODUCTION

On November 24 of 2016, under the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos, the congress of Colombia approved a peace agreement that ended the war with the longest-standing guerrilla, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-FARC. What many believed to be the end of the conflict was in reality the beginning of a long and arduous path towards peace in which the state's ability to respond to the needs and demands of the victims was key to achieve peace. Unfortunately, the most notable outcome of the treaty so far has been the increasing number of social leaders assassinations after the FARC stopped all types of bellicose activities in 2014. In this context, the questions around the potential effects that the peace deal has had on matters of justice, democracy, security, and development are particularly relevant to understand and evaluate the peace deal.

The empirical study of the deaths of social leaders in Colombia has not been widely investigated in economics. Considering Prem, Rivera, Romero, & Vargas (2018) take over a partially new field of research, my thesis explores possible variations around the dynamics of the post-conflict as well as a somewhat contrasting view of possible mechanisms behind it. In this research, I sought to replicate and extend the study done by Prem et al. (2018) in which the authors study the increasing trends of violence against social leaders in the aftermath of the ceasefire of 2014. With this in mind, the initial section of this investigation seeks to understand how the presence of FARC and the exposure to other armed groups have influenced the murder of social leaders in the country in the aftermath of the ceasefire. Furthermore, I will separate the country between municipalities that have gold or coca and municipalities that have none in order to analyze possible differences given by the availability of historically significant resources for subversive groups. The following component will deal with the importance of both the ceasefire and the formal signature of the agreement in 2016 to examine if the presence of FARC and the exposure to other armed groups are significant only after violence was officially ended in 2014 or if the implementation of the agreement can better explain the murders. Finally, in order to add to the ones proposed in Prem et al. (2018), I include the Territorially Focused Development Programmes (PDET) in the specification to account for the increased visibility that the leaders have acquired as a possible mechanism to explain the increase in murders.

Following Prem et al. (2018), I implement both a triple and a quadruple differences model to compare regions exposed to both FARC and other groups after the ceasefire, in comparison, to those with only FARC presence and those only exposed to other groups. I also implement the same methodology to compare across regions with gold or coca and regions with none of the two. The data obtained in the murders is meant to be as similar to their paper as possible. However, I add the year 2018 to the dataset of the social leaders murdered. In terms of the data on presence and exposure to FARC and other armed groups, respectively was obtained directly from researcher Juan Vargas. The data on coca and old availability was directly retrieved from official government agencies.

The results provide several conclusions and hypothesis that can help explain, at least partially, the raise in violence against leaders in the country. Initially, the results maintain that increases in the average municipal exposure to other armed groups have resulted in increase in the rate of leaders murdered per 100,000 as well as the probability of a social leader being killed after the ceasefire in municipalities that had FARC presence prior 2014. Moreover, I find that areas previously occupied by the FARC but not exposed to other groups also had a statistically significant increase in the rate of leaders murdered per 100,000, which could be related to the attempt of FARC dissidents to kill leaders advocating for the implementation of the peace agreement and to use violence to establish themselves as a legitimate force. Additionally, the results imply that dissidents could have opted to regain control of those municipalities with profitable economies, that is gold or coca, to sustain themselves as an organization as well as to continue getting individual profits. Furthermore, the research suggests that in areas that had both FARC and other groups the ceasefire triggered the killings and that in areas with only FARC the implementation is what seems to be the point of increase in the murders possibly due to official demobilization and renunciation to all of their assets, which could have been the actual rupture between FARC and dissidents. Finally, the PDET seems to be a significant mechanism that could imply that the increasing visibility that these peripheral regions have acquired during the peace process have also increased the risks they face.

In terms of the implications of this paper, the government of Colombia continues to be incapable of controlling its entire territory. Likewise, the government has to be aware of possible reincidence by FARC members due to lack of commitment to the established

conditions of the agreement. Finally, the withdraw of the FARC should lead to the government's push for the development of the historically ignored peripheral regions.

The paper will be organized as follows: first I will provide the context of the conflict to connect the results to the roots of the conflict. Then, the literature review is meant to connect the trends seen in this post-conflict era with more historical approach trends studied previously regarding the political and economic model of the country. Following, the data, methodology, and results section will expose and explain the empirical method. Finally, the last section will provide some policy implications and suggestion to conclude.

2. CONTEXT

2.1 The Peace Agreement and the Social Leaders

When the peace negotiations began in 2012, the political discussion was polarized between those who supported the negotiations and those who did not. On one side, some groups believed that the peace agreement would decrease violence and improve economic growth, particularly in the rural areas. On the other, a large portion of the population considered that the treaty would leave serious gaps in terms of justice. In this context, the questions around the potential effects that the peace deal has had on matters of justice, democracy, security, and development are particularly relevant to understand and evaluate the peace deal.

The main points of the final agreement deal with issues of land distribution, security, democracy, and justice. It seeks to recognize and compensate the victims of the war, particularly those living in the peripheral zones who have been systematically targeted by it (LeGrand, Isschot & Riaño-Alcalá, 2017). It also attempts to redistribute around three million hectares of land to the victims in rural regions and impulse the economic development of these areas along with promoting the substitution of illegal crops (Gill, 2017). Furthermore, one of the key and most controversial compromises was the opening of the political arena to “different visions and interests of society,” including those of the FARC itself (“Colombia’s Agreement to End Conflict and Build Peace”).

The initiation of the peace negotiations in La Habana between the leftist guerrilla FARC and the Colombian state began in 2012 under the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos.

In 2014 the Colombian government and the FARC agreed to a ceasefire, and in October of 2016 the government passed a referendum for the popular approval of the final agreement. Surprisingly, particularly to the international community, the “No” to the ratification of the peace treaty won, reflecting more than ever the polarization of the country. The opposition, led by the ex president and senator Alvaro Uribe Velez, encompassed the concerns of most middle- and upper-class urban dwellers, ranchers, and landlords. Meanwhile, students, peasants, victims’ rights advocates, women's organizations, unionists, indigenous peoples, Afro-Colombians, and LGBT activists advocated through protests and other public manifestations for the implementation of the accord (Gill, 2017).

According to the human rights NGO “Somos Defensores,” a social leader is defined as “any person who is dedicated to the defense, promotion, respect and protection of Human Rights in the national and international level, which also works for the effective elimination of human rights violations at the national and / or regional level.” Moreover, peasant leader Luis Carlos Suárez establishes that a social leader also has a sense of belonging for the territory and its people that makes him/her fight collectively for a common cause (Corredor, 2018). Then, the increasing number of social leaders being killed in the country poses one of the main challenges for the Colombian government because it not only reveals the lack of control over the territory but also the weakness of its democratic institutions. In this context, the leaders are likely to be targeted by regional elites as well as other armed organizations see potential threats to their economic and political agenda (Steele & Schubiger, 2018). The paramilitaries represent a great obstacle for the implementation of the peace agreement as they continue to intimidate FARC members, left-wing activists and community leaders, “displace rural populations, and resist land restitution efforts” (Maher & Thomson, 2018). But failing to recognize that FARC dissidents and public forces are also a threat for the implementation would provide a very simple picture of the real conflict. On their side, FARC dissidents continue to afflict the communities where the FARC were previously located. In Tumaco, for instance, dissidents are highly present and continue to kill, torture, abuse, and disappear the afro-colombian community (Human Rights Watch, 2018). Similarly, Colombians are growing wary of the army because the commander in chief ordered his troops to duplicate the number of criminals and rebels they capture or kill. However, when this same policy was implemented during Alvaro Uribe’s presidency led to the killing of

innocent peasants that the army passed or even dressed as guerrilla members to report higher numbers (Casey, 2019).

2.2 *The Civil War.*

By the beginning of the twentieth century the “institutional allocation of political power” between the Liberal and Conservative elites had allowed Colombia to transition from chaos to order (Mazucca, Sebastian L, and James A Robinson. 2009). This stability was disrupted when Liberal presidential candidate, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, was murdered. The assassination of Gaitan triggered the uprising of lower class and rural liberals, Gaitan’s main supporters, against the conservatives (Posnanski, 2005). This period between 1948 and 1958 known as “La Violencia” or “The Violence” came to an end when both the liberal and conservative elites signed the agreement known as the National Front to alternate the presidency between them (World Peace Foundation,2016; Posnanski, 2005). The coalition between these two parties led to a decrease in violence. However, it also “restricted democratic competition” of the popular classes which inevitably resulted in the creation of several guerrillas that advocated for the excluded classes(World Peace Foundation,2016). In this setting, during the 1960’s the most prominent guerrillas including the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (Colombia), and the M-19 were created (“*Radio Nacional*”). Like most of them, the FARC, were originally thought as a socialist organization that defended land reform, education, health, and peasant rights for those peripheral areas in the country (Franz, 2016). In response to the increasing support that the guerrilla movements were acquiring across the country, the government and other elites who saw their economic and political sovereignty at risk sponsored the creation of right wing “paramilitary and counter-revolutionary groups” in the 80s (Franz, 2016).

The dynamics of the Colombian conflict can be difficult to discern because of the constantly shifting agendas and actors involved. However, for the purposes of this research, there are three particular moments that can be reflected on today’s post-conflict period. First, the boom of the illegal drug trade and the later development of the energy and mining sector transformed the interests and incentives of both right-wing and left-wing subversive groups from a political and ideological base to a resource-oriented civil war. (Franz, 2016). On one side, the expansion of the drug business encouraged both the FARC and the paramilitary to

obtain control of those areas where coca could be grown (Posnanski, 2005). Furthermore, the peasants living in these areas were forced to either cultivate coca for armed groups and pay them taxes or forcibly leave their land (Posnanski, 2005; Peña-Huertas, R, Ruiz, LE, Parada, MM, Zuleta, S, Álvarez, 2017). On the other hand, the development of the mining industry, particularly during the boom of the price of gold in the twenty first century, opened once again a new set of resources these groups could loath from. Not only gold provided illegal armed groups, landowners, businessman, and government officials with the opportunity to extract more profits, but it also was spatially distributed in the same areas where coca was planted, which facilitated the appropriation of these new opportunities (Rettberg & Ortiz-Riomalo, 2016; Sankey, 2001).

Second, policies focused on the globalization of the country have generated more risks than benefits to the historically excluded classes. For instance, since the 90s the colombian government sought to open up the economy and reduce tariffs on imported food, which shifted rural communities from “agricultural production to one based on mineral and oil production for export, land speculation and narco trafficking” (Al Gedicks, 2003). Similarly, under Plan Colombia the US gave the country an aid’ package of US\$1.3 billion to spend on the reduction of violence through the militarization of the areas controlled by subversive groups, and the use of aerial spraying to eradicate drug-related crops (Franz, 2016). Not only this plan resulted in several health issues for the peasants, but also led to a ‘balloon effect’ that instead of decreasing the production of coca, only shifted it (Mejía and Restrepo 2008).

Lastly, the systematic killing of the Patriotic Union members demonstrates that the killing of social leaders is not a new phenomenon. The peace agreement of 2016 was not the first time the government and the FARC sought to end the war. Similar to today's agreement, in 1982 the then president of the republic, Belisario Betancur, agreed to both a bilateral ceasefire with the FARC and the opening of political spaces for those who demobilized (Reuters, 2018). As a result, the FARC members who demobilized created the Patriotic Union (UP), a new political party meant to defend land and peasant rights. The political participation of UP in the elections and the wide support they received made its leaders and followers the target of the so called “political cleansing”(Steele, A., & Schubiger, 2018). From 1984-2002, UP members were systematically targeted by paramilitaries, other groups

financed by drug lords, landowners, and even the military who saw their economic and political dominance over the territory at risk (Suárez-Jaramillo, 2018). Although this period left more than 4.000 UP leaders assassinated, the attacks were not recognized as a systematic trend up until recently which further stigmatized their convictions, legitimized violence against them, and further increased the violations they suffered (Osorio-Granados, 2018).

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

Over the last few years, modern theories of development have emphasized the role of institutions, elites, rents, and violence on cross-country and cross-regional differences in economic performance (Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson 2002). These theories have demonstrated that there are two key elements to achieve economic growth: stability and accumulation of capital. Stability, which puts special emphasis on the importance of less shrinking, is modeled by political institutions meant to create and enforce laws to ultimately prevent violence. Meanwhile, accumulation is associated with economic institutions that promote competition and investment through property rights and incentives (Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005) (North, 1991).

A particular branch of study has focused on the control of violence as a mechanism for stability and growth. Weingast (2017) studies Adam Smith's theories of political economy and in particular, Smith's theory of violence and natural states. Based on Smith's work, Weingast explains the dynamics of the control of violence, that is, the ability of powerful individuals to protect themselves and their interests from other equally powerful. These individuals or groups create a natural state that is stable because it restricts the access to "privileges, state services, and organizations... to create and support their rents" but not necessarily efficient because it limits competition and incentives. North, Wallis, Webb, & Weingast (2012) provide a general framework that can be applied to the role of violence and rents in the case of Colombia. However, there is also a significant amount of literature that discusses the relation between political economy and violence in the particular case of Colombia. Fergusson, Molina, Robinson, & Vargas (2017) provide a discussion of the spatial distribution of political and economic institutions in the country and how it reflects on the persistence of different economic outcomes across regions. This paper provides the basis to understand the historical processes through which institutions have developed and their

capacity to endure over time. The country presents “stable patterns of regional inequality” since the colony. Colonial elites concentrated in particular regions of the country where they established centers of government that restricted the access to politics of other individuals. This meant that the elites managed the creation and enforcement of laws however was more beneficial to them. Therefore, wherever there was a concentration of elites, poverty and violence were lower. These centers, also referred as the core, continued to maintain these power relations up until today, which explains why capital cities and urban centers in have had historically better economic outcomes than the rural or peripheral areas. By the same logic, the periphery of the country has had more extractive institutions in place that has influenced the tendencies of these areas to have higher poverty and violence, insecure property rights, less efficient judiciary systems, and less provision of public goods.

Robinson (2015) goes further into the discussion of extractive institutions. He proposes an explanation of the determinants of poverty and violence in Colombia based on the existence of extractive and inclusive institutions, which explain the spatial differences emphasized in North, et. al. (2012). Extractive institutions are defined as institutions that “rob people of the incentives and opportunities to invest in human and physical capita, save, and innovate.” The core has been able to control, manipulate, and justify the persistence of the core-periphery system through different mechanisms such as justifying the monopoly and expropriation of resources and land on the periphery’s inability to manage them; fragmenting and isolating the periphery so it cannot organize; using vote buying and clientelism in those outlying areas to maintain their power; and purposely getting involved in violent acts against the periphery to preserve their political and economic status quo. This last mechanism is particularly relevant to this discussion because of the role of the government in the continuation of violence in Colombia up until today. Robinson explains that these extractive and limited relationships have left the country with a weak and ineffective state that cannot control violence.

Fergusson’s (2017) analysis of the Colombian conflict and the role of the state in it provides a clear hypothesis as to why the Colombian government has been unable to monopolize violence in its territory. The author’s main thesis is that the country’s government has been unable to establish a consensually strong state that both has the capacity to provide public goods across all regions and is controlled and checked by all of its people.

According to Ferguson, the country has fallen into a “Public Goods Trap” that has prolonged internal conflict. The system behind the trap is the following: whenever public goods are not provided in society individuals will find a way to satisfy them privately. This will lead them to demand less of the public good from the government not because they do not need it but because it is being satisfied privately. The government at the same time will decrease its provision even more because the demand for them has lowered. In the case of Colombia and the supply of security, one of the most important public goods, paramilitary forces and guerrillas were able to emerge in peripheral areas where there was low resistance and large returns to fighting. People of the periphery either found a way to satisfy their needs through the creation of rebel groups or was subdued to them, therefore, in theory decreasing the demand for security. Although these rebel groups are not part of the historical elites, their ability to use their military strength to get the support of the periphery, either voluntarily or involuntarily, can be beneficial for the state itself. Politicians are able to get rents from the disorder because these rebel organizations can and have helped them influence elections, mostly through vote buying, clientelism, and coercion, hence remain in power. Consequently, not giving the state an incentive to monopolize violence and alter its status quo.

The body of research available in economics on the issue of violence against social leaders is limited. However, over the past few months it has gained significant attention in Colombia. A recent paper by Prem, Rivera, Romero, & Vargas (2018) studies the consequences that the Colombian peace agreement has had on the murder of social leaders. The authors propose that the peace agreement between the FARC and the government has had some negative consequences. Consistent with North, et. al. (2012), this paper finds that the murder of social leaders is concentrated in rural areas where there is a weak presence of the state. The main failure of the peace process, they argue, was that the state was not able to consolidate its presence where the FARC used to dominate. The social leaders that live in areas where there are other insurgent and criminal groups besides the FARC are more at risk because they are able to “replace” the FARC’s authority in that particular region. This paper concludes that the killing of social leader after the peace agreement is driven by the zone’s exposition to other organizations capable of using violence. Prem & et. al (2018) research is effective in providing a more general understanding of the situation of social leaders in Colombia. Furthermore, it opens a new area for research particularly oriented to understand

what makes the land valuable for all the actors of the conflict. In Colombia, oil, minerals, and biodiversity have been found to be correlated to violence and conflict (Lavaux, 2006). Lavaux (2006) finds that a significant reason behind this correlation is that insurgent groups have used the exploitation of resources as a source of wealth. The control of resources has allowed them to finance their organizations through this channel, but more importantly, it has ultimately resulted in an increasing amount of power and control over the peripheral regions. Similarly, a research about land, natural resources and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa concluded that extractive resources, which in this case include minerals and hydrocarbons such as diamonds, gold, coal, and oil, increase the probability of observing violence and conflict (Maggioni & Balestri 2016).

The literature of the Colombian war has been largely focused on the effect that resource availability has had on creating and aggravating conflict. Rettberg & Ortiz-Riomalo (2016) propose the existence of resource portfolios, defined as “the parallel participation and exchangeability of resources in the provision of funding for illegal organizations.” They argue that Colombia’s armed groups have acquired an ability to diversify their criminal activities creating to further expand their profits. In particular, the portfolio of gold mining and coca production has been one of the most used by armed groups thanks to the spatial location of both mines and viable soil and to the increased profitability of gold (Rettberg & Ortiz-Riomalo, 2016; Idrobo, Mejía, & Tribin, 2014). Illegal activities related to gold mining and coca production has created extremely extractive economies in those peripheral territories that have resulted in increased violence. However, the Colombian government’s inability to deal with the heterogeneous and dynamic characteristics of marginalized regions has further pushed the migration of armed groups or even regular individuals to the direct or indirect exploitation of extractive resources. Furthermore, land degradation and pollution of natural ecosystems resulting from activities such as aerial spraying or mercury handling pose social, economic and health threats to the communities living there (Rincón-Ruiz, Correa, León, & Williams, 2016; Betancur-Corredor, Loaiza-Usuga, Denich & Borgemeister, 2018). Under these circumstances, several authors contend that the government must tackle these issues locally, addressing issues related but not restricted to: social investment, social welfare, structural laws, market incentives, citizens’ democratic participation, effective regulatory frameworks, safety regulation, and environmental protection (Davalos, 2016; Rincón-Ruiz,

Pascual & Flantua, 2013; Rincón-Ruiz, Correa, León, & Williams, 2016; Betancur-Corredor, Loaiza-Usuga, Denich & Borgemeister, 2018).

This section has focused on understanding and contextualizing the economic, political, and social relationships that have influenced Colombia's history of war and violence. However, the signature of the peace agreement gave the country the opportunity to ask "does peace stand a chance in Colombia?" (Gill, 2017). The research on this field is increasing as the effects of the peace agreement become more visible. One factor that continues to put at risk the peace are paramilitary groups that not only continue to displace rural populations and resist land restitution efforts, but also are actively targeting and threatening FARC members, left-wing activists and community leaders, which could even "provoke the FARC into taking retaliatory measures" (Maher & Thomson, 2018). For Colombia to achieve peace, several scholars agree, the government must commit to the promotion of popular empowerment, social justice, and protection of vulnerable groups such as local leaders, human rights defenders and trade unionists. (Gill, 2017; Betancur-Corredor, Loaiza-Usuga, Denich & Borgem).

4. DATA

The data on the social leaders assassinated from 2011 to 2018 was retrieved from the annual reports provided by the NGO Somos Defensores. This organization created the System of Information of Aggressions to Advocates of Human Rights (SIADDH) in which it registers and investigates the cases of violence and threats against social leaders in the country (Somos Defensores). Each annual report includes the name, municipality, presumed perpetrator, and type of organization of the leaders. The database contains a total of 653 cases registered between January of 2011 and December of 2018. For the purpose of this research, the individual information is aggregated at the municipal level per year. The data shows that around 24% of municipalities have had at least one social leader murdered. Figure 1 shows the evolution of the total number of killings per year both nationally and segregated by the presence or exposure to FARC and other armed groups. The trend seems to have increased dramatically after the ceasefire in regions occupied both by the FARC and other groups, which support the thesis that the FARC left a power vacuum that other groups are taking

advantage of to gain territorial control. Additionally, Table 1 shows that the average rate of killings per municipality per year is 0.26 per 100,000 inhabitants.

Professor Juan Vargas, one of the authors of “Killing Social Leaders for Territorial Control, provided the data on the attacks, clashes, casualties, victims, and group responsible per municipality from 1996 to 2014 used to categorize municipalities by the presence or exposure to armed groups. This database of the Armed Conflict in Colombia was constructed by the Conflict Analysis Resource Centre (CERAC) (Prem et al. 2018). Following the methodology used by Vargas in the mentioned paper, I create a dummy variable called FARC that is equal to 1 if there was at least one violent event sponsored by the FARC between 2011 and 2014. Similarly, I continue to follow Prem et al. (2018) methodology to construct the measures of exposure to other groups, which takes into account not only the presence of other armed groups in a municipality but also the exposure of neighboring municipalities to these groups. Summarized, the calculation of the exposure was constructed by “creating a vector of (distance-penalized) neighboring municipalities that... varies between 0 and 1 and accounts for the differential exposure of other armed groups given the neighborhood of a specific municipality” (Prem et al. 2018). This matrix of exposure was available online as part of the data used in Acemoglu et al. (2015). To finalize the creation of exposure to other armed groups, I interact a dummy variable of presence of other groups in a municipality with the matrix. In the country, 11.4% of municipalities had FARC presence, 46.4% are exposed to other armed groups, and 9.4% have both FARC presence and are exposed to other groups.¹

The data on the municipalities that produce gold was obtained from the Colombian System of Mining Information (SIMCO), which collects the data directly from the National Agency of Mining (ANM), the specialized mining authority in the country. Illegal groups have historically extracted profits from gold through indirect and direct channels. Indirect methods include extortion and sabotage of legal mines, illegal taxing on revenues, intimidation, participation on legal operations, corrupt use of royalties, and collaboration with local authorities to launder money. More direct ways of participation in gold extraction have been related to running gold extraction and transformation operations. However, the later is less prevailing among illegal groups because of the costs, time, and level of expertise required to perform it, thus, making them choose the “most cost-effective way to obtain

¹ Refer to Table 1: Summary Statistics

income from a resource, which is to syphon off the work of others” (Rettberg & Ortiz-Riomalo, 2016, 90). Since little information is available on the municipalities that have illegal gold mines managed by armed groups, using the data obtained from the SIMCO offers a good approximation of the municipalities of interest for these groups, “assuming all operations are vulnerable to looting by illegal armed actors” (Rettberg & Ortiz-Riomalo, 2016, 93).

The data on coca producing municipalities was retrieved from The Colombian Observatory of Drugs (ODC), the official source of information on drugs in the country. The final database contained one dummy variable for gold if it was a gold-producing municipality, one dummy variable for coca if it was a coca-producing municipality, and finally one dummy variable for both if municipality *i* produced both. According to Table 1, approximately 27.5% of municipalities produce gold, 28% produce coca, 13.8 % produce both, and 58.3% produce none. Figure 2A shows the spatial distribution of killings of social leaders, which can be compared to Figure 2B which displays the spatial distribution of gold and coca. These figures display a possible spatial relationship between the killing and the availability of resources. To put in perspective, about 65.7% of the total number of murders occurred within this 41.7% of the national territory.

The data on the 170 municipalities that are part of the PDET come from the Agency For the Renovation of the Territory and was published by the portal Datos Abiertos, the government’s open data portal that gathers data from different public entities. Finally, I used the population per municipality in 2010 from the Municipal panel of the Center of Economic Development Studies (CEDE) to create the measure of rate of killings.

5. METHODOLOGY

The methodology of this paper was largely based upon the statistical methods Prem, et al. (2018) used on their research, more specifically using their equations 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4. The main purpose of this paper was precisely to replicate, understand, and extend the results obtained in their paper in order to provide a different understanding of the data and the outcomes as well as to expose new insights about post-conflict dynamics.

Specification 1² consist on a triple differences model used to estimate the differential effect that the exposure to other armed groups has on the killing of social leaders after the ceasefire in municipalities where FARC were also present. This equation not only allows the understanding of the dynamics in municipalities with both groups, but also permits to compare and contrast them with municipalities that are either only exposed to other armed groups or FARC. I control for municipal and time effects but not include the control for municipal trends based on a large set of pre-treatment characteristic used by Prem, et al. (2018, 12).

(1)

$$Y_{mt} = \delta_m + \beta_1 * CEASE_t \times OTHERS_m \times FARC_m + \beta_2 * CEASE_t \times FARC_m + \beta_3 * CEASE_t \times OTHERS_m + \mu_{mt}$$

In specification 1 shown above, m refers to municipality and t to time. Y_{mt} is a dependent variable for two measures of the social leaders killed in municipality m and year t . The first measure for the killings is the rate of social leaders killed obtained by dividing the total number of assassinations over population per 100,000 in m during t . The second is a dummy variable that equals 1 if there was at least 1 social leader killed in municipality m during the year t . $CEASE_t$ is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the year of the murder was after 2014. $OTHERS_m$ refers to the level of a municipality's exposure to other armed groups, which is a number between 0 and 1.3, 0 being the least exposed. $FARC_m$ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if m had the presence of FARC prior to the ceasefire. δ_m are municipal fixed effects and μ_{mt} is the error term. To check for other possible trends within certain groups of municipalities, I test this equation only within the group of municipalities that produce only gold, only coca, both gold and coca, gold or coca, and none to check for other possible trends that could be related to the production of economically significant resources for subversive groups.

In order to further test for any relationships between the production of coca or gold and the behavior of armed groups, I use specification 2³ to test for potential mechanisms. In this case, the additional interaction variable Z_m is in a first moment a dummy variable equal

² Equation 4.1 in Prem et al. (2018)

³ Equation 4.3 in Prem et al. 2008

to 1 if the municipality produces gold or coca. In a later step of the research, Z takes the value of 1 if the municipality is part of the PDTE. The results of this tests can provide an insight to possible relationships and mechanisms such as resource availability in the land and increased visibility of leaders; however, they are not necessarily causal (Prem, et al. 2018, 14).

(2)

$$Y_{mt} = \delta_m + \beta_1 * CEASE_t \times OTHERS_m \times FARC_m \times Z_m + \beta_2 * CEASE_t \times FARC_m \times Z_m + \beta_3 * CEASE_t \times OTHERS_m \times Z_m + \beta_4 * CEASE_t \times Z_m + \beta_5 * CEASE_t \times OTHERS_m \times FARC_m + \beta_6 * CEASE_t \times FARC_m + \beta_7 * CEASE_t \times OTHERS_m + \mu_{mt}$$

Finally, continuing with the methodology of Prem et al. I study if the beginning of the implementation of the peace agreement in 2017 resulted in a potential differential effect on the increasing number of deaths. Significant differences between using the ceasefire or the implementation would possibly indicate that after the final agreement was signed it became easier for armed groups to take control of areas previously occupied by the FARC because they began to leave the territory, and not exactly when the FARC stopped all violent activities by the end of 2014. Furthermore, this methodology can also provide some differential dynamics in areas only occupied by the FARC or only exposed to other armed groups. To study possible trends relating to the timing of the agreements between the FARC and the government I use specification 3⁴.

(3)

$$Y_{mt} = \delta_m + \beta_1 * CEASE_t \times OTHERS_m \times FARC_m + \beta_2 * CEASE_t \times FARC_m + \beta_3 * CEASE_t \times OTHERS_m + \beta_4 * IMPLEMENTATION_t \times FARC_m \times OTHERS_m + \beta_5 * IMPLEMENTATION_t \times FARC_m + \beta_6 * IMPLEMENTATION_t \times OTHERS_m + \mu_{mt}$$

In equation 3, $IMPLEMENTATION_m$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the murder of a social leader occurred after 2016, that is, if it happened in 2017 or 2018. In this case, a difference between β_1 and β_4 would indicate that the killing of social leaders increased in areas exposed to other armed groups and where the FARC were present after the ceasefire or the implementation, depending on which period is significant. In the same manner, one can

⁴ Equation 4.4 in Prem, et al. (2018)

make these comparisons in areas only occupied by the FARC or only exposed to other groups after both periods.

6. RESULTS

As mentioned above, the initial piece of this research consisted on replicating the main results obtained by Prem, et al. (2018) but including additional data of the social leaders murdered in 2018. The coefficient of interest in their research was β_1 of equation 1, which presented the “differential change in the killing of social leaders after the ceasefire in municipalities with FARC presence and that are exposed to the influence of other armed groups⁵”. Parallel to their research, I interpret the outcomes in terms of standard deviations in order to provide an estimate of the influence of exposure to other subversive groups on the rate of social leaders killed after the ceasefire. At the national level, Table 2 column *Rate* reports that after 2014 in municipalities that had FARC presence and are exposed to other illegal armed groups, a “one standard deviation increase in the in the average municipal exposure to other armed groups” resulted in an estimated 0.155 increase in the rate of leaders murdered per 100,000⁶ (Prem, et al.2018). Compared to Prem, et al. (2018), my coefficient is higher (0.155 versus 0.11 rate) and only significant at the 10% level, not 5%⁷. Although both estimates are within one standard deviation of the other, this increase can be attributed to the larger number of leaders assassinated in 2018 compared to any other year. Similarly, the results presented in Table 2 column *Any*, in which the dependent variable is a dummy indicating if any death occurred in that municipality on a particular year, shows with a 5% significance that a one standard deviation increase in the average municipal exposure leads to a 2.2%⁸ increase in the probability of a social leader being killed after the ceasefire in municipalities with both FARC presence prior 2014 and exposed to other groups.

The results of the main interaction terms were equivalent to those found on Prem, et al. however, there are significant differences in relation to the social leaders killed in areas previously occupied by the FARC but not exposed to other groups. After 2014, a one standard deviation increase in the in the average municipal presence of FARC resulted in a

⁵ Prem, et al. (2018), Page 12

⁶ Standard Deviation of exposure=0.364 & $\beta_1=0.426$ hence, $0.364*0.426=0.155$ per 100,000.

⁷ Prem, et al. (2018), Page 34, Table 4, Column 1

⁸ $0.0617*0.364=0.02245$. Also compared to Prem, et al. (2018) Page 34, Table 4. The rate was 1.7 with 10%

statistically significant 0.084 increase in the rate of leaders murdered per 100,000⁹. Likewise, a one standard deviation increase in the in the average municipal presence of FARC translated into a 1.8% increase in the probability of a social leader being killed after the ceasefire in municipalities with only FARC presence. Moreover, the coefficients in municipalities that are only exposed to other groups are not significant, hence, imply no differential change in the murder of leaders in those regions. On one side, the former outcomes could be partially related to the attempt of FARC dissidents to establish themselves as a legitimate force after the heads of the organization agreed to a ceasefire. In this sense, dissidents could be killing more social leaders because: many of these leaders are former FARC members advocating for the implementation of the peace agreement and violence allows dissidents to maintain their power and authority over the territory. Furthermore, public armed forces, also present in these regions, have been involved on the illegal exertion of violence to protect powerful individuals or companies which could arguably be a plausible explanation as well. On the other side, it makes sense that municipalities that are only exposed to other groups have no significant differential change because the ceasefire as well as the peace treaty is a consensus directly with the FARC, therefore, it likely affected regions where the FARC was active.

In order to take this research further, I studied if the results obtained at the national level continued to be valid within the set of municipalities that produce only coca, only gold, or only both or if instead they presented different patterns. According to Table 2, in none of these cases the interaction between exposure to other armed groups, presence of FARC, the ceasefire, and the resource is statistically significant. This could imply that other armed groups are seeking control of municipalities across the boundaries of those particular economic portfolios because their main goal is to gain territorial control over the areas left by the FARC after the ceasefire and not to merely to increase their profits by taking control of areas with more resources, hence, is not necessarily guided by the availability of gold and coca. Nonetheless, it is interesting to see that in municipalities where the FARC were present but not exposed to other armed groups a one standard deviation increase in the in the average municipal presence of FARC resulted in a 3.1%, 3%, 2.9% increase in the probability of a

⁹ (0.318*0.264)

social leader being killed in areas that only produce coca, only coca and gold, and only gold, respectively.

Since there does not seem to be a significant difference among these three groups, I used Equation 2¹⁰ to estimate if there was a differential effect between a municipality having any of these two resources at all compared to having none. As expected, a one standard deviation increase in the average presence of FARC in areas that produced gold, coca, or both was followed by a 2.5% increase in the probability of having a social leader murdered after the ceasefire. In contrast, the municipalities that had none of these resources at all an increase of one standard deviation in the mean presence of FARC resulted in a statistically significant decrease of 3.7% in the probability of having a social leader killed after the ceasefire¹¹. Put into context, the results suggest that although dissidents or even public forces sought to acquire or preserve territorial control over the areas left by the FARC not necessarily guiding their interest towards one particular resource, they are willing to put more effort in reacquiring municipalities that provide some type of economic profit. More specifically, the FARC had already established efficient illegal economies that allowed the group to extract profits from the territories it controlled. Once the commanders of the FARC decided to demobilized, it is likely that dissidents would try to regain control of those profitable economies to sustain themselves as an organization as well as to continue getting individual profits. There was less competition where only the FARC was present and the opportunity cost of losing the control over those economies was too high,¹² hence, supporting the argument that many of the dissidents decided not to sign the peace agreement in the first place because they did not want to lose the economic power they had.

Timing. Prem et al. (2018) uses equation 3¹³ to study if there are any differential effects in the killing of leaders after the formal implementation of the peace agreement compared to the ceasefire. The results obtained in Table 4 indicate that the killing of social leaders in areas occupied by the FARC and exposed to other armed groups only increased

¹⁰ Equation 4.4 in Prem, et al. (2018)

¹¹ Table 3

¹² “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) agreed under a 2016 peace deal with the government to hand over all funds and property to pay reparations to victims” (Reuters, 2017)

¹³ Equation 4.3 in Prem, et al. (2018)

differentially after the ceasefire, and is not significant after 2016¹⁴, which confirms that FARC's disarmament, even before the guerrilla's mobilization out of these regions, was enough to provide other groups an opportunity to take control.

The dynamics in municipalities where only the FARC or only other groups are present seem to vary and could bring to light some potential patterns or hypothesis. In terms of the regions that only had FARC presence, the ceasefire is no longer significant but the implementation is. One could continue to argue that the increasing violence towards social leaders is at least in part incited by dissident groups. Yet, it was after the approval the final agreement in 2016 when the FARC began to formally demobilize and cede all of their assets, valued at around three hundred million dollars (Symmes Cobb, 2017). Under these conditions, it would be conceivable that the actual rupture within the FARC and the dissidents' quest for control intensified after 2016. In terms of the resources, the increase in the rate and the probability of the assassination of a social leader after the implementation is significant only in municipalities that have gold or coca, and not among the ones that don't have either. This results further support that most dissidents sought to stay and take control over the areas that had some type of resource they could obtain economic profits from.

The outcomes relating to the murder of leaders in municipalities that were only exposed to other groups are more complex to analyze. First, the differential effects on the killings in these areas is negative and significant after the ceasefire. Following Prem et al. reasoning, this could be explained by the desire of other armed groups to take total control over the areas they disputed with the FARC, thus driving their efforts towards those municipalities and away from the ones that were not disrupted by the ceasefire. However, in this same group of municipalities there was a significant increase in both the rate and the probability of the murders after 2016 when the implementation began. Since the goal of the ceasefire was to immediately stop the FARC's violent and criminal activities, it makes sense that it particularly affected the areas exposed to other groups too because they saw a window of opportunity to take control. Meanwhile, the final peace agreement signed in 2016 attempted to reach all the areas affected by the war and provided communities an opportunity to gain property rights, stop extractive activities such as mining, substitute illegal crops,

¹⁴ One SD increase in the exposure resulted in a 0.19 increase in the rate per 100,000 people of leaders killed after 2014

denounce their aggressors, among others. Therefore, they could have redirected their efforts, at least partially, to the municipalities they already controlled to silence the voices of those communities seeking territorial justice.

PDET. In order to continue studying potential mechanisms that might be influencing the deaths of the leaders, I propose that the increasing visibility that these peripheral regions have acquired during the peace process have also increased the risks they face.¹⁵ The Territorially Focused Development Programmes (PDET in Spanish) in particular is a program part of the peace agreement created to provide the 170 municipalities most affected by the conflict communal and democratic spaces in which they could communicate with the government what their main needs and concerns were. I use equation 2 where Z is a dummy that equals 1 if the municipality is part of the PDET to analyze if there are any differential effects in municipalities that have this program. The results, positive and significant, show that a one standard deviation increase in the exposure to other groups in municipalities where the FARC was present and where the PDET were implemented translated in an increase of 0.43 in the rate of social leaders assassinated after the ceasefire.¹⁶ The outcomes cannot prove a causal relationship between the increasing trends of violence that the leaders face and the implementation of the PDET because the fact that these territories are classified as the most affected puts them in the middle of a myriad of policies that interact with each other differently. The PDET opened up a space for the leaders to talk about the main concerns their territory has and formulate possible solutions with the government. The problem is that to be able to implement a program that gives so much visibility to social leaders, the government should have anticipated that they would need protection from the armed groups disputing the land. The aforementioned results could also imply that the areas most affected by the conflict, which should be the most benefited by the peace agreement, continue to face trends of increasing violence and lack of access to democracy largely due to Colombia's historical inability to control and provide security to the peripheral regions.

8. POLICY IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSION

¹⁵ Prem, et al. (2018) studies "the demand for land restitution, the (lack of) state capacity and the economic attractiveness of the municipality."

¹⁶ Table 5

For decades, scholars have studied the Colombian conflict and provided certain suggestions as to how to end the war. The peace agreement of 2016 was historical day for the country because for the first time in more than 50 years the FARC decided to give up its weapons. The Kroc Institute for Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame affirmed that it was the most comprehensive and complete peace agreement in the world and it is even thought as the biggest conversation in the world (Avila, 2016). In this sense, the Colombian peace agreement seemed to be the best peace agreement the country could have possibly written, so what went wrong?

There is clearly not an exact answer to this question. However, there seems to be general consensus on three particular issues the country should focus on. First, the state's inability to control its entire territory has left the FARC's rendition obsolete. Instead, it has facilitated the occupation of these territories by paramilitary members and dissidencies of the FARC. Second, the government must guarantee the protection of the peripheries and of the social leaders representing them (Guarin, Tovar, & Amaya, 2018). As long as these leaders, among them former FARC members, continue to be killed because the state is not recognizing the systematicity of the attacks, Colombia will not achieve the goals of economic and democratic development proposed in the peace deal because they will not have a safe space to advocate for their regions. Thirdly, there is a problem of commitment with the Colombian state due to the lack of stability in terms of the institutions defending the deal which are putting FARC members alert. These issues of commitment and stability of the accords are also present in the Colombian agreement especially because the election of Ivan Duque in 2018, who had been an opponent of the dialogues ever since they started, created an environment of uncertainty for all the parties involved. In fact, there have been consistent efforts from the congress and the senate, dominated by Duque's political party, to obstruct the implementation of the arrangement

Like most of Latin America, the history of Colombia has been one of constant struggle over political, economic, and territorial dominance in which small but powerful groups of individuals have maintained jurisdiction over most of the land and its resources. For over 50 years Colombia has been in the middle of a civil conflict in which guerrillas, paramilitary groups, criminal bands, and public forces have fought over the territory's political and economic power. In this paper, I provided plausible hypothesis that could help

explain the increasing in violence against social leaders in the country. Through the use of a variation of a difference-in-difference method, this paper presents that municipalities previously occupied by the FARC are in potential risks potentially due to 1) other armed groups' efforts to take over their territory 2) FARC dissidents efforts to maintain control over the areas the FARC occupied that have valuable resources 3)the increased visibility along with the government's inability to provide security to the leaders.

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10. FIGURES & TABLES

Figure 1. Total Number of Killings of Social Leaders per Year





Figure 2A, Spatial Distribution of Killings



Note: This map shows the spatial distribution of social leaders killed from 2011 to 2018.

Figure 2B. Spatial Distribution of Gold & Coca Production




Table 1. Summary Statistics

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
FARC present	0.114	0.318	0	1
Only FARC present	0.019	0.138	0	1
Exposure to other subversive groups	0.164	0.364	0	1.319
Dummy for exposure to other subversive groups	0.464	0.499	0	1
Only other groups present	0.370	0.483	0	1
Both FARC and other groups present	0.094	0.293	0	1
Municipalities affected by coca crops	0.279	0.448	0	1
Municipalities affected by gold mining	0.275	0.446	0	1
Municipalities affected by both gold & coca	0.138	0.345	0	1
Rate of Social Leaders murdered per municipality per year	0.260	1.707	0	1
Dummy Social Leaders murdered per municipality per year	0.044	0.205	0	1
Number of Leaders Murdered per municipality per year	0.060	0.327	0	1

Table 2. Killing of social leaders after ceasefire of 2014, FARC presence, and exposure to other armed groups

	National Level		Only Coca		Only Gold		Only Both		Only None	
	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Any</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Any</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Any</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Any</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Any</i>
Cease*FARC*Others	0.426*	0.0617**	-0.139	0.0554	-1.053	-0.0254	0.743	0.00369	0.255	-0.00531
	(0.231)	(0.0272)	(0.532)	(0.0664)	(0.982)	(0.122)	(0.702)	(0.0738)	(0.381)	(0.0487)
Cease*FARC	0.264**	0.0570****	0.937***	0.0996**	0.550	0.0837*	-0.0523	0.0944*	-0.118	-0.00900
	(0.132)	(0.0155)	(0.316)	(0.0395)	(0.358)	(0.0445)	(0.468)	(0.0492)	(0.136)	(0.0174)
Cease*Others	-0.0805	-0.00298	0.153	0.0273	0.0500	-0.0519	-0.194	-0.0120	-0.141	0.0114
	(0.102)	(0.0120)	(0.313)	(0.0391)	(0.277)	(0.0345)	(0.327)	(0.0344)	(0.0994)	(0.0127)
Constant	0.242****	0.0396****	0.329****	0.0575****	0.283****	0.0538****	0.697****	0.105****	0.104****	0.0164****
	(0.0191)	(0.00225)	(0.0653)	(0.00816)	(0.0555)	(0.00690)	(0.0987)	(0.0104)	(0.0146)	(0.00186)
N	8720	8720	1232	1232	1192	1192	1208	1208	5088	5088
Groups	1090	1090	154	154	149	149	151	151	636	636

This table shows the results from Specification 1, taken from Prem, et al. (2018) equation 4.1. The results at the national level (first two columns) can be compared to Table 1 in Prem, et al. (2018) columns (1) and (5). The groups of Only Coca, Only Gold, Only Both, & Only None also regress Specification 1 using exclusively the municipalities that have that respective characteristic. The first column within each group presents the rate of social leaders killed per 100,000 population as their dependent variable. Meanwhile, the second presents the results using a dummy variable that equals 1 for any killing in the municipality. Standard errors are in parentheses: * represents a 0.1 significance level (SI), ** a 0.05 (SI), *** a 0.01 (SI), and **** a 0.001 (SI).

Table 3. Killing of social leaders including Z= presence of particular economic activity

	Any resource		No resource	
	Rate	Any	Rate	Any
Cease*FARC*Others*Z	0.165 (0.686)	0.0730 (0.0807)	0.105 (0.685)	-0.0371 (0.0806)
Cease*FARC*Z	0.417 (0.285)	0.0816** (0.0335)	-0.677** (0.282)	-0.116**** (0.0331)
Cease*Others*Z	-0.0800 (0.221)	-0.0448* (0.0259)	-0.190 (0.216)	0.00886 (0.0254)
Cease*Z	0.176*** (0.0674)	0.0209*** (0.00793)	0.0838* (0.0485)	0.0135** (0.00570)
Cease*FARC*Others	0.255 (0.629)	-0.00531 (0.0739)	0.241 (0.267)	0.0465 (0.0314)
Cease*FARC	-0.118 (0.224)	-0.00900 (0.0264)	0.474*** (0.163)	0.0935**** (0.0192)
Cease*Others	-0.141 (0.164)	0.0114 (0.0193)	-0.0421 (0.131)	-0.0122 (0.0154)
Constant	0.219**** (0.0210)	0.0369**** (0.00247)	0.221**** (0.0227)	0.0362**** (0.00267)
N	8720	8720	8720	8720
Groups	1090	1090	1090	1090

This table shows the results from Specification 2, taken from Prem, et al. (2018) equation 4.4. The groups regress Specification 2 using Z equals a dummy variable of the presence of that respective characteristic. The first column within each group presents the rate of social leaders killed per 100,000 population as their dependent variable. Meanwhile, the second presents the results using a dummy variable that equals 1 for any killing in the municipality. Standard errors are in parentheses: * represents a 10% significance level, ** a 5% significance level, *** a 1% significance level, and **** a 0.1% significance level.

Table 4. Killing of social leaders with Implementation in 2016 and Ceasefire

	National Level		Resources		No Resources	
	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Any</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Any</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Any</i>
2016*FARC*Others	-0.216 -0.326	0.0421 -0.0384	-0.825 -0.515	-0.0224 -0.059	-0.173 -0.539	0.000492 -0.0689
2016*FARC	0.873**** -0.186	0.0755**** -0.0219	1.364**** -0.315	0.126**** -0.0361	-0.0212 -0.192	-0.0162 -0.0246
2016*Others	0.438*** -0.144	0.0507*** -0.017	0.688*** -0.253	0.0831*** -0.0289	0.0455 -0.141	-0.0000803 -0.018
Cease*FARC*Others	0.534* -0.283	0.0406 -0.0332	0.654 -0.446	0.0577 -0.0511	0.341 -0.467	-0.00555 -0.0597
Cease*FARC	-0.173 -0.161	0.0193 -0.0189	-0.208 -0.273	0.0303 -0.0313	-0.108 -0.166	-0.000906 -0.0213
Cease*Others	-0.300** -0.125	-0.0283* -0.0147	-0.386* -0.219	-0.0537** -0.0251	-0.163 -0.122	0.0115 -0.0156
Constant	0.242**** -0.0191	0.0396**** -0.00224	0.436**** -0.0427	0.0721**** -0.00489	0.104**** -0.0146	0.0164**** -0.00186
N	8720	8720	3632	3632	5088	5088
Groups	1090	1090	454	454	636	636

The results at the national level (first two columns) can be compared to Table 6 in Prem, et al. (2018) . The groups of Resources & No Resources also regress Specification 3 using exclusively the municipalities that have that respective characteristic. The first column within each group presents the rate of social leaders killed per 100,000 population as their dependent variable. Meanwhile, the second presents the results using a dummy variable that equals 1 for any killing in the municipality. Standard errors are in parentheses: * represents a 0.1 significance level (SI), ** a 0.05 (SI), *** a 0.01 (SI), and **** a 0.001 (SI).

Table 5. Killing of social leaders interacted with PDET

	National Level		Resources		No Resources	
	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Any</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Any</i>	<i>Rate</i>	<i>Any</i>
Cease*FARC*Others*Z	1.180** (0.531)	0.0110 (0.0624)	1.050 (0.882)	-0.0953 (0.101)	16.36** (7.889)	0.309 (1.009)
Cease*FARC*Z	-0.475 (0.308)	0.00169 (0.0362)	-0.367 (0.554)	0.0281 (0.0635)	-1.893**** (0.420)	-0.157*** (0.0537)
Cease*Others*Z	-0.519* (0.275)	-0.0426 (0.0323)	-0.694 (0.444)	-0.0203 (0.0509)	-0.402 (0.446)	-0.134** (0.0570)
Cease*Z	0.441*** (0.155)	0.0500*** (0.0183)	0.572** (0.259)	0.0600** (0.0297)	0.171 (0.166)	0.0312 (0.0213)
Cease*FARC*Others	-0.0825 (0.394)	0.0779* (0.0464)	-0.126 (0.708)	0.147* (0.0812)	-0.130 (0.390)	-0.0453 (0.0499)
Cease*FARC	0.285 (0.199)	0.0281 (0.0234)	0.331 (0.410)	0.0316 (0.0470)	0.251 (0.161)	0.0271 (0.0206)
Cease*Others	-0.0581 (0.121)	-0.00501 (0.0142)	0.0132 (0.236)	-0.0285 (0.0271)	-0.127 (0.102)	0.0178 (0.0131)
Constant	0.231**** (0.0195)	0.0384**** (0.00229)	0.413**** (0.0442)	0.0697**** (0.00506)	0.101**** (0.0147)	0.0160**** (0.00188)
N	8720	8720	3632	3632	5088	5088
Groups	1090	1090	454	454	636	636

The results at the national level (first two columns) can be compared to Table 6 in Prem, et al. (2018) . The groups of Resources & No Resources also regress Specification 3 using exclusively the municipalities that have that respective characteristic. The first column within each group presents the rate of social leaders killed per 100,000 population as their dependent variable. Meanwhile, the second presents the results using a dummy variable that equals 1 for any killing in the municipality. Standard errors are in parentheses: * represents a 0.1 significance level (SI), ** a 0.05 (SI), *** a 0.01 (SI), and **** a 0.001 (SI).