Debt Crises and Risk Sharing: The Role of Markets versus Sovereigns

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Abstract
Using a variance decomposition of shocks to GDP, we quantify the role of international factor income, international transfers, and saving in achieving risk sharing during the recent European crisis. We focus on the sub-periods 1990–2007, 2008–2009, and 2010 and consider separately the European countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. We decompose risk sharing from saving into contributions from government and private saving and show that fiscal austerity programs played an important role in hindering risk sharing during the sovereign debt crisis.

Keywords: Income insurance; capital markets; international financial integration

JEL classification: E2; E6; F15
1 Introduction

“The weather soon turned cold. All the food lying in the field was covered with a thick white blanket of snow that even the grasshopper could not dig through. Soon the grasshopper found itself dying of hunger. He staggered to the ants’ hill and saw them handing out corn from the stores they had collected in the summer. He begged them for something to eat. What! cried the ants in surprise, haven’t you stored anything away for the winter? What in the world were you doing all last summer? I didn’t have time to store any food, complained the grasshopper; I was so busy playing music that before I knew it the summer was gone.” Aesop.

Economic agents often rely on pro-cyclical saving to smooth consumption. As Aesop’s fable suggests, lack of saving in good times may hamper consumption smoothing in bad times. This article attempts to quantify if, and how, aggregate consumption in EU countries was buffered from output fluctuations in the 1990–2010 period, with a focus on the recent European crisis.

We provide a metric for risk sharing, which we also refer to as consumption smoothing, starting from the Arrow-Debreu one-good benchmark model of consumers with identical Constant Relative Risk Aversion utility functions having access to complete financial markets. The benchmark model’s key prediction is that consumption in each country is a constant share of aggregate world consumption. An implication is that consumption growth rates in all countries are equal to the growth rate of world consumption and we take this implication as the definition of perfect risk sharing in this paper. Under perfect risk sharing, the consumption growth of individual countries should be orthogonal to other factors, conditional on world consumption growth.

Starting with Mace (1991), who consider households, the literature generally tests whether or not consumption growth rates are orthogonal to income growth of income conditional on

\footnote{See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for a lucent exposition.}
aggregate consumption. At the country level, Obstfeld (1994) perform similar regressions, testing whether consumption is orthogonal to GDP growth and other variables, conditional on world consumption growth, while a parallel literature, starting with the influential work of Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992), compares correlations of consumption growth and output growth with those derived from a more general model with labor-leisure choice and investment and similarly concludes that the complete markets model does not match the empirical data.²

The early literature tests the existence of full risk sharing against the null of none while we are interested in evaluating the amount of risk sharing. To do so, we follow the methodology of Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998), who undertake a variance decomposition of shocks to GDP in order to discover the amount of risk sharing achieved via various channels, such as governments versus markets.³ We calculate how much of a shock to GDP is absorbed by various components of saving, in particular government saving, and other channels, such as net foreign factor income for the sub-periods 1990–2007, 2008–2009, and 2010. We find that, overall, risk sharing in the EU was significantly higher during 2008–2009 than it was during the earlier period, but total risk sharing more or less collapsed in 2010.⁴

We study how the crisis affected risk sharing for “PIIGS” countries (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain), which were at the center of the sovereign debt crisis, compared to

²See Lewis (1996) and Coeurdacier and Rey (2012) for extensive reviews of this literature.
³It is possible to translate the deviations from full risk sharing into measures of welfare lost, see Van Wincoop (1999) and Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2001); however, such measures are extremely sensitive to the degree of persistence in output shocks, which is hard to estimate precisely.
⁴Sørensen and Yosha (1998) find country-level risk sharing provided by markets to be low 1966-1990 while Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996), who are the first to decompose risk sharing into channels such as market-provided and government-provided risk sharing, find that markets provide more risk sharing (about 40 percent) than the federal government (about 15 percent) for U.S. states 1963–1990. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2003) show that markets provide a similar amount of risk sharing within European countries (such as regions of Italy and regions of Germany), but much less (around 5 percent) between EU countries before the introduction of euro. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2005) show that risk sharing among European Union (EU) countries increased in step with the introduction of the euro for the Euro-zone countries.
non-PIIGS countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). For 1990–2009, risk sharing was mainly due to procyclical government saving but the amount of risk sharing from government saving turned negative in 2010 for the PIIGS-countries: government saving increased at the same time as GDP decreased. For these countries our measure of overall risk sharing turns negative because (conditional on world consumption growth) the decline in GDP in 2010 was accompanied by a more than proportional decline in consumption. This mirrors the behavior of emerging economies where government saving typically is counter-cyclical as shown by Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2005).

If Ricardian equivalence holds, with private saving off-setting government saving one-to-one, the distinction between government and private saving should not matter. We do not rigorously test if Ricardian equivalence holds, but if consumption smoothing from private saving does not fully offset changes in consumption smoothing from government saving, it indicates that it does not hold.

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5Ireland is in some dimensions different, with government deficits mainly the results of banking failures, and hence a previous version of the paper did not include Ireland among the PIIGS; however, the results are broadly robust to this choice.

6Ricardian equivalence holds under quite restrictive assumptions—non-distortionary lump-sum taxes, fully developed financial markets, infinite horizons, and full information about future levels of income, government spending and rates of return as highlighted in Barro (1999). Barro (1999) mentions, in addition to distortionary taxes, that a key reason why equivalence may fail is the existence of a large amount of debt which can influence governments’ incentives to default on outstanding obligations, disconnecting saving decisions between private and government sectors. Both of these conditions are relevant for Europe. Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven (2000) reject Ricardian equivalence for a wide range of countries.

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We present the methodology in Section 2, followed by a description of the data in Section 3. Section 4 reports on the empirical analysis and Section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology: Measuring Channels of Risk-Sharing

Following Sørensen and Yosha (1998), we perform an accounting exercise which quantifies the fractions of cross-sectional variance in GDP absorbed by wedges between GDP and consumption. We take GDP growth to be exogenous although this is not crucial because our regressions are not structural.\footnote{This approach is similar to that of growth and development accounting which parse GDP growth into contributions from physical and human capital as suggested by Solow (1957).}

Consider the identity

\[
\text{GDP}_i = \frac{\text{GNI}_i}{\text{GNI}_i} \frac{\text{NI}_i}{\text{NI}_i} \frac{\text{NNDI}_i}{\text{NNDI}_i} \frac{\text{CONS}_i}{\text{CONS}_i},
\]

(1)

where \(\text{GNI}\) (gross national income) is GDP plus net factor income from abroad, \(\text{NI}\) (net national income) is gross national income minus depreciation, \(\text{NNDI}\) (net disposable income) is net national income plus net transfers from abroad, while \(\text{CONS}\) (total consumption, private plus government) is net disposable income minus saving. All the magnitudes are in per capita terms, and \(i\) is an index of countries. To stress the cross-sectional nature of our derivation, we suppress the time index.

Defining \(\text{GDP}_{it}, \text{GNI}_{it}, \text{NI}_{it}, \text{NNDI}_{it}, \text{CONS}_{it}\) as the log of country \(i\)'s year \(t\) per capita GDP, gross national income, net national income, net national disposable income, and consumption, respectively. By taking logs and differences, multiplying by \(\Delta_{\text{GDP}}\) (minus its mean), and taking the cross-sectional average on both sides of equation 1, we obtain the variance decomposition

\[
\text{var}\{\Delta_{\text{GDP}}\} = \text{cov}\{\Delta_{\text{GDP}} - \Delta_{\text{GNI}}, \Delta_{\text{GDP}}\} + \text{cov}\{\Delta_{\text{GNI}} - \Delta_{\text{NI}}, \Delta_{\text{GDP}}\} + \text{cov}\{\Delta_{\text{NI}} - \Delta_{\text{NNDI}}, \Delta_{\text{GDP}}\} + \text{cov}\{\Delta_{\text{NNDI}} - \Delta_{\text{CONS}}, \Delta_{\text{GDP}}\}
\]
+ COV\{Δ_{CONS, ΔGDP}\}.

In this equation, “var\{X\}” and “cov\{X,Y\}” denote the statistics \(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (X_i - \bar{X})^2\) and \(\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (X_i - \bar{X})(Y_i - \bar{Y})\), respectively, where \(N\) is the number of countries in the sample. Dividing by var\{ΔGDP\} we get

\[1 = \beta_f + \beta_d + \beta_r + \beta_s + \beta_u,\]

where, for example,

\[\beta_f = \frac{COV\{Δ_{GDP} - Δ_{GNI}, Δ_{GDP}\}}{VAR\{Δ_{GDP}\}},\]

is the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional regression of \(Δ_{GDP} - Δ_{GNI}\) on \(Δ_{GDP}\), and similarly for \(\beta_d, \beta_r,\) and \(\beta_s\). The last coefficient in the decomposition is given by

\[\beta_u = \frac{COV\{Δ_{CONS, ΔGDP}\}}{VAR\{Δ_{GDP}\}},\]

which is the ordinary least squares estimate of the slope in the cross-sectional regression \(Δ_{CONS}\) on \(Δ_{GDP}\).

If there is full risk sharing, \(COV\{Δ_{CONS, ΔGDP}\} = 0\), and hence \(\beta_u = 0\). If full risk sharing is not achieved, consumption in country \(i\) varies positively with idiosyncratic shocks to country \(i\)’s output and \(\beta_u > 0\). A cross-sectional regression of consumption on output, controlling for fluctuations in world consumption is, therefore, a test of full risk sharing.\(^8\) The other coefficients quantify the role of the relevant wedges in bringing consumption closer to the Arrow-Debreu benchmark and we will use the more intuitive terminology that these coefficients measure the contributions from various “channels of consumption smoothing.” “Smoothing” from depreciation, which is mainly imputed, is not very interesting but because it is the wedge between gross national income and net national income, it is included

\(^8\)This is precisely the test suggested by Mace (1991).
in order to have a full decomposition. We show below that saving is the main channel of consumption smoothing, as found for an earlier sample of European countries by Sørensen and Yosha (1998), and one focus of the present article is to decompose the contribution from saving into contributions from private (corporate plus household) saving and government saving. Government saving provides risk sharing if it increases when GDP increases and decreases when GDP decreases and the same holds for private saving.

We perform panel regressions of the form:

\[
\Delta \text{GDP}_{it} - \Delta \text{GNI}_{it} = \alpha_f^{\prime} + \beta_f \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} + \epsilon_{itf},
\]

\[
\Delta \text{GNI}_{it} - \Delta \text{NI}_{it} = \alpha_d^{\prime} + \beta_d \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} + \epsilon_{itd},
\]

\[
\Delta \text{NI}_{it} - \Delta \text{NNDI}_{it} = \alpha_r^{\prime} + \beta_r \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} + \epsilon_{itr},
\]

\[
\Delta \text{NNDI}_{it} - \Delta \text{CONS}_{it} = \alpha_s^{\prime} + \beta_s \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} + \epsilon_{its},
\]

\[
\Delta \text{CONS}_{it} = \alpha_u^{\prime} + \beta_u \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} + \epsilon_{itu}.
\]

As shown by Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996), the coefficients estimated in the panel regression with time fixed effects equal weighted averages of the coefficients of year-by-year cross-sectional regressions and the coefficients therefore have the interpretation outlined in the variance decomposition. The first regression, to pick one, can alternatively be written as

\[
-\Delta \log(1 + \frac{\text{NFI}_{it}}{\text{GDP}_{it}}) = \alpha_f^{\prime} + \beta_f \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} + \epsilon_{itf},
\]

which highlights how income smoothing, if positive, is obtained through counter-cyclical foreign net factor income \((\text{NFI} = \text{GNI} - \text{GDP})\), while the next-to-last equation can be written as

\[
\Delta \log(1 + \frac{\text{S}_{it}}{\text{CONS}_{it}}) = \alpha_s^{\prime} + \beta_s \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} + \epsilon_{its},
\]
which highlights how consumption smoothing, if positive, is obtained through pro-cyclical total saving ($s = \text{NNDI} - \text{CONS}$).

It is hard to benchmark the optimal degree of saving in the face of the shocks which materialized in the Great Recession. Saving in good times and dis-saving in bad times is a form of “self-insurance” against consumption fluctuations but the optimal amount of saving depends, from the point of view of models of forward-looking consumers, on the persistence of income shocks. The standard PIH model implies that it is optimal to not smooth random walk shocks while i.i.d. (temporary) income shocks should be mainly absorbed by saving. In this paper, we are agnostic about why saving does or does not smooth consumption.\footnote{Models such as those of Blundell, Pistaferri, Preston (2008) and Heathcote, Storesletten, Violante (2012), typically allow for income as being composed of a mix of random walk shocks and i.i.d. shocks. More complicated models which allow for credit constraints and large non-divisible durables such as housing, predict a more gradual adjustment to random walk shocks; see Luengo-Prado and Sørensen (2008). However, it is hard to sort out the degree of persistence of shocks in a short panel of aggregate data. As in Attanasio and Davis (1996), a long time dimension is needed to sort out the structure of income shocks. Using the same framework as the present article and much longer time series, Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996) show that U.S. states with more persistent income shocks rely more on smoothing via capital markets and less on smoothing via saving. This pattern agrees with the broad predictions of forward looking consumer models.}

If consumption (gross national income, etc.) is measured with error, this error may migrate to GDP (and other national account components) leading to upward bias in the coefficient to consumption; i.e., to an underestimate of risk sharing. We believe that this is not a serious issue as GDP to a large extent is measured from the income side, and we believe that government saving, which is one of our main foci, is not measured with error because government budgets are public and subject to outside scrutiny.

The coefficient $\beta_\text{f}$ measures risk sharing from net income from abroad, with a negative estimate indicating dis-smoothing, $\beta_\text{d}$ measures risk sharing from depreciation, $\beta_\text{f}$ measures risk sharing from international transfers, and $\beta_\text{s}$ measures risk sharing from net saving. $\beta_\text{u}$ measures the fraction of GDP shocks reflected in consumption; i.e., the fraction of risk un-smoothed. The regressions all have the same regressor and therefore constitute a SURE
regression, where single equations estimation gives the same result as a system regression.
We can therefore “zoom in” on, in particular, saving by estimating the impact of saving, or
saving components, alone without changing any interpretation of the results.

We estimate panel data regressions with GDP shocks interacted with dummy variables for
particular time periods in order to examine if the coefficients vary over time. We display the
regression equations for consumption only (other equations follow the same approach in an
obvious fashion):

\[
\Delta CONS_{it} = \alpha_t + \beta_{90-07} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{90-07} + \beta_{08-09} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{08-09} + \beta_{10} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{10} + \epsilon_{it_u},
\]

where the dummy variables \(p^{90-07}, p^{08-09},\) and \(p^{10}\) take the value unity for the years 1990–2007,
2008–2009, and 2010, respectively, and zero otherwise.

We further allow the coefficient to vary between PIIGS and non-PIIGS, by estimating the
regression

\[
\Delta CONS_{it} = \alpha_t^I + \alpha_{90-07}^{PIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{90-07} + \alpha_{08-09}^{PIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{08-09} + \alpha_{10}^{PIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{10} + \epsilon_{it_u}^I, \\
\alpha_{90-07}^{NPIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{90-07} \times d^{PIIGS} + \\
\alpha_{08-09}^{NPIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{08-09} \times d^{PIIGS} + \\
\alpha_{10}^{NPIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{10} \times d^{PIIGS} \\
+ \beta_{90-07}^{PIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{90-07} \times d^{NPIIGS} + \\
+ \beta_{08-09}^{PIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{08-09} \times d^{NPIIGS} + \\
+ \beta_{10}^{PIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{10} \times d^{NPIIGS} + \\
+ \beta_{90-07}^{NPIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{90-07} \times d^{NPIIGS} + \\
+ \beta_{08-09}^{NPIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{08-09} \times d^{NPIIGS} + \\
+ \beta_{10}^{NPIIGS} \Delta GDP_{it} \times p^{10} \times d^{NPIIGS} + \epsilon_{it_u},
\]

where \(d^{PIIGS}\) takes the value unity for Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain and zero
otherwise, while \(d^{NPIIGS}\) takes the value unity for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, and zero otherwise.

The amount of smoothing obtained from pro-cyclical saving, \(\beta_s\), can be broken down into
smoothing obtained via government and private (personal plus corporate) saving. In order
to make the breakdown independent of the order in which we consider these components of
saving, we linearize. The OLS formula for the coefficient is $\beta_s = \frac{\text{COV}(\Delta_{\text{NNDI}} - \Delta_{\text{CONS}}, \Delta_{\text{GDP}})}{\text{VAR}(\Delta_{\text{GDP}})}$. Now consider

$$\Delta_{\text{NNDI}} - \Delta_{\text{CONS}} = \Delta \log \left(1 + \frac{S_{\text{CONS}}}{\text{CONS}}\right) \approx \frac{S_{\text{CONS}}}{\text{CONS}} ,$$

Define $s^{\text{Priv}}$ and $s^{\text{Gov}}$ as private and government net saving, respectively, then $s = s^{\text{Priv}} + s^{\text{Gov}}$ and

$$\beta_s \approx \frac{\text{COV}\left(\frac{\Delta S_{\text{CONS}}}{\text{CONS}}: \Delta_{\text{GDP}}\right)}{\text{VAR}(\Delta_{\text{GDP}})} ,$$

$$= \frac{\text{COV}\left(\Delta S_{\text{CONS}}^{\text{Priv}}: \Delta_{\text{GDP}}\right)}{\text{VAR}(\Delta_{\text{GDP}})} + \frac{\text{COV}\left(\Delta S_{\text{CONS}}^{\text{Gov}}: \Delta_{\text{GDP}}\right)}{\text{VAR}(\Delta_{\text{GDP}})} ,$$

$$= \beta_{\text{Priv}} + \beta_{\text{Gov}} .$$

where $\beta_{\text{Priv}}$ and $\beta_{\text{Gov}}$ estimate the fraction (of GDP shocks) insured through pro-cyclical private and government saving, respectively. We estimate those coefficients by running the following panel data regressions with time-fixed effects:

$$\Delta \frac{S_{\text{CONS}}^{\text{Priv}}}{\text{CONS}_{\text{it}}} = \alpha_{\text{Priv}} + \beta_{\text{Priv}} \Delta_{\text{GDP}_{\text{it}}} + \epsilon_{\text{itPriv}} ,$$

$$\Delta \frac{S_{\text{CONS}}^{\text{Gov}}}{\text{CONS}_{\text{it}}} = \alpha_{\text{Gov}} + \beta_{\text{Gov}} \Delta_{\text{GDP}_{\text{it}}} + \epsilon_{\text{itGov}} .$$
3 Data

The main source of data for this study is the OECD. GDP, gross national income, net national disposable income, (government plus private) consumption, and private and government saving are from the annual national accounts main aggregates, detailed tables, and simplified accounts sections; CPI and nominal exchange rates are from the prices and purchasing power parities statistics, while the population of the countries are from the demography and population statistics. In order to make our data comparable across countries and time, GDP, national income, disposable income, consumption, and private and government saving are transformed to real per capita 2005 dollars.

Net government and external debt are from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) and the European Central Bank (ECB). In particular, government debt is net government debt (percentage of GDP) from the WEO, where this variable is defined as gross debt of the general government sector minus its financial assets in the form of debt instruments.\textsuperscript{10} External debt is the outstanding amount on the financial account of the balance of payments statistics at the end of the fourth quarter of each year from the ECB data warehouse.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10}The WEO defines general government gross debt as all liabilities that require payment or payments of interest and/or principal by the debtor to the creditor at a date or dates in the future (this includes debt liabilities in the form of SDRs, currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pensions and standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts payable). In addition, financial assets in the form of debt instruments include currency and deposits, debt securities, loans, insurance, pension, and standardized guarantee schemes, and other accounts receivable.

\textsuperscript{11}The series were incomplete for France and Belgium, in both cases we fill the missing values with data from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) (http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html).
4 Empirical Analysis

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 shows net government and net external debt by country. As expected, the PIIGS are heavily indebted, with Greece having government debt equal to 144 percent of GDP and Italy having debt roughly similar to GDP in 2010. Spain’s net debt is lower than that of many non-PIIGS. This indicates that the level of debt is just one of several factors determining sovereign debt crises as also highlighted by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). Net external debt is at the level of GDP for Greece, Portugal, and Spain, but much lower at 24 percent for Italy. Ireland has external debt of about 84 percent of GDP in 2010 but had low government debt before the crisis hit: 21 percent pre-2008 and 33 percent in 2008–2009; however, Irish net government debt ballooned to 75 percent of GDP in 2010 because of large government bailouts of banks. The level of net government debt varies widely between the non-PIIGS from –65 percent of GDP in Finland in 2010 to 79 percent in Belgium in 2010. Net external debt is low for all non-PIIGS, with Belgium’s net foreign assets (negative debt) at 64 percent of GDP in 2010.

Graphical exposition

Our story can roughly be told from figures. Figures 1a and 1b consider PIIGS and non-PIIGS, respectively, for the years after 2000. We display GDP growth in percent year-by-year and split it into the change in consumption (as a share of GDP), which we with a slight abuse of language interpret as risk not shared, and the remainder, which we interpret as the fraction of GDP risk shared. The figures do not literally tell a story about risk sharing because there is no adjustment for the aggregate non-insurable component, but the prima facie evidence displayed holds up in the empirical analysis in the next sub-section.
From the figures, most risk is not shared, although non-PIIGS countries shared a non-negligible amount of risk during 2000–2007 while the PIIGS shared little risk in those years: in the good year 2005, consumption increased faster than GDP leading to “negative risk sharing.” In 2008 and 2009 the major amount of GDP risk is shared for non-PIIGS with low consumption growth rates in spite of large drops in GDP, with the amount of risk shared in 2008 over 100 percent (positive consumption growth in spite of negative GDP growth). For the PIIGS, consumption declined very little in 2008 in spite of a large drop in GDP, while the drop in GDP in 2009 clearly led to declining consumption and, in 2010, consumption fell by almost as much as GDP, indicating little risk sharing.

Figures 2a and 2b decompose GDP growth into changes in foreign net factor income, private saving, government saving, and consumption—all as shares of GDP, so that these components add up to GDP. Shares which are on the same side of the X-axis as GDP growth contributes to consumption smoothing. We see, for non-PIIGS, the dominant role of government saving in smoothing consumption, with negative saving during 2001–2003 and 2008–2009, and positive saving 2004–2007. Government saving is positive in 2010, reflecting budget tightening in response to heavy government debt burdens, but very close to zero. Private saving visibly buffered GDP shocks for the non-PIIGS countries during 2008–2009 and absorbed most of the GDP growth in 2010. For the PIIGS, almost all risk sharing during 2008 and 2009 was provided by governments, which increased deficits while private saving increased in 2009 dis-smoothing GDP shocks. In 2010, where GDP growth was negative for the PIIGS, the sovereign debt crisis forced government saving to dis-smooth as the governments tightened budgets dramatically and risk sharing was basically only provided by private saving in 2010. For PIIGS, net foreign factor income also provided some consumption smoothing in 2010.

Figures 3a and 3b display the evolution of net government debt and net external (foreign) debt for PIIGS and non-PIIGS. It is immediately apparent that the governments of PIIGS countries have been more heavily indebted for the full period and, in particular since 2007,
the indebtedness of PIIGS has increased rapidly. Regarding net external debt, the two groups of countries were at similar debt levels in year 2000 but, while net foreign debt has dwindled to nil for the non-PIIGS, it has steadily increased for the PIIGS. In 2010, government debt of PIIGS is over 90 percent and net foreign debt is about 80 percent. This is a typical sovereign debt scenario where a heavy government debt burden is reflected in heavy net foreign indebtedness.

Figures 4a and 4b show how international capital flows (defined here as minus the current account balance), for PIIGS in particular, are dominated by debt flows. It is clear that before the crisis, during 2001–2007, the increased degree of financial integration helped channel funds from the European core to, in particular, Portugal, Ireland, Greece, and Spain as these countries experienced booms in productivity. However, most of the capital flows were in the form of debt. When the Great Recession hit, capital flows declined while government debt flows ballooned.

Regression analysis

Table 2 reports on channels of risk sharing by the chosen sub-periods. The top panel displays averages across all countries while the bottom panel displays results for PIIGS and non-PIIGS. For the 1990–2007 period, net factor income from abroad in the top panel is insignificant at 5 percent. Net factor income is a function of cross-ownership of financial assets—the type of risk sharing that matches up best with the stylized Arrow-Debreu model. We do not here separate out interest payments on government debt from dividends and private interest income, but we believe that the lack of private ownership across national borders results in low risk sharing among the members the European Monetary Union in contrast to U.S. states for which income smoothing is very significant at about 40 percent and increasing slowly over time according to Asdrubali, Sørensen, and Yosha (1996). At the country
level, Sørensen and Yosha (1998) similarly find no significant risk sharing from net factor income flows pre-1990. Splitting the sample into PIIGS and non-PIIGS, factor income flows significantly smoothed consumption for PIIGS before 2007 while providing insignificant risk sharing for non-PIIGS. This likely reflects that the PIIGS had relatively high growth before 2007 at the same time that dividends and interest payments from the PIIGS were high as a result of large inflows of capital after these countries joined the Euro zone.\textsuperscript{12}

Our point estimates indicate that net factor income provides economically important (12 percent) positive risk sharing for non-PIIGS since 2007 although the sample is too short to obtain statistical significance. For the PIIGS, net factor income flows provided little smoothing during 2008–2009 but the estimate turns negative at 13 percent for 2010—this point estimate is not statistically significant, reflecting that the estimate is based on 5 observations, but it is believable that higher interest payments on government debt held abroad led to an unwelcome outflow of capital income at a time where GDP declined.\textsuperscript{13}

Depreciation provides a fair amount of dis-smoothing, in that depreciation is an expense which is roughly constant so when GDP goes up this expense becomes a smaller fraction of GDP, which our metric measures as dis-smoothing and vice versa when GDP goes down. This channel is mechanical and not of much interest but is included in order to have all wedges between GDP and consumption. International transfers are not large enough to provide significant risk sharing.

Our focus in this paper is on the role of saving, because saving is such a large proportion of GDP, and because saving displayed such large variation during the crisis years that we are able to obtain statistically significant estimates. Before the Great Recession, saving absorbed

\textsuperscript{12}Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha (2005) find that risk sharing from foreign factor income turns significantly positive in the Euro area around the time of the introduction of the Euro.

\textsuperscript{13}This result is a little unexpected because aggregate net factor income was positive for the PIIGS in 2010 according to Figure 2. However, Figure 2 does not control for time fixed effects (year-by-year “world averages”). Also, large countries will dominate the aggregates in Figure 2, but affect the regression less strongly.
49 percent of shocks and this increased slightly to 52 percent in 2008–2009 before pulling back to 33 percent in 2010. This leaves a substantial amount of variation un-smoothed: 53 percent before the Great Recession, falling to 40 percent during 2008–2009, and 86 percent in 2010. Before 2008, PIIGS smoothed about 30 percent of GDP shocks through saving while non-PIIGS smoothed a substantial 60 percent. During 2008–2009, smoothing through saving declined slightly to 57 percent among non-PIIGS while rising to 47 percent for the PIIGS. Nonetheless, only an insignificant 16 percent was un-smoothed for the non-PIIGS while 51 percent of shocks went un-smoothed for PIIGS 2008–2009. However, as the sovereign crises raised it ugly head, risk sharing collapsed among the PIIGS mainly due to the collapse of procyclical saving; indeed for the PIIGS each percent decline in GDP in 2010 was accompanied by a more than one percent decline in consumption while the fraction un-smoothed for non-PIIGS was 45 percent.

Is the collapse in risk sharing due to changes in the behavior of government or private saving? Table 3 shows that government saving for non-PIIGS absorbed 46 percent of GDP shocks before the crisis while private saving absorbed 14 percent. For PIIGS, private saving smoothed 16 percent of shocks, similar to the results for non-PIIGS, while risk sharing from government saving was 15 percent, low compared to the non-PIIGS, indicating that the government surpluses of the fast growing PIIGS were not very high. In 2008–2009, as GDP fell, PIIGS governments dis-saved to the extent that government dis-saving absorbed 73 percent of the fall in GDP (after controlling for the aggregate un-smoothable component) while government dis-saving absorbed 38 percent of shocks among the non-PIIGS. Among the PIIGS, private saving increased as GDP fell, leading to a negative contribution to risk sharing, partly off-setting the governments dis-saving while for non-PIIGS the contribution was private saving was roughly unchanged at 19 percent (although statistically insignificant). In 2010, risk sharing from government saving declined to an insignificant 17 percent for non-PIIGS as government saving was positive but negligible, as shown in Figure 2, but positive private saving helped smooth consumption significantly. For PIIGS in 2010, private dis-saving
provided substantial consumption smoothing at 57 percent; however, positive government saving resulted in significant dis-smoothing at minus 38 percent. This brings home the main point of our paper: government budgets can not provide substantial smoothing over long and deep recessions unless governments save in advance. This contrasts to risk sharing through cross-ownership of stocks—foreign investors will share the risk of falling stock values, but this does not in general lead to debt spirals where high debt leads to risk of sovereign default which leads to higher interest payments which leads to increasing debt and so on.

Table 4 explores, using the national account identity, \( s = CA + I - \delta K \), where \( CA \) is the surplus on the current account and \( I - \delta K \) is net investment, how the “uses” of saving—domestic physical investment or cross-border asset purchases—contributed to consumption smoothing. For non-PIIGS, self-insurance, in the form of pro-cyclical real investment at home, provided substantial risk sharing before the Great Recession at 46 percent, while procyclical current account surpluses provided less, but still statistically significant, smoothing at 14 percent. In the 2008–2009 Great Recession years, these channels contributed about equally with high significance, with 32 percent of the GDP decline offset by declining current accounts and 25 percent by investment. For 2010, for the non-PIIGS, smoothing via the current account was not significant, although the point estimate is numerically large but negative. Procyclical real investment absorbed 86 percent of GDP growth for the non-PIIGS in 2010. For the PIIGS, the current account surplus dis-smoothed consumption by being countercyclical before the Great Recession leading to 11 percent dis-smoothing—while in 2008–2009 the current account balances for the PIIGS improved, at the same time as GDP contracted, leading to significant dis-smoothing at –22 percent. During 2008–2009, this dis-smoothing was outweighed by sharply declining real investment which helped smooth consumption substantially at 69 percent. For the PIIGS, real investment declined in 2010 absorbing 53 percent of the decline in GDP growth, but the current accounts improved significantly, providing substantial dis-smoothing at 34 percent. For completeness, we also show income smoothing through
Net exports.\textsuperscript{14} Net exports absorb roughly the same as the current account, reflecting that these series are highly correlated, although the results for the current account generally are estimated with more precision during the crisis years.

In order to examine if the patterns observed for the PIIGS during the Great Recession are atypical, Table 5 displays the decomposition of risk sharing during two severe crises affecting developed countries; namely, the Scandinavian banking crisis 1991–1994 which severely affected Finland, Norway, and Sweden and the Japanese crisis of 1997–2001. Commenting only on the significant coefficients during the crises, we observe that the Scandinavian crisis was accompanied by severe dis-smoothing from net factor income, which may have been due to high interest rates paid on Scandinavian debt, as the governments tried to defend the currency values, although we are not able to verify this conjecture in this article. In Japan, the overall patterns of risk sharing did not change much during the crisis with the fraction un-smoothed declining from 61 to 57 percent while in “Scandinavia” (Denmark is part of Scandinavia but was not affected) the fraction of shocks un-smoothed increased from 28 to 47 percent, mainly due to the perverse net factor income flows, as smoothing through saving was unchanged.

Table 6 considers the roles of government and private saving in providing risk sharing during the crises in Scandinavia and Japan. The amount of smoothing from government saving hardly changed when the crisis hit, it was 76 percent in Scandinavia during non-crisis years, dropping to 70 percent during the crisis, while the point estimates for risk sharing through government saving in Japan, in spite of being statistically insignificant, stayed constant at 44 percent. In both Scandinavia and Japan, the contribution to smoothing from real investment increased in the crises. However, the main take-away from these results is that the pattern found for the PIIGS during the sovereign debt crises is unusual for developed European

\textsuperscript{14}The relevant national accounts identity is $GDP - CONS = I + (NX)$ where $I$ is now is gross investment and $NX$ is net exports. Gross investment behaves quite similar to net investment and we do not display smoothing through gross invest separately.
countries, although similar patterns hold in emerging economies as described by Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Végh (2005).

5 Conclusion

Risk sharing collapsed in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain in 2010. We show that this was the result of government austerity programs which were forced upon these countries because of their vulnerable external and internal asset positions. For other EU countries, risk sharing from government saving declined but did not turn negative.
References


Figure 1: Risk Sharing.

(a) Non-PIIGS.

(b) PIIGS.

Notes: Figures 1a and 1b display annual growth of aggregate GDP and (crisscrossed) aggregate consumption as a share of GDP (the dollar change in consumption as a fraction of lagged GDP) for PIIGS and non-PIIGS, respectively. The change in consumption can be interpreted as the amount of GDP-risk not shared while the difference between GDP growth and consumption growth can be interpreted as the amount of risk shared in a given year. PIIGS denotes Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain and non-PIIGS denotes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Source: Authors’ own calculations based on OECD data.
Figure 2: Decomposition of GDP Growth.

(a) Non-PIIGS.

(b) PIIGS.

Notes: The bars in Figures 2a and 2b represent annual growth of aggregate net factor payments from the domestic country (net factor income with the sign reversed), aggregate government saving, and aggregate private saving—all as shares of GDP. The height of each bar can be interpreted as the amount of risk shared through a specific factor, and the vertical distance between GDP and consumption as the total amount of risk shared in a given period. PIIGS denotes Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain and non-PIIGS denotes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Source: Authors’ own calculations based on OECD data.
Figure 3: Net Government and External Debt: Non-PIIGS vs PIIGS.

(a) Net Government Debt.

(b) Net External Debt.

Notes: Net government and external debt are aggregate net government and external debt (each as a fraction of aggregate GDP) for each country group. Country data on net government and external debt are from the World Economic Outlook and the European Central Bank. Net government debt is defined as gross debt of the general government sector minus its financial assets in the form of debt instruments. External debt is the outstanding amount on the financial account of the balance of payments statistics at the end of the fourth quarter of each year. PIIGS denotes Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain and non-PIIGS denotes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Source: Authors’ own calculations based on World Economic Outlook and European Central Bank data.
Figure 4: Net Government and External Debt Flows: Non-PIIGS vs PIIGS.

(a) Net Government Debt Flows.

(b) Net External Debt Flows.

Notes: For each country group, net government and external debt flows are measured as the change in aggregate net government and external debt. Capital inflows is the aggregate current account surplus with the sign reversed (each as a fraction of aggregate GDP). Country data on net government debt and current accounts are from the World Economic Outlook and net external debt is from the European Central Bank. Net government debt and external debt are defined as in Figure 3. PIIGS denotes Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain and non-PIIGS denotes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Source: Authors’ own calculations based on World Economic Outlook and European Central Bank data.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Government and External Debt.

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<td>(5.79)</td>
<td>(5.65)</td>
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<td>(5.79)</td>
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<td>(5.79)</td>
<td>(5.65)</td>
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<td>Panel B: Non-PIIGS.</td>
<td>Austria</td>
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<td>(5.79)</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>(5.79)</td>
<td>(5.65)</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
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Notes: Net government and external debt, as percentages of GDP, averaged over the periods 2000–2007, 2008–2009 and 2010. Standard deviations in parentheses. Net government and external debt are from the World Economic Outlook and the European Central Bank and defined as in Figure 3. Source: Authors’ own calculations based on World Economic Outlook and European Central Bank data.
Table 2: Risk Sharing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A: Group.</th>
<th>Channels of Risk Sharing</th>
<th>Un-smoothed</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$\beta_i$</td>
<td>$\beta_d$</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP (1990–2007)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(-1.57)</td>
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<td>GDP (2008–2009)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(-0.43)</td>
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<td>GDP (2010)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-21***</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(-4.45)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Panel B: Non-PIIGS against PIIGS.

| GDP (1990–2007) (non-PIIGS) | -5 | -11*** | -1 | 60*** | 57*** |
|                            | (-1.53) | (-4.24) | (-0.46) | (6.19) | (8.10) |
|                            | (1.65) | (-1.16) | (1.52) | (3.02) | (1.02) |
| GDP (2010) (non-PIIGS)      | 12 | -23** | 6 | 60*** | 45*** |
|                            | (0.86) | (-2.54) | (1.06) | (3.23) | (4.32) |
| GDP (1990–2007) (PIIGS)     | 12*** | -5** | 1 | 31*** | 61*** |
|                            | (3.01) | (-2.29) | (0.55) | (4.66) | (12.69) |
| GDP (2008–2009) (PIIGS)     | -3 | 1 | 4 | 47*** | 51*** |
|                            | (-0.29) | (0.21) | (0.82) | (2.70) | (2.61) |
| GDP (2010) (PIIGS)          | -13 | -21*** | 1 | 19 | 114*** |
|                            | (-1.59) | (-4.26) | (0.17) | (1.55) | (14.13) |

Observations: 281

Notes: Panel A: We estimate the relations $\Delta \text{GDP}_{it} - \Delta \text{GNI}_{it} = \alpha_i' + \sum_s \beta_{is} \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} \times P^s + \epsilon_{sit}$, $\Delta (\text{GNI} - \text{NI})_{it} = \alpha_i' + \sum_s \beta_{is} \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} \times P^s + \epsilon_{sit}$, and $\Delta \text{CONS}_{it} = \alpha_i' + \sum_s \beta_{is} \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} \times P^s + \epsilon_{sit}$, where $\{90, 97, 03, 08, 09, 10\}$, GDP, GNI, NI, and CONS are log GDP, gross national income, net national income, net national disposable income, and total consumption, respectively, $s$ is net saving, CONS is total consumption, $P^s$ is a dummy variable for the period $s$, and $\alpha_{i}'$ are time fixed effects. The panel shows the $\beta^s$ coefficients. The estimated values of $\beta_i$, $\beta_d$, $\beta_r$, and $\beta_s$ are interpreted as the percentage of consumption smoothing obtained through international capital markets, physical capital depreciation, net transfers, and domestic saving, respectively. $1 - \beta^s_{it}$ is interpreted as the percentage of output shocks smoothed in period $s$.

Panel B: We estimate the relations $\Delta \text{GDP}_{it} - \Delta \text{GNI}_{it} = \alpha_i' + \sum_s \beta_{is} \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} \times P^s + \epsilon_{sit}$, $\Delta (\text{GNI} - \text{NI})_{it} = \alpha_i' + \sum_s \beta_{is} \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} \times P^s + \epsilon_{sit}$, and $\Delta \text{CONS}_{it} = \alpha_i' + \sum_s \beta_{is} \Delta \text{GDP}_{it} \times P^s + \epsilon_{sit}$, where $s$ belongs to $\{90, 97, 03, 08, 09, 10\}$, and $\alpha_i'$, $\beta_{is}$, $\beta_{is}$, and $\epsilon_{sit}$ are time fixed effects. The panel shows the $\beta^s$ coefficients. All coefficients are estimated by feasible GLS using annual data 1990–2010. The countries in the sample are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. PIIGS are Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain while non-PIIGS are the other countries. $t$ statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
Table 3: Saving and Risk Sharing.

<table>
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<th>Panel A: Group.</th>
<th>Saving Government ($\beta_{Gov}$)</th>
<th>Private ($\beta_{Priv}$)</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>GDP (1990–2007)</td>
<td>16** (2.09)</td>
<td>33*** (4.19)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP (2008–2009)</td>
<td>62*** (5.87)</td>
<td>–10 (–0.98)</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP (2010)</td>
<td>–24* (–1.82)</td>
<td>57*** (4.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panel B: Non-PIIGS against PIIGS.</td>
<td>Saving</td>
<td>Private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (1990–2007) (non-PIIGS)</td>
<td>46*** (7.85)</td>
<td>14** (2.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (2008–2009) (non-PIIGS)</td>
<td>38*** (2.73)</td>
<td>19 (1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (2010) (non-PIIGS)</td>
<td>17 (0.65)</td>
<td>44* (1.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (1990–2007) (PIIGS)</td>
<td>15*** (2.71)</td>
<td>16*** (2.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (2010) (PIIGS)</td>
<td>–38** (–1.98)</td>
<td>57*** (2.97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 281

Notes: Panel A: We jointly estimate the relations $\Delta \frac{s_{it}}{CONS_{it}} = \alpha_{j}^t + \sum_{x} \beta_{x}^t \Delta GDP_{it} \times P_{x} + \epsilon_{itj}$, for $j = \{Gov, Priv\}$, with the constraints $\beta_{Gov} + \beta_{Priv} = \beta_{s}^t$, where $s_{Gov}$ and $s_{Priv}$ are government and private saving, respectively, $CONS$ is total consumption, $GDP$, $x$, $P_{x}$, and $\alpha_{j}^t$ are defined as in panel A of Table 2. The panel shows the $\beta_{x}^t$ coefficients. The coefficients $\beta_{Gov}$ and $\beta_{Priv}$ are interpreted as the amount of consumption smoothing reached through government and private saving, respectively, during period $t$.

Panel B: We jointly estimate the relations $\Delta \frac{s_{it}}{CONS_{it}} = \alpha_{j}^t + \sum_{y} \alpha_{y}^t D_{y} + \sum_{y} \sum_{x} \beta_{x}^{y}\Delta GDP_{it} \times D_{y} \times P_{x} + \epsilon_{itj}$, for $j = \{Gov, Priv\}$, with the constraints $\beta_{Gov}^{y} + \beta_{Priv}^{y} = \beta_{s}^{y}$, where $s$ and $D_{y}$ are defined as in panel B of Table 2, and the other variables and coefficients are defined as in panel A of this table. The panel displays the $\beta_{x}^{y}$ coefficients.

All coefficients are estimated by feasible GLS, using the same countries, country groups, and periods as in Table 2. $t$ statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
Table 4: Capital Flows, Investment, Net Exports, and Risk Sharing.

| Panel A: Group. | | | |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | Net Investment ($\beta_I$) | Net Capital Outflows ($\beta_{CA}$) | Net Exports ($\beta_{NX}$) |
| GDP (1990–2007) | 50*** | –1 | 11* |
| | (7.05) | (–0.11) | (1.84) |
| GDP (2008–2009) | 57*** | –5 | –1 |
| | (5.94) | (–0.53) | (–0.05) |
| | (5.44) | (–2.66) | (–2.29) |

| Panel B: Non-PIIGS against PIIGS. | | | |
|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| | Net Investment ($\beta_I$) | Net Capital Outflows ($\beta_{CA}$) | Net Exports ($\beta_{NX}$) |
| GDP (1990–2007) (non-PIIGS) | 46*** | 14*** | 5 |
| | (9.31) | (2.80) | (1.01) |
| GDP (2008–2009) (non-PIIGS) | 25** | 32*** | 51*** |
| | (2.12) | (2.68) | (3.72) |
| | (3.89) | (–1.14) | (–0.60) |
| GDP (1990–2007) (PIIGS) | 41*** | –11** | 7 |
| | (8.94) | (–2.36) | (1.21) |
| | (7.45) | (–2.35) | (–1.22) |
| | (3.24) | (–2.08) | (–2.72) |

Observations: 281

Notes: Panel A: The first two columns of the panel show the $\beta^t$ coefficients from jointly estimating $\Delta_I^{CONS} = \alpha_I + \sum_y \beta_I^{\Delta GDP} D_y \times p^t + \epsilon_I$, and $\Delta_{CA}^{CONS} = \alpha_{CA} + \sum_y \beta_{CA}^{\Delta GDP} D_y \times p^t + \epsilon_{CA}$, with the constraints $\beta_{I}^{\Delta GDP} + \beta_{CA}^{\Delta GDP} = \beta_s^{\Delta GDP}$, while the third column shows the $\beta^t$ coefficients from estimating $\Delta (\text{GDP} - \log(\text{GDP} - \text{NX})) = \alpha_{NX} + \sum_y \beta_{NX}^{\Delta GDP} D_y \times p^t + \epsilon_{NX}$, where $I$, $CA$, $NX$, $GDP$, $CONS$ are net investment, current account, net exports, GDP, and consumption, respectively, where GDP, $\epsilon$, $\beta_s$, and $\alpha_I$ are defined as in Table 2. $\beta_I$, $\beta_{CA}$, and $\beta_{NX}$ are interpreted as consumption smoothing obtained through net investment, net capital outflows, and trade, respectively.

Panel B: The first two columns of the panel show the $\beta^{\nu t}$ coefficients from jointly estimating $\Delta_I^{CONS} = \alpha_I + \sum_y \alpha_I^{\nu t} D_y + \sum_x \beta_I^{\Delta GDP} D_x \times p^t + \epsilon_I$, and $\Delta_{CA}^{CONS} = \alpha_{CA} + \sum_y \alpha_{CA}^{\nu t} D_y + \sum_x \beta_{CA}^{\Delta GDP} D_x \times p^t + \epsilon_{CA}$, with the constraints $\beta_I^{\Delta GDP} + \beta_{CA}^{\Delta GDP} = \beta_s^{\Delta GDP}$, while the third column shows the $\beta^{\nu t}$ coefficients from estimating $\Delta (\text{GDP} - \log(\text{GDP} - \text{NX})) = \alpha_{NX} + \sum_y \alpha_{NX}^{\Delta GDP} D_y + \sum_x \beta_{NX}^{\Delta GDP} D_x \times p^t + \epsilon_{NX}$, where $\nu$ and $\nu t$ are defined as in panel B of Table 2, and the other variables and coefficients are defined as in panel A of this table.

All coefficients are estimated by feasible GLS, using the same countries, country groups, and periods as in Table 2. $t$ statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
Table 5: Crises and Risk Sharing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Channels of Risk Sharing</th>
<th>Un-smoothed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_f$</td>
<td>$\beta_d$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A: Financial Crises and Non-Peripherical Developed Economies.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Others) (Core)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td>(-0.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (1991–1994) (Core)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.83)</td>
<td>(-1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (1997–2001) (Core)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.86)</td>
<td>(-2.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel B: Financial Crises in Developed Countries.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Others) (Scandinavia)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.79)</td>
<td>(-3.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (1991–1994) (Scandinavia)</td>
<td>-15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-3.68)</td>
<td>(-4.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Others) (Japan)</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-0.76)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (1997–2001) (Japan)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations: 323

Notes: The decomposition is constructed in a similar manner to that in panel B of Table 2 but now $x$ and $y$ belong to \{91–94, 97–01, 08–09, OTHERS\} (OTHERS includes the years 90, 95–96, 02–07) and \{CORE, JAPAN, PIIGS, SCANDINAVIA\}, respectively. Panel A shows the coefficients corresponding to CORE, while the coefficients in panel B correspond to SCANDINAVIA and JAPAN. All coefficients are estimated by feasible GLS using annual data for 1990–2010. The countries considered in the sample are the same as in Table 2 but including Japan and Norway, CORE includes Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom while SCANDINAVIA denotes Finland, Norway, and Sweden. $t$ statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6: Decomposing the Contribution of Saving.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panel A: Financial Crises and Non-Peripherical Developed Economies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (Others) (Core)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (1991–1994) (Core)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (1997–2001) (Core)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Financial Crises in Developed Countries.

| GDP (Others) (Scandinavia) | 76*** (9.48) | 10 (1.21) | 40*** (5.61) | 46*** (6.37) |
| GDP (1991–1994) (Scandinavia) | 70*** (6.70) | 17 (1.62) | 10 (1.07) | 77*** (8.24) |
| GDP (Others) (Japan) | 44 (1.52) | –6 (–0.19) | –35 (–1.35) | 74*** (2.84) |
| GDP (1997–2001) (Japan) | 44 (1.19) | –7 (–0.18) | –55* (–1.66) | 93*** (2.80) |

Observations: 323

Notes: The decomposition is constructed in a similar manner to those in panel B of Tables 3 and 4, but now z and y belong to \{91–94, 97–00, 08–09, OTHERS\} (OTHERS includes the years 90, 95–96, 02–07) and \{CORE, JAPAN, PIIGS, SCANDINAVIA\}, respectively. Panel A shows the coefficients corresponding to CORE, while the coefficients in panel B correspond to SCANDINAVIA and JAPAN.

The coefficients in the first two columns are estimated as in Table 3, while those in columns three and four are estimated as in Table 4. The countries, country groups, and periods are the same as in Table 5. t statistics in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent, respectively.