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The Formation and Resilience of Law-Abiding Attitudes Under Authoritarianism: The Case of Russia.*

Kathryn Hendley† Peter Murrell‡

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Abstract

Authoritarian leaders frequently send mixed messages about law. While official rhetoric typically emphasizes obeying law, leaders have proven willing to sidestep the law when it proves inconvenient. We explore the impact of this duality on the attitudes of Russian citizens, drawing on three rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. To identify the separate effects of cohort, age, and survey year, we use existing estimates of a function relating age to the predisposition to form new attitudes. Our results indicate that one factor driving Russians' attitudes on law-abiding is the strength of the Kremlin's messaging on the importance of obeying the law, especially in their formative years. This effect would have been strongest for the oldest Russians. Yet, ceteris paribus, more years lived in Russia lead to declines in law-abiding attitudes. The net result of these two effects is that older Russians profess greater law abidingness. Putin's emphasis on obeying the laws on the books has left its mark in the increasing prevalence of law-abiding attitudes.

Keywords: law, authoritarianism, Russia, legal dualism, cohort and age effects

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† Roman Z. Livshits and Theodore W. Brazeau Professor of Law and Political Science, University of Wisconsin Madison, Wisconsin 53706. khendley@wisc.edu.

‡ Department of Economics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742, USA. Email: pmurrell@umd.edu

1. Introduction

Law is typically presumed to be peripheral, even irrelevant, in authoritarian countries (Wang 2015; Hale 2015). This presumption likely follows from the coverage of well-publicized cases in which the powerful are able to twist the law to serve their interests. The failure of political and economic elites to obey the law when it proves inconvenient is assumed to fuel a disdain for law among ordinary citizens. Such cases can be found in almost every contemporary authoritarian setting and tend to dominate media coverage of the legal system, leading many social scientists to dismiss law's relevance. Yet reality is more complicated. As scholars of Nazi Germany (Fraenkel 1941), Stalinist Russia (Sharlet 1977), and contemporary Russia (Bækken 2019; Hendley 2017; Trochev and Solomon 2018; Sakwa 2020) and China (Pils 2023) have recognized, alongside the cases in which outcomes are blatantly manipulated are a wealth of cases that are of interest only to the litigants themselves and which are decided in strict accord with the law on the books. The latter dominate the courts' dockets, both in the past and the present (Hendley 2017; Ng and He 2017). This sort of dualism is not just reflected in the courts – where the same judge might adhere rigorously to the law when deciding a mundane dispute but might hew to the informal norms favoring the regime in a politicized case – but also in citizens' expectations of law.[1] They are able to identify cases that are likely to be politicized: they are open to turning to the court to resolve simple cases but eschew legal solutions when confronting the state or other well-connected actors (Pils 2023; Bækken 2019; Hendley 2017).

Our interest is in how ordinary citizens living under legal dualism think about the role of law. Do they buy into the official ideology that insists that laws must be uniformly obeyed by all, or do

[1] Dualism is just one of several theoretical approaches developed by scholars of authoritarian law. These include authoritarian legality (Gallagher 2017), law and order (Cheesman 2022), rule by law (Massoud 2014), repressive law (Nonet and Selznick 2001), and an argument that the goal of authoritarian leaders is maintaining order not legality (Clarke 2022). Of these, dualism is the only approach that systematically places two competing visions of law at its center.

they question that narrative? Their attitudes are the product not just of state-generated messaging, but also of their own experiences. The effects of both components vary over time and across individuals. As a result, attitudes about law, often referred to as legal consciousness, are not uniform. Our study explores how legal consciousness is shaped by two factors: the socialization produced by the shifting rhetoric of different political regimes and the changing attitudes produced as citizens age and participate in the socioeconomic system.

Our focus on Russia contributes to the literature on why people obey the law which, to date, has largely been devoted to the U.S. and other democratic polities (Tyler 2006) that are hostile to the sort of quasi-official interference in legal proceedings that is tolerated under authoritarianism. We rely on results from the 2006, 2012, and 2018 rounds of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey. Our dependent variable reflects responses to a question that asked respondents to identify as either law abiding or nihilistic, the latter capturing a willingness to sidestep the law when it is perceived as inconvenient or unfair. In order to avoid prolixity in the remainder of the paper, we will refer to respondents as law abiding if they self identified as such. We emphasize, of course, that our measure of law abidingness captures only attitudes, and not behavior.

Figure 1 depicts some descriptive statistics for the whole sample, and for important subgroups. These belie the common wisdom that legal nihilism dominates Russians' attitudes towards law (Mehlich 2020; Zakhartsev 2015; Dawisha 2014; Matevosova 2014). In all three rounds and in all subgroups, the majority of respondents are law abiders, with the raw percentage increasing over time.

Figure 1:Percentage of Abiders in the Sample and Sub-Samples



In order to disentangle the effects of socialization and experience, we must separate cohort, aging, and period effects.[2] In situations like ours, with data on only one country, this involves introducing an extra identifying assumption. We approach this well-known problem in a novel way by using estimates derived from U.S. data of the importance of each year of a typical person's

[2] Fosse and Winship (2019) provide an overview of the age-period-cohort identification problem. They make clear that all solutions to this problem depend on assumptions that are not intrinsic to the core age-period-cohort model. Rather these assumptions must be based on a theory of the processes being studied. Further discussion of this point appears in Section 3.

life in that person's attitude formation (Ghitza et al. 2022).[3] We use these estimates to construct variables that capture the socialization of each person under each Russian political regime, with effective exposure to a regime varying over a person's lifetime because of greater susceptibility to ideology at certain ages. In contrast, we capture the general experience of daily life in the Soviet Union and Russia by assuming that such experience accumulates quadratically with age and is independent of cohort.

Our analysis uncovers intriguing composite effects of socialization and experience. As Figure 2 shows, within our sample, older Russians are more likely to be law abiding than younger ones.[4]



[3] In related work, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017) use data on different countries. Their identifying assumption is that there is a degree of homogeneity across countries. Stated that way, their approach and ours are similar in the sense of using information from outside a specific country.

[4] Note that there are only 2 respondents in their hundreds and 94 in their nineties. All other age groups contain more than 1,000 respondents.

However, this is not the ceteris paribus effect of age: it captures both an age effect and the effect of the different regimes under which Russians of different ages were socialized. We disentangle these two effects. We document the relationship between attitudes and the regime in power during a citizen's formative years. Regime effects, namely rhetoric vis-à-vis law, are particularly strong among older Russians, who, during their formative years, were the targets of an undeviating message of the need to obey law. This effect wanes with the ideological fervor of the regime and its ability to shut out contrary messages.

In tandem, Russians grow increasingly less law abiding as they age, a finding contrary to the conventional wisdom that people generally become more law abiding over time (Fine & van Rooji 2020; Tyler 2006). We conjecture that this finding reflects Russians' lifelong experiences with law.

Although the strength of the socialization and experience effects generally diminish from the era of Stalin onwards, there is one notable exception. Living under Putin has increased respondents' law abidingness. Given the popular impression of Putin's regime as being prepared to twist the law (both domestic and international) to achieve its goals, this may seem incongruous. But these extra-legal propensities, which are never openly conceded, exist in an uneasy partnership with the official rhetoric that, in a callback to the early days of the Soviet Union, strongly promotes the critical importance of abiding by the law on the books. The roots of Putin's stress on obeying the law on the books are different. He has no unifying ideology other than maintaining and enhancing his power. His commitment to law abidingness buttresses his signature policy of restoring authority to the central government, the so-called power vertical. This may be part of the explanation for respondents' increasing law abidingness.[5]

[5] Guriev and Treisman (2019: 101) explore the recent "emergence of softer, nonideological autocracies" and contrast them with the ideologically grounded dictatorships of the 20th century.

Our analysis is also relevant to the literature on the legacies of communism. There are several ways in which our work adds to this literature. First, we focus on attitudes to the law, which have previously been tangential to the analysis. Second, because we study Russia, we are able to consider the effects of a large variety of regime types under both communism and post-communism (as well as a short democratic period). We thus contribute to the varieties of authoritarianism literature and to the literature on the differences between the effects of communist and post-communist regimes (see, e.g. Northmore-Ball and Tertytchnaya (2023)).[6] Third, we produce precise estimates of the ceteris paribus effects of transferring one formative year experienced under one regime to another regime. Fourth, our analysis suggests that the greater law abidingness of older Russians relative to younger ones is not due to the accumulation of experience gained as a person ages, but rather due to the strength of the socialization experienced by the older generation. In fact, as previewed above, we find an effect of age that is different than in most existing studies.

The most comprehensive analysis of post-communist attitudinal legacies is that of Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017), who investigate how communism has affected attitudes on democracy, markets, social welfare, and gender equality. Their strongest conclusion, consistent with our findings, is that "communist regimes were overall remarkably effective in shaping the political attitudes of their subjects" (Pop-Eleches and Tucker 2017: 297).[7] One important difference between our results and theirs is that we find strong and robust differences between attitudes of those socialized under different types of authoritarian regimes.[8] In this respect our results are complementary to those of Northmore-Ball and Tertytchnaya (2023), who find that the propensity

[6] See also Pyle (2021) who shows the effects on attitudes of labor-market experiences during the years surrounding the fall of the Soviet Union.
[7] See also Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2020) and Mishler and Rose (2007).
[8] In contrast with our results below, Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2017: 294) state that "we do not find strong evidence in support of the general hypothesis that effects of exposure decrease from Stalinist to neo-Stalinist to post-totalitarian to reformist exposure."

to vote after 1990 is related to the character of the electoral mobilization that Russians experienced during their formative years.

We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of context—the role of law in Russia. Section 3 describes our data, particularly focusing on our measure of law abidingness and how we integrate the Ghitza et al. (2022) information into our data. Section 4 introduces our empirical framework and details how the construction of our data facilitates the identification of the different effects of the official ideology of varying types of political regimes. Section 5 describes our results, emphasizing political-regime and age effects, but also providing results on key demographic variables such as gender and age. Section 6 concludes and provides further thoughts.

2. The Role of Law in Russia – An Overview

Law has a checkered reputation in Russia. Belying its reputation as a lawless state, legislation covering most aspects of daily life has been on the books since the 1920s (Berman 1950; Maggs et al. 2020). The importance that various leaders attached to obeying these laws and, more importantly, the consequences for disobeying them, varied over time. The messaging under Stalin was relentless as was the follow through: penalties for violating both civil and criminal laws were imposed with little regard for extenuating circumstances. Though Stalin's tenure is understandably associated with terror, "terror alone was not the only or even the main form of social control used … before 1953." Instead, the Kremlin "embraced the criminal sanction as an instrument of rule" (Solomon 1996: 1). After Stalin's death, Khrushchev and Brezhnev continued to pay lip service to complying with the law, but many citizens were able to skirt the law without serious repercussions. Post-Stalin leaders would periodically roll out with great fanfare new laws or plans to prosecute criminal behavior that had previously been tolerated. For a time, arrests and convictions would spike. The passion would die out in relatively short order, relegating these

efforts to the back burner. Citizens learned to wait them out (Feofanov & Barry 1996; Holmes 1993; Solomon 1992).

This narrative with its emphasis on the messaging of the importance of the laws on the books does not fully capture the reality of how law has been experienced in Russia. The legal protections provided on paper proved impotent for those accused of anti-Soviet activities. The Stalinist purges were fueled by laws drafted to give officials maximum flexibility (Solomon 1996; Pomorski 1989). On the surface, the criminal proceedings appeared to live up to the dictates of the law, fooling domestic and international observers alike. The audio of these so-called "show trials" were broadcast to the nation. With no counter-narrative, it is hardly surprising that people generally believed the defendants were traitors, thereby reinforcing the regime's messaging about the importance of obeying the law.

Khrushchev's 1956 speech at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party began to expose the reality of legal dualism. The dualistic nature of the legal system affected fewer people but did not disappear, as the prosecution of dissidents in the 1960s and 1970s as well as the present-day prosecution of Kremlin opponents illustrates.

The official narrative shifted under Gorbachev. He advocated that the Soviet Union become a "rule-of-law-based state" (*pravovoe gosudarstvo*) with law applying equally to all. The radical nature of this shift becomes apparent as we home in on his language. Russian has two words for law: *pravo* and *zakon* (Livshits 1989). The former captures an amorphous notion of rights and justice, while the latter refers to written law.[9] Prior to Gorbachev, Kremlin-led discussions of law were consistently framed in terms of *zakon*, reflecting the assumption that law is imposed from above rather than evolving from societal attitudes and norms. The accompanying policy of

[9] Unsurprisingly, *zakon* serves as the root for legislation (*zakonodatel'stvo*), while *pravo* is the root for fairness (*spravedlivost'*) and human rights (*prava cheloveka*).

glasnost', more openness in public discussion, led to a deluge of accounts of various misuses of law by officials. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the rise of the Russian Federation, Yeltsin continued to rethink the role of law. The first article of the new constitution declared Russia to be a *pravovoe gosudarstvo*. At the same time, while the incidence of law being manipulated to serve the interests of the powerful diminished under both Gorbachev and Yeltsin, it did not go away.

Putin has ostensibly remained committed to the rule of law. But rather than referring to a *pravovoe gosudarstvo*, he typically talks about the "supremacy of law" (*verkhovenstvo zakona*). The profound implications are evident from his word choice. Although Putin's phrasing is often rendered in English as rule of law, it reflects a return to a commitment to obeying the laws on the books. At first glance, this may seem to reflect rule-of-law values, but two realities undermine its meaningfulness. First, whenever a statute or *zakon* proves inconvenient to the regime, it can easily be changed thanks to a legislature dominated by the Kremlin-backed party. Second, taking a leaf from the Stalinist playbook, Putin has championed purposely vague laws (such as those allowing almost anyone to be classified as a foreign agent). Interpreting these laws is left in the hands of his loyal minions. Laws dealing with the realities of daily life have not been affected, which helps explain the steady increase in use of courts over the post-Soviet period (Varaksin 2022).

3. Data: Implementing the Age-period-cohort Model

3.1 The dependent variable: abidingness

The Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey – Higher School of Economics (RLMS-HSE) is a nationally representative, household-based survey of Russians that uses a stratified cluster sample. Since 1992, it has been fielded on a regular basis.[10] It includes questions focusing on living

[10] For more information on the history of the RLMS-HSE, the sample design, replenishment sample designs, response rates and other key factors, see Kozyreva, Kosolapov & Popkin (2016). The website for the RLMS-HSE includes the questionnaires, data, and updates on the information contained in Kozyreva et al. (https://rlms-hse.cpc.unc.edu/, accessed April 29, 2022).

standards, health conditions, and basic demographic measures, administered through in-person interviews. Questions dealing with respondents' attitudes and behavior with respect to law were added to the survey rounds fielded in 2006, 2012, and 2018. The dataset we analyzed included 8,797, 15,288, and 13,429 respondents, respectively.[11]

Our analysis focuses on one of the law-related questions. Respondents were asked to agree or disagree on a five-point scale with the following statement: "If a person considers a law unjust, he has the right to 'go around' it" (*Esli chelovek schitaet zakon nespravedlivym, on imet pravo 'oboiti ego'*). We classified as law abiding those who responded that they somewhat disagreed or strongly disagreed with this statement. Those who were ambivalent, somewhat agreed, or strongly agreed were coded as being legal nihilists.

The question is designed to elicit responses that distinguish between a propensity for respecting or disrespecting law. Our question approaches this problem by asking respondents to reflect on their openness to "going around" a law (*zakon*) that they believe to be unjust (lacking in *pravo*). If respondents believe that *zakony* are inherently legitimate, they are likely to disagree with the statement. Respondents who lack respect for the legislative process are more likely to substitute their own moral code, leading them to agree with the statement. This nihilistic approach to law gives greater credence to their own internally generated concept of *pravo* than to *zakon*.

3,2 Explanatory Variables: Age-period-cohort

The point of departure for our estimation is the standard age-period-cohort framework, where the dependent variable, abide, is a function of when a person was born (cohort), the year in which the data was collected (period), the person's age, and possibly other variables. It is well known that

[11] Our dataset does not include those who did not answer the survey (8,066), those who did not answer the adult survey (7,605), and those who did not provide a substantive response to the question of interest (2,272). Hence, the RLMS-HSE sample of 55,457 was reduced to our 37,514.

in its most general form this model is not identified, and further assumptions are needed for estimation (Fosse and Winship 2019; Bell 2020). We focus our assumptions on the cohort effects, while leaving age and period in conventional forms.

A quadratic for age is used to capture the effect of continuing experience while living within Russian society. This interpretation follows from the fact that the effect of one more year does not depend on the person's age at the time that the year is experienced, and therefore is not reflective of cohorts. We use period fixed effects for the years (2006, 2012 and 2018) when the surveys were implemented (with 2006 the omitted effect). Given that the surveys were conducted in the Putin era, our estimates apply a particularly strong lens to the Putin period, allowing us to examine the effectiveness of the regime's ideological commitment to obeying the laws on the books.

3.3 From cohort effects to political-regime effects

As in many standard treatments, we will eventually interpret cohort effects as reflecting the lasting effects of political regimes. But the route by which we do so is a new one. First, we have to identify specific political regimes. The RLMS does not include measures of Soviet and/or Russian leaders' commitment to different conceptions of law. This is drawn from our synthesis of existing scholarship on the role of law over time. We divide the years of Soviet and Russian history into 12 non-overlapping periods, listed in Table A.1 of Appendix A. As already noted, both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods were notable for the existence of a duality in terms of ideology and behavior regarding law. The continuing theme of citizens' obligation to obey the law on the books would have been filtered through the political and practical realities of the day. Thus, how law was conceptualized shifted over time.

In Appendix Table A.1, we provide our reasoning underlying the choice of the 12 historical periods that we use in the analysis. In most cases, divisions correspond to a change in leadership.

Where marked changes occurred during one leadership, we assign more than one period to a specific leader. We highlight the political realities that served as a filter through which citizens' perceptions about law were refracted. On purely theoretical grounds, it is impossible to predict which eras would lead to a greater prevalence of law-abiding attitudes. For example, while the Kremlin's exhortations to obey the law were at their height during the purges, mass terror was too: the first aimed at producing law abiders and the other undermining the official messaging. The extent to which the regime's messaging was undermined was likely diminished by the inability of most Soviets to learn the true story of the purges while they were ongoing. On the other hand, Gorbachev's messaging was more subtle. He continued to implore obedience to the law on the books while tolerating – perhaps even encouraging – exposés about incidents in which state officials failed to do so.

Given that the starting point for our empirical model is a standard age-period-cohort model, we must find a way to untangle the Gordian knot of the linear dependence of cohort, age, and year of survey. Our identification strategy results in our interpreting the cohort variables as political-regime variables, a common interpretation, but we take a new approach in deriving that interpretation.

We adopt three general principles in our approach. First, a person's attitudes are a reflection of the regime's messaging throughout their lives, "a running tally of impressions" left by the messaging of the various regimes that the person has lived through (Ghitza et al. 2022: 520). Second, all years do not count equally in that running tally. For example, the formative-years hypothesis emphasizes the teenage years and the early-twenties as crucially important.[12] Third, the

[12] This is also referred to as the impressionable-years hypothesis. This hypothesis has been widely tested: see Krosnick and Alwin (1989), for an early study, von Wachter (2020) for a review of studies in labor economics,, and Osborne, Sears, Valentino (2011) in political science.

last century of Soviet and Russian history can be partitioned into the twelve periods described above, each having a different tenor for the regime's messaging on law, with that tenor being relatively homogeneous within each of the time periods.

To construct a single value for each respondent for each of the twelve variables corresponding to each of the twelve periods, we need a distribution over a person's lifetime of the importance of each year to a person's attitude formation. We obtain this from Ghitza et al. (2022), who use U.S. presidential voting data to estimate a function relating a person's age to the relative importance in attitude formation of the events experienced at that age. We use this function assuming that it captures universal aspects of the process of attitude formation, reflecting properties of the mind that are independent of any specific culture or political system. For example, the estimated function reflects the formative-years hypothesis, with events occurring around the age of 18 nearly three times as meaningful as those experienced in later life.

It is certainly a strong assumption to use a function estimated with U.S. presidential-voting data in the context of an analysis of the determinants of attitudes on law in Russia. Ultimately, our case for using this assumption rests on three premises. First, there is the need, emphasized by Fosse and Winship (2019) and Bell (2020), to address the age-period-cohort-identification problem using information that is external to the data and that characterizes core features of the process that generated the data. Second, there is the absence of any existing alternative approaches in the literature that so clearly capture the profile of age-related predispositions to attitude formation. Alternatives that have been commonly used in the literature invoke even blunter assumptions. If years lived under a specific regime counted equally whatever a person's age, the formative years hypothesis would not be reflected in the data. If one counted only the formative years as contributing to attitude formation, the regime's messaging has no effect on older people.

Third, the estimate from Ghitza et al. (2022) of the function relating a person's age to the relative importance of events experienced at that age has properties that are consistent with those that are discussed in the literature that reflect on the general properties of such functions.[13] We assume that this function reflects core psychological processes rather than the specifics of any country or any specific types of attitudes. While this is a strong assumption, it is commonly used in the literature (e.g. Krosnick and Alwin (1989)). Then transferring a function estimated in one domain—politics—to a somewhat different domain—law—is justified. Indeed, a set of recent articles in psychology, sociology, and political science on changes in attitudes over time have examined similarities and differences across different types of attitudes, and, in our reading, lead to no concern on our decision to apply the politics-derived estimates of Ghitza et al. (2022) to our legal domain.[14]

Using the Ghitza et al. (2022) function, respondent birthdates, and year of survey, we constructed the data for the 12 political-regime variables. Supplementary Appendix B details this process. Every observation in the dataset has a value for each of these variables. The value of any one regime variable is simply the sum of the relative importance in attitude formation of each of the years pertinent to the variable, taking into account the person's age. For each individual, the sum of all political-regime variables equals 1. Supplementary Appendix Table C.1 provides summary statistics on these political-regime variables and all others used in this study.

Finally, while we refer to these variables as regime variables, it is important to note that they arise by adding to a traditional cohort approach the assumptions given above.[15] In a very commonly used formulation, regime variables are constructed by applying the assumption that only the

[13] See for example Krosnick and Alwin (1989), Schuman and Corning (2000), Corning (2010), and Ghitza et al. (2022).
[14] See, for example, Ahlfeldt et al. (2022) and Lersch (2023) and the references cited therein.
[15] Appendix B.1 justifies this statement.

formative years matter and respondents are matched to political regimes by noting the regime in power in the respondent's formative years. Our approach is actually analogous to this, but we assume that all years matter, to a varying extent. Given the structure of our dataset, it is only implementable because of the use of the Ghitza et al. (2022) estimates. Cast in this light, it is easy to see that our approach is not a radical break with existing approaches. Rather, it solely breaks with the assumption that the formative years are all that matter and uses the assumption that the messaging of all political regimes matters, but to different extents for respondents of different ages.

3.4 Additional Explanatory Variables

We use dummy variables for whether the respondent is female, ethnic Russian, lives in an urban setting, and subscribes to the Orthodox religion. Three variables measure the amount of schooling: the number of years of elementary and secondary school combined; the number of years in technical institutes, which provide vocational education; and the number of years of university. Three variables capture self-perceived socioeconomic status, reflecting answers to questions that asked respondents to place themselves on a nine-step ladder in terms of wealth, power, and respect. These are implemented using dummy variables that capture those who placed themselves on the top five steps. Supplementary Appendix C provides further details on the construction of these variables.

4. The empirical framework

We estimate the following linear fixed-effects probability model on a repeated cross-section:

$$abide_{ij} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^{11} \beta_k C_{kij} + \beta_a age_{ij} + \beta_{12} survey12_{ij} + \beta_{18} survey18_{ij} + \rho_i + \sum_k \theta_k X_{kij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \quad [1]$$

where $abide_{ij}$ is a dummy variable indicating whether person *j* in region *i* thinks that going around the law is unacceptable, $(C_{1ij}, \ldots C_{11ij}) = (early_{ij}, purges_{ij}, WWII_{ij}, postWWII_{ij}, khrushchev_{ij}, brezhnev1_{ij}, stagnation_{ij}, gorbachev_{ij}, republic_{ij}, yeltsin_{ij}, putin1_{ij})$, age_{ij} is respondent age in

the survey year, $survey12_{ij}$, and $survey18_{ij}$ are dummy variables indicating survey year, ρ_i are a set of fixed effects indicating the region in which a respondent lives.[16] The X_{kij} are a set of other relevant variables, which we introduce as the analysis unfolds. $Putin2_{ij}$ and $survey06_{ij}$ are omitted. ε_{ij} is the error term. α, β_1,…β_{12}, β_{18}, β_a, and θ_k are coefficients to be estimated.

From which variations are political-regime effects (β_1,…, β_{11}) identified? To construct examples, assume that [1] contains only age, survey-year, and political-regime. Then deliberate on the residuals of $abide_{ij}$ and (C_{1ij}, … C_{11ij}) derived from regressing these variables on age and survey-year dummies. The question of identification is then whether there is any residual linearly independent variation in the residual political-regime variables and what form that variation takes. Consider three people answering the 2006 survey, A, born in 1970, B in 1971, and C in 1988. Then the differences in the values of $Gorbachev_{ij}$ for A and B relative to the same differences for $Yeltsin_{ij}$ will be comparatively larger because Gorbachev is leader during the formative years of A and B. In contrast, differences in the values of $Gorbachev_{ij}$ between A and C relative to their differences for $Yeltsin_{ij}$ will be smaller than for A and B because C's formative years are under Yeltsin.

This is just one clear-cut example of the variation that produces identification. There are many others. More generally, for any sample of three observations for which there was variation in either survey year or birthdate then the residualized political-regime variables would not be linearly dependent and all three observations would contribute to identification. The use of the function relating age to the relative importance of life events brings much more information to the estimation of political-regime effects than do many previous attempts to solve the cohort-age-year dependency problem.

[16] Russia is a federal system with over 80 "subjects" which, depending on their history, are known as republics, krais, and oblasts. Three cities (Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Sevastopol) are categorized as subjects. We use the neutral term of region.

5. Results

Table 1 presents the results from six estimations of equation [1] that use cohort, age, and survey year as key explanatory variables and sequentially add a series of controls. All estimations include regional fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the regional level.[17] We first comment on how the key coefficient estimates change from specification to specification, and then move to discussion of the effects of each of the variables.

Age (in decades), the square of age, and survey year are added in column (2). The estimated coefficients of the cohort variables markedly change, a reflection of the well-known problem of the entanglement of age and cohort effects. The addition in column (3) of gender, ethnic Russian, and Orthodox religion do not appreciably change the key coefficient estimates. Addition of the education variables in (4) results in large changes. After that, the key estimates do not change appreciably with the addition of urban-rural status (5) and the set of variables on self-perceived socioeconomic status (6).

Notably, for the coefficient estimates of age, survey-year, and 10 of the 11 cohorts, there are increases in absolute size when moving from specification (1) to specification (6). This is important because the effect of the addition of observed explanatory variables plausibly provides insights into the likely effects of omitted variable bias due to unobservables (Altonji et al. 2005; Oster 2019). A formal application of the Oster (2019) procedure would provide estimates of an interval in which an estimated coefficient would almost certainly lie if all omitted-variable problems were solved. Here, there is no need to apply that procedure because it would simply

[17] A large percentage of respondents have family members who were also surveyed. Moreover, some respondents contributed responses in more than one year. With our data indicating that there is a low level of migration of individuals or their family members across regions, and thus family membership is nearly nested within regions, regional clustering should counter biases in standard errors due to the non-independence of the error terms of family members and/or multiple individual responses. Nevertheless, we examined the robustness of the results when clustering on membership in the same family, both within time periods and across time periods, the latter implying clustering on individuals as well. The results are effectively unchanged. See Table F.1 in Appendix F.

Table 1: Estimates of Linear-Probability Models Predicting Abidingness

	Dependent variable*: Abide*					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Early	-0.591	0.847	0.943	2.026*	2.026*	2.158**
(1906-34)	(0.452)	(0.740)	(0.763)	(0.751)	(0.749)	(0.756)
Purges	0.739	1.727	1.601	2.295*	2.296*	1.923
(1935-39)	(0.957)	(1.109)	(1.099)	(1.123)	(1.121)	(1.178)
WWII	0.492	1.924*	2.090*	2.983**	2.983**	3.312**
(1940-45)	(0.735)	(0.903)	(0.942)	(0.957)	(0.950)	(0.956)
PostWWII	-0.068	1.002	1.007	1.953**	1.953**	1.914**
(1946-53)	(0.379)	(0.656)	(0.651)	(0.642)	(0.642)	(0.686)
Khrushchev	0.102	1.092*	1.138*	1.755***	1.755***	1.788***
(1954-64)	(0.174)	(0.425)	(0.445)	(0.428)	(0.426)	(0.483)
Brezhnev1	-0.013	0.861*	0.882*	1.515***	1.515***	1.535**
(1965-74)	(0.158)	(0.423)	(0.430)	(0.420)	(0.418)	(0.444)
Brezhnev2	-0.054	0.641*	0.668*	1.072***	1.072***	1.081***
(1975-84)	(0.106)	(0.271)	(0.280)	(0.267)	(0.266)	(0.296)
Gorbachev	-0.341+	0.278	0.289	0.719**	0.719**	0.741**
(1985-91)	(0.185)	(0.251)	(0.252)	(0.240)	(0.238)	(0.255)
Yeltsin1	1.223+	0.503	0.527	0.563	0.563	0.581
(1992-93)	(0.624)	(0.693)	(0.735)	(0.734)	(0.734)	(0.727)
Yeltsin2	-0.433***	0.499*	0.503*	0.781**	0.781**	0.781**
(1994-99)	(0.111)	(0.233)	(0.236)	(0.226)	(0.226)	(0.239)
Putin1	-0.072	0.093	0.097	0.201*	0.201**	0.205*
(2000-11)	(0.062)	(0.071)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.074)	(0.082)
Age in decades		-0.132**	-0.134**	-0.229***	-0.229***	-0.233***
		(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.044)
Age in decades, squared		0.003+	0.003	0.004*	0.004*	0.004*
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
2012 survey		0.172***	0.145**	0.209***	0.209***	0.208***
		(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.052)
2018 survey		0.292**	0.270**	0.404***	0.404***	0.407***
		(0.086)	(0.091)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.095)

Table 1, continued

	Dependent variable*: Abide*					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender			0.079***	0.072***	0.072***	0.069***
			(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Ethnic Russian			-0.003	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
			(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Orthodox			0.036+	0.038*	0.038*	0.035+
			(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)
Years of school				0.009**	0.009**	0.009**
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Years of technical school				0.004	0.004	0.004
				(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Years of university				0.018***	0.018***	0.018***
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Urban					0.002	0.008
					(0.043)	(0.039)
Wealth ladder						-0.025+
						(0.013)
Power ladder						0.010
						(0.015)
Respect ladder						0.046**
						(0.014)
Constant	0.689***	0.551***	0.514***	0.417***	0.416***	0.392***
	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.054)	(0.066)	(0.071)
Observations	37514	37514	37514	37335	37335	35407

Notes: Standard errors clustered on regions in parentheses.
$^{+}$p<0.10 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
omitted variables: *Putin2*, 2006 survey

indicate, when comparing columns (1) and (5) for example, that zero was not in the estimated intervals for the coefficients of age, survey-year, and 10 of the 11 cohorts.

The one cohort variable to which the comments in the previous paragraph do not apply is that for the short *Yeltsin1* era, which captures the post-collapse period when the executive and legislative branches were at loggerheads, culminating in the tragic events of October 1993. That coefficient is positive and marginally significant in column (1), and smaller and non-significant in all other columns. If the Oster (2019) procedure were applied to the estimates for this variable, then few additional insights would be generated beyond a simple perusal of the estimated values of the *Yeltsin1* coefficient and its standard errors in columns (4)-(6): acceptance of the null hypothesis that this coefficient is zero.

The variables included in columns (1)-(5) are plausibly exogenous, but it is harder to make that case for the 'ladder' variables, which measure self-perceptions of socioeconomic status. Given this, we focus on the estimates in column (5) in most of the following comments. Nevertheless, the inclusion of socioeconomic status in column (6) provides evidence on robustness of the estimates, given the similarities between estimates in columns (5) and (6).

5.1 Political-regime effects

The numerical values of the estimated cohort coefficients reflect, most of all, the emphasis placed on the *zakon*-oriented vision of law during Russians' formative years in various eras.[18] The values of the coefficients suggest that acceptance of this law-and-order view of law was greater in the periods when it was pushed most firmly. Thus, acceptance is highest during the Stalinist era. In the early decades of the Soviet regime, many genuinely believed in the regime's policies (Silver 1987), including the obligation to obey the law. The absence of a free press left most unaware of the misuses of law by the Kremlin. Those who were disenchanted learned to "speak Bolshevik" and keep any divergent thoughts to themselves (Kotkin 1995: 220). As the rituals of Soviet life,

[18] All effects are estimated relative to the *Putin2* era.

such as joining the youth organizations of the Communist Party, became rote obligations rather than reflections of a belief in the Party's tenets, the extent to which Russians took these tenets to heart diminished (Raleigh 2006; Bahry 1987). Consistently, the coefficients for belief in the importance of obeying the law decline over time. Figure 3 shows that decline.

Further interpretation of these coefficients provides information on the strength of the effects. Examine comparisons for a person born in 1934 and responding to the 2018 survey. She experienced her 20th year during the Khrushchev era. For this 84-year-old, the 20th year accounts for 0.024 of her total weighted experience. Now suppose that by some wonder of time travel she had actually instead experienced that 20th year in the Gorbachev era, all other things equal (including of course her age of 84 in 2018 and her age during all other cohorts!). Then, using the estimated coefficients in column (5) of Table 1, the probability that the person was an abider would decline by 0.025. This is 3.9% of the mean of the abide dummy variable within the 2018 sample.[19]

This thought experiment can be carried out for a person of any age between any two eras in which she lived. Supplementary Appendix D provides estimates of the effects derived from a multitude of thought experiments. Consider any individual who was 20 years-old in the first year of any of the twelve political regimes. Then examine the effect on the 2018 probability of abidingness for that individual, when by the same magic of time travel, she instead experienced her 20th year under a different political regime. Supplementary Appendix D provides the numerical values and statistical significances of the resultant effect, for all possible pairs of political regimes.

[19] The 0.025 arises from the following calculation. The Khrushchev coefficient is 1.755. The 20th year accounts for 0.024 of the weighted accumulated experience of an 84-year-old. The Gorbachev coefficient is 0.719. Hence, the total comparative static effect is [1.755-0.719]*0.024=0.025. The proportion of abiders in 2018 is 0.638 and therefore the 3.9% is 100*0.0.25/0.638.

Figure 3: The Declining Size and Significance of the Effect of Socialization



Note: Coefficients are those appearing in column (5) of Table 1. 95% confidence bands.

Fully 75% of the effects are statistically significant at the 10% level. Effect sizes are considerable. For example, the years from 18 to 24 account for 0.172 of a person's total weighted experience. If all these years were transferred from the *Khrushchev* era to the *Gorbachev* era, then in 2018 the estimated probability that the person was an abider would decline by 0.178, or 27.8% of the mean estimated probability in the 2018 sample.

5.2 Age

The coefficient on age (in decades) in column (5) is statistically and substantively significant. The estimated coefficient on age-squared is statistically significant and positive, but small, so that the relationship between age and being an abider is only slightly curvilinear.[20] For every decade of aging, the probability of being an abider declines by 0.23. This finding is unusual. Following Tyler (2006), it has become widely accepted that people tend to become more law abiding as they grow older. However, many of the pertinent statistical studies do not clearly identify the ceteris paribus causal effect of age.[21]

Plausibly, then, our estimated age effect reflects the tortuous twists and turns of Russians' lifelong experiences with law. Studies of the quotidian reality of how law operated reveal that the majority of Russians have been able to rely on the law working as written (Feifer 1964; Hendley 2017). Yet following Khrushchev's 1956 revelations about the abuses of *zakony* under Stalin, their eyes were opened to the dualistic nature of the law. They learned about the willingness of the powerful to manipulate law to advance their interests. They observed qualitatively different abuses of the law in the successive decades (Pomeranz 2019). Many citizens responded in kind by using *blat* or connections to achieve goals that were at odds with the law on the books (Ledeneva 1998). We surmise that these experiences may have contributed to Russians growing disenchantment with law as reflected in the negative trajectory of their attitudes as they age.

5.3 Survey year and the Putin era

The coefficients on survey years reflect the experience of the Putin years on respondents of all ages and all cohorts. Each year experienced under Putin, ceteris paribus, raised the expected

[20] Supplementary Appendix E, Figure E.1 makes this point clear.
[21] Mishler and Rose (2007) do separate cohort and time and find the opposite effect of age, more in line with the traditional view. Arguably Pop-Eleches and Tucker's (2017) results on the age effect are consistent with ours. For four attitudinal variables, they find that the ceteris paribus effect of age is one that reduces support for the positions taken by the communist regimes.

probability of abidingness by 0.034. When he came to power in 2000, Putin returned to a Soviet-era vision of law grounded exclusively in *zakon*. However, in contrast to the post-Stalin Soviet-era leaders, for whom obeying the law on the books was expected but never central (Lipson 1962), the supremacy of *zakon* has been a keystone policy for Putin. Unlike his Soviet predecessors who would loudly champion certain *zakony*, only to move on when new priorities asserted themselves, Putin's commitment has not been ephemeral. While Putin certainly has areas of law that interest him more than others and effectively signals this, the importance he attaches to societal obedience to law has never waned. He has backed it up by reinvigorating the formal legal system through the expansion of jury trials and justice-of-the-peace courts and has used his dominance in the parliament to pass critical legislation that had been stymied by the political stalemate of the 1990s (Pomeranz 2019). At the same time, his years in power have seen the continuation of Soviet-era practices of telephone law, with powerful figures able to dictate the outcome of cases in which they have an interest. Now, though, such cases are not limited to those with political clout (Ledeneva 2013), but also extend to those with economic clout (Taylor 2018). Just as before, judges take pains to present the results in these cases as reflecting the law, which is only possible thanks to the deliberately vague language of the laws (*zakony*).

The results on survey year would therefore reflect the net effect of two factors. First, there is the fact that the supremacy of *zakon* has been a keystone policy for Putin, and this has been backed by institutional measures consistent with this commitment. Second, there is the continuation of Soviet-era practices of legal dualism. Our results tend to suggest that this first factor has been more important, at least in determining attitudes on law abidingness.

5.4 The Effect of Age Versus Intergenerational Variations in Attitudes

The above comments on cohort, age, and survey-year all reflect the effects of ceteris paribus changes in these variables. However, these ceteris paribus changes can never correspond to the differences between any two people: different cohorts have different ages; different surveys imply different ages. Thus, the negative ceteris paribus effect of age on abidingness does not necessarily imply that older Russians will be less abiding than younger ones. Comparisons between the young and old imply a combination of age and cohort effects.

Using the estimates in Table 1 column (5), Figure 4 depicts predictions on abidingness levels of older and younger Russians, given data on all cohort-age combinations that are feasible in 2012. Our estimated model predicts that, as a group, older Russians are more law abiding than their



Notes: For ethnic Russian, urban, orthodox males in Volgograd oblast, who have completed 11 years of secondary education but no post-secondary education. 95% confidence intervals.

younger counterparts. From ages 40 to 95, abidingness increases with age: for those born in the pre-Brezhnev2 eras, the effect of early socialization within the *zakon*-driven official vision of law increasingly outweighs the negative effect of Russians' lifelong experiences with the law. Notably the patterns in Figure 2, reflecting sample characteristics, and those in Figure 4, reflecting predictions from our estimated model, are very similar.

5.5 Gender, education, and other demographic *variables*

We explored the relevance of key demographic variables. Gender is highly statistically significant. Women have a probability of being abiders that is 0.072 higher than men, which constitutes 11.7% of the baseline rate of abiding (0.614) in the raw sample. Our finding is consistent with the existing literature which holds that women are generally more law-abiding than are men.[22]

We created a dummy variable indicating Russian ethnicity. The effect is neither statistically nor substantively significant, a finding consistent with prior studies (Hendley 2012b; Gibson 2003). We also distinguished between urban and rural residents. Although some have found that rural residents in Russia tend to have greater trust in political institutions (Gudkov et al 2019; Mishler & Rose 2001), this factor has not had much predictive power in studies that focus on law in Russia (Hendley 2012b; Gibson 2003). Our findings are consistent.

The variable 'Orthodox' captures those who considered themselves to be Russian Orthodox.[23] It is statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.038, 6% of the baseline rate of being a law abider. This makes intuitive sense. Church members commit themselves to unquestioning adherence to a wide variety of rules. Extending this compliant attitude to the secular realm is

[22] See Tom & Granie (2011); Tyler (2006); and Yagil (1998) generally and Hendley (2012b) on Russia.
[23] A variable based on the number of believers would have been an equally compelling measure of religiosity. Unfortunately, this question was not included on the 2006 round of the RLMS. For the 2012 and 2018 rounds, 89% of believers were Russian Orthodox.

natural, especially considering the symbiotic relationship between Patriarch Kirill, the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, and Putin.

Education matters. The variable 'school' measures the number of years of elementary and/or secondary education received. Its values range from 0 to 12 years, but 93% of the sample lie in the range 8-11, thus differences between any two respondents of more than 3 years are not common. The coefficient is 0.009 and statistically significant. A 3-year increase in school leads to a 0.027 increase in the probability of being an abider.

The effect of attending university is highly statistically significant and substantively important. 30% of the sample have a university education and two-thirds of those spent the five years necessary to earn a basic undergraduate degree. A typical respondent with a university education has a higher probability of being an abider of 0.09. Higher levels of education are generally associated with greater institutional trust (Hakhverdian & Mayne 2012). The rationale is that university graduates are better able to understand the need for functional institutions.[24] This includes the legal system, which is grounded in the social compact that the obligation to obey the law is universal. Our finding is consistent with prior Russia-based studies (Pokida & Zybunovskaia 2020; Hendley 2012a & b).

In order to control for socioeconomic status, we made use of three questions that asked respondents to place themselves on a nine-step ladder in terms of wealth, power, and respect. The responses for each are captured in a dummy variable indicating those who placed themselves on the top five steps. Power emerges as unimportant. This is intriguing, given that the question was framed in terms of individual rights, with respondents placing themselves on lower steps if they

[24] From this, it follows that every additional year of secondary education increases the likelihood of being an abider.

felt they had few or no rights. While it is intuitive that those who feel themselves powerless in these terms would have little faith in law, our data do not support that story.

Respondents who put themselves on the top steps in terms of wealth were less likely to be law abiders, though the coefficient of 0.025 is only marginally statistically significant. Although some studies argue that Russians with higher incomes are more likely to see value in law (Pokida & Zybunovskaia 2020; NAFI 2021), the only prior study of the incidence of legal nihilism found that wealthier Russians were significantly more likely to be nihilistic (Hendley 2012b). This is consistent with our findings. We also found that those who feel well-respected are significantly more likely to be law abiders. These results are consistent with the more general literature on institutional trust, which posits a positive spillover effect from personal life satisfaction to institutions (Listhaug & Wiberg 1995: 315).

5.6 Robustness exercises

The above discussion of our findings is based primarily on one regression, column (5) in Table 1. Robustness exercises are implicit in that table in the sense that the results are consistent across columns (3)-(6), where we implement various versions of the age-period-cohort model by including a succession of additional variables. This subsection adds further exercises, showing that the results are confirmed in a variety of different specifications.

In the regressions of Table 1, we calculated standard errors based on regional clustering following the presumption that the error terms of respondents living in the same local polity might not be independent. In the RLMS, some respondents answer in multiple years and some family members of respondents are also respondents. Therefore, we invoke an alternative clustering approach, assuming that the error terms of the same respondent in different years or the respondent and fellow family members might not be independent. The results appear in Appendix Table F.1,

whose structure matches that of Table 1. The use of Table F.1 instead of Table 1 would cause no change in core conclusions.

As indicated in section 3.1, we converted a 5-point scale to a dichotomized variable to construct our dependent variable *abide*. Table F.2 shows the results if we do not dichotomize but simply use the 5-point scale as the dependent variable. The core conclusions do not change. In all the regressions reported so far, we have used linear probability models in the standard way as approximations for logit or ordered logit models. Table 4.3 shows results if we implement a logit regression: the core conclusions remain.

6. Concluding Reflections

"Russia is not a lawless society, only one in which the law is frequently manipulated" (Bækken 2019: 175). Legal dualism, which has been ever present in the Soviet Union and Russia, provides a framework for analysis. Courts twist the law beyond recognition in cases with political implications. Yet, the same courts are sticklers for the letter of the law in mundane cases, consistent with the official pronouncements to which Soviet and Russian citizens have been continually exposed. This dualism has given rise to a remarkably nuanced legal consciousness in Russia. By estimating the effect on survey respondents of the socialization arising from regime messaging under different political regimes, we show that although the Kremlin's basic message encouraging Russians to obey the law (*zakon*) has remained consistent, the impact of this message has been strongest when most resolute and ideologically driven. This impact diminishes as ideological fervor gave way to careerism under Brezhnev and becomes negligible in the post-Soviet era. There is no sign in our estimates that those who came of age under Putin have been especially affected by the official rhetoric extolling the importance of abiding by the law. Nevertheless, the Putin years have evidenced a significant decline in nihilism. Why this has happened must remain a

question for further research. One possible hypothesis is that the older generations have been especially susceptible to the resurrection from the Stalinist period of the idea of rigid adherence to the written law. Another is that as court use has expanded, the recognition that law mostly works as intended has generally grown.

What lessons can be learned from this Russian case study? It suggests two distinct situations in which an authoritarian regime can shape (and even reshape) attitudes towards law. Under Stalin, the unrelenting messaging could hold sway over citizens' own contrary experiences because information was limited. People were told that the defendants in the purge trials were traitors and, even if the evidence often strained credulity, there was no easily available information that disproved it. Indeed, to question it would have risked arrest. The Putin effect is different. At the time of our surveys, although regime enemies were being increasingly targeted on the basis of vaguely worded laws, Russians were able to access alternative news sources (both domestic and international) that often exposed the fallacy of the official rhetoric. However, most Russians rely on television for their news ("Preferred News Sources" 2020; Greene and Robertson 2019: 19, 29), which is firmly under the control of the Kremlin (Pomerantsev 2015). The information provided is skewed in favor of the regime (Rozenas and Stukal 2019). And that information might be consistent with personal experiences in mundane cases in the courts, and with reports on the experiences of neighbors, friends, and family. The practical result is a knowledge gap between those who dominate our survey results, ordinary citizens who accept the Kremlin messaging at face value, and a small, more curious and well-informed minority (Guriev and Treisman 2019; Szostek 2018). It is an open question as to whether this is because the messaging has been particularly effective or whether the daily experiences of Russian citizens in the Putin years have been less inconsistent with that messaging than in previous years.

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Supplementary Appendixes for

"The Formation and Resilience of Law-Abiding Attitudes Under Authoritarianism: The Case of Russia"

Kathryn Hendley & Peter Murrell

April 30, 2024

Appendix A: The Political Regimes and Their Characteristics

Table A.1: The Political Regimes and Cohort Variable Names

Span	Variables	Political filter
1906-34	*Early*	October Revolution (1917) brings Communist Party to power. First decades in power marked by drastic policy shifts, including War Communism, the New Economic Policy, and introduction of planned economy with industrialization and collectivization. Courts initially replaced by revolutionary tribunals but reinstated in short order.
1935-39	*Purges*	Continued rebuilding of formal legal system, which is used for mundane disputes, is combined with the use of mass terror in the form of conveyor-belt prosecutions under the criminal code for vaguely-defined anti-Soviet behavior.
1940-45	*WWII*	Heightened patriotism.
1946-53	*PostWWII*	Recovery from the devastation of the war combined with a return to politicized prosecutions, albeit on a more selective basis.
1954-64	*Khrushchev*	Khrushchev's "secret speech" in 1956 exposes excesses of Stalinism and opens the door to legal rehabilitation of low-profile victims of purges. Some willingness to tolerate criticism of the regime, but targeted prosecutions for anti-Soviet behavior persists.
1965-74	*Brezhnev1*	Criticism of regime politics no longer tolerated, leading to increased (but not mass) arrests. Efforts to defend alleged anti-Soviet activities as protected by the constitution fail. Continued willingness to tolerate suggestions on economic policy.
1975-84	*Brezhnev2*	Persistent economic shortages that, by 1974, had led to stagnation. Sidestepping law by using connections to secure shortage goods is mostly tolerated. Focus on maintaining status quo domestically.
1985-91	*Gorbachev*	Rethinking central precepts of Soviet system. Introduced concept of rule of law, stressing justice rather than obedience to the written law.
1992-93	*Yeltsin1*	Introduction of market to replace planned economy. Conflicts between legislative and executive branches culminate in armed conflict in October 1993.
1994-99	*Yeltsin2*	Executive branch preeminence in new constitution. Most policies via executive order due to continuing opposition in legislature.
2000-11	*Putin1*	Reenergizes the central government's role. Judicial system reformed to increase accessibility and introduce jury trials.
2012-18	*Putin2*	Putin returns to the presidency in 2012 and doubles down on ensuring his personal power. The legislature passes vague laws aimed at silencing opposition.

Note: *Putin2* ends in 2018 because that is the last year of survey data included in our analysis.

Appendix B: The Construction of the Cohort/Regime Variables

B.1 The basis of the estimating equation

Before turning to the data, we provide an informal proof that our estimating equation in the paper (equation (1)) corresponds to the Ghitza et al. (2022) framework, given of course assumptions appropriate to the context in which our model is estimated. This exposition then illuminates the process by which we construct our cohort/regime variables. We use a very simple scenario, simply to allow us to avoid the tedious details entailed in taking into account multiple regimes and in making sure that our summations do not indicate that respondents experienced political events when they were not alive.

We examine a measure of the cumulated experiences (or running tally) of a person who is age *a* in year *p*. We assume there are only two distinct regimes experienced by the person. The person is born into regime R_1 and year *p* is during regime R_2, with the last year of R_1 being *d*, with $p - a < d < p$. According to the Ghitza et al. (2022) formulation, the accumulated experiences are then:

$$\sum_{k=0}^{d-p+a} v_k e_{a-p+k} + \sum_{k=d-p+a+1}^{i} v_k e_{a-p+k}$$

where v_k is the weight that a person places on events experienced at age *k*, while e_t measures the events experienced at year *t*, which are the same for all those alive at time *t*.

Now assume that the experience of a regime (the e_{a-p+k} above) is the same in all years of a regime and denote that yearly experience by r_1 for regime R_1 and r_2 for R_2. Then the above simplifies to:

$$r_1\left(\sum_{k=0}^{d-p+a} v_k\right) + r_2\left(\sum_{k=d-p+a+1}^{a} v_k\right)$$

One final adjustment ensures that accumulated experience is measured on the same scale for people of all ages. (That is, if all regimes were the same we would want all respondents to have the same measure of experience.) This adjustment is provided by dividing by the sum of all weights from 0 to *a*. Thus, our expression becomes:

$$r_1\left[\left(\sum_{k=0}^{d-p+a} v_k\right) \Big/ \left(\sum_{k=0}^{a} v_k\right)\right] + r_2\left[\left(\sum_{k=d-p+a+1}^{a} v_k\right) \Big/ \left(\sum_{k=0}^{a} v_k\right)\right]$$

Therefore, a person's accumulated experiences are characterized by the coefficients r_1 and r_2 each multiplied by a sum of the pertinent age-related weights divided by the sum of the weights for all years of the person's life. If this expression appeared as one element of a standard regression equation, as in the paper, then one could estimate the regime effects, coefficients r_1

and r_2, if one had data on the weights, v_k. It is the estimation of such weights that is the major contribution of Ghitza et al. (2022) and, to our knowledge, the only source for these numerical estimates. As described in the paper, we draw on their estimates to calculate our data on the weighted experience of all respondents to each of the 12 regimes.

B.2 Using the Ghitza et al. (2022) estimates to construct our data on cohorts/regimes

We use the data from Figure 4(L) of Ghitza et al. (2022) which shows the relationship between age and the amount of influence on attitudes of events experienced at that age for a person who is 70 years old. Because the particular results of Ghitza et al. (2022) could reflect artefacts specific to the US, for example, voting rules and the time of elections, we smooth their data with a four-period moving average. We call the resultant relationships, the experience density function. Because there are respondents in our sample who are older than 70, we extended the Ghitza et al. (2022) density function to age 100 by simply assuming that the proportionate influence of each year after 70 fell linearly to zero at age 100 from the value at age 67.[25] Thus, for example, experiences in the 85th year of a person's life are half as important as those in the 70th year. Given that fewer than 3% of our observations are for respondents over the age of 80, the precise form of this extrapolation is unlikely to have any appreciable effects on our results. The values of the experience density function were adjusted to ensure that the proportionate effects of experiences at all ages from 1 to 100 summed to unity. Figure B.1 depicts the experience density function used in the paper.

We used this density function, birthdates, and the survey year to construct the data for the 12 political-regime variables listed in Table A.1 above. More specifically, let w_t be the proportion of influence on the attitudes of a 100-year-old person that is due to events experienced at year *t*. (These are analogous to the v_k used for the example in appendix subsection B.1 above.) For notational convenience, set $w_t = 0$ if $t \leq 0$. Consider person *i* who was born in year s_i and who was a respondent on the survey in year (or period) p_i ($s_i < p_i$). Because the details for every political-regime variable are different, we simply provide an example. Consider the construction of $Khrushchev_i$, for person *i*. Obviously, $Khrushchev_i$, = 0 if $s_i > 1964$. If $s_i \leq 1964$, then:

$$Khrushchev_i = \sum_{t=1954-s_i}^{1964-s_i} w_t \Big/ \sum_{t=1}^{p_i-s_i} w_t \qquad \text{(B.1)}$$

Thus, the value of $Khrushchev_i$ is simply the sum of the values of the density function over all the ages of person *i* that are relevant for the Khrushchev years divided by the values of the density function at all ages that are relevant to person *i* at the time of the survey. This

[25] The Ghitza et al. (2019) data rise in value at ages 68 and 69 that is likely to result from sampling error. The data trend downwards from age 56 to 67. Our linear interpolation effectively continues this trend.

immediately implies, for example, that the value of $Khrushchev_i$ will be higher for a person born in 1955 and answering the 2006 survey than for a person answering the same survey and having been born in 1956 because the person born in 1955 will be slightly older but still younger than the formative years. It is such variations (and many others) that provide the information that leads to the identification of the causal effects.

Given equation (B.1), the variables are scaled to reflect the relative importance of the various political regimes for each respondent. By construction, they sum to 1 for each respondent. Every observation in the dataset will have a score on each of the 12 political-regime variables, with that score equal to zero if the person did not live during a particular time-period corresponding to a specific political regime.

Figure B.1



Appendix C: Additional details on the data.

The ethnicity variable:

We created a dummy variable to capture respondents who, when queried, identified as ethnic Russians (*russkii*).

The religion variable:

Respondents were asked about their religious affiliation. They were given a choice between Russian Orthodox (*pravoslavie*), Islam (*musul'manstvo*), another religious persuasion, or being affiliated with no religion. We created a dummy variable for those who identify as Orthodox.

The education variables:

The RLMS included a complicated module of questions about education. These were divided into three sections that addressed (1) grammar and high school; (2) technical institutes of various stripes attended after graduating from high school (*tekhnicheskoe uchilishche*); and (3) academic institutes and universities. As to each, interviewers recorded the number of years attended, any specialization, and whether the respondent received a diploma. Our education variables are drawn from the number of years the respondent attended each type of educational institution, i.e., years of school, years of technical school, and years of university.

The urban variable:

Interviewers for the RLMS divided the locations where respondents lived into four categories: large city (*oblastnoi tsentr*), city (*gorod*), small town (*pocelok gorodshogo tipa*), and village (*derevnia*). We created a dummy variable in which the first two options were coded as urban and the second two were coded as rural.

The socioeconomic 'ladder' variables.

The RLMS-HSE consistently included a series of questions in which respondents were asked to place themselves on a nine-step ladder with respect to specified issues. Higher scores indicated that they saw themselves as ranking higher. They were also given the option of not responding or refusing to respond because the question was too difficult: these observations were coded as missing. The text of these questions is set forth below.

Please imagine a nine-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest people, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand the rich. On which of the nine steps are you personally standing today?

Please imagine a nine-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand people who are completely without rights, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand those who have a lot of power. On which of the nine steps are you personally standing today?

Please imagine a nine-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand people who are absolutely not respected, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand those who are very respected. On which of the nine steps are you personally standing today?

Table C.1: Data Summary

Variable name	Definition	Obs.	Mean	Std. dev.	Min.	Max.
abide	= 1 if going around law is unacceptable	37514	0.614	0.487	0.000	1.000
Early	Proportionate influence of living in 1906-34 on attitude formation	37514	0.001	0.011	0.000	0.447
Purges	Proportionate influence of living in 1935-39 on attitude formation	37514	0.002	0.011	0.000	0.121
WWII	Proportionate influence of living in 1940-45 on attitude formation	37514	0.006	0.024	0.000	0.147
PostWWII	Proportionate influence of living in 1946-53 on attitude formation	37514	0.019	0.050	0.000	0.203
Khrushchev	Proportionate influence of living in 1954-64 on attitude formation	37514	0.054	0.093	0.000	0.299
Brezhnev1	Proportionate influence of living in 1965-74 on attitude formation	37514	0.084	0.102	0.000	0.312
Brezhnev2	Proportionate influence of living in 1974-84 on attitude formation	37514	0.137	0.130	0.000	0.389
Gorbachev	Proportionate influence of living in 1985-91 on attitude formation	37514	0.122	0.089	0.000	0.292
Yeltsin1	Proportionate influence of living in 1992-93 on attitude formation	37514	0.041	0.027	0.000	0.098
Yeltsin2	Proportionate influence of living in 1994-99 on attitude formation	37514	0.141	0.088	0.000	0.351
Putin1	Proportionate influence of living in 2000-11 on attitude formation	37514	0.308	0.223	0.005	0.857
Putin2	Proportionate influence of living in 2012-20 on attitude formation	37514	0.085	0.147	0.000	0.857
surveyAge	Age at survey in decades	37514	4.485	1.839	1.300	10.100
surveyAgeSq	Age at survey in decades, squared	37514	23.496	17.835	1.690	102.010
survey06	2006 survey round	37514	0.234	0.424	0.000	1.000
survey12	2012 survey round	37514	0.408	0.491	0.000	1.000
survey18	2018 survey round	37514	0.358	0.479	0.000	1.000
female	= 1 if female	37514	0.574	0.494	0.000	1.000
ethnicR	= 1 if ethnic Russian	37514	0.849	0.359	0.000	1.000
orthodox	= 1 if respondent identifies as Orthodox religion	37514	0.632	0.482	0.000	1.000
e_school	number of years of primary and secondary school	37421	9.483	1.468	0.000	12.000
e_tech_total	number of years of post-secondary technical education	37476	1.426	1.584	0.000	7.000
e_uni_total	number of years of university education	37458	1.356	2.160	0.000	10.000
urban	= 1 if living in an urban environment	37514	0.669	0.470	0.000	1.000
econLadder	= 1 if respondent chooses top-5 of 9-step rich-poor ladder	36900	0.391	0.488	0.000	1.000
powerLadder	= 1 if respondent chooses top-5 of 9-step power ladder	36675	0.377	0.485	0.000	1.000
respectLadder	= 1 if respondent chooses top-5 of 9-step respect ladder	36054	0.871	0.335	0.000	1.000

Appendix D: The Ceteris Paribus Effects of Moving a Person's Twentieth Year from One Political Regime to Another

	Early	Purges	WWII	PostWWII	Khrushchev	Brezhnev1	Brezhnev2	Gorbachev	Yeltsin1	Yeltsin2	Putin1	Putin2
Early	0	-0.006	-0.022	0.002	0.007	0.013	0.027	**0.043**	0.052	**0.046**	**0.074**	**0.117**
Purges	0.006	0	-0.016	0.008	0.013	0.020	0.034	0.052	0.062	0.056	0.085	**0.132**
WWII	0.022	0.016	0	0.024	0.030	0.038	**0.054**	**0.074**	**0.087**	**0.081**	**0.113**	**0.172**
PostWWII	-0.002	-0.008	-0.024	0	0.005	0.011	0.025	**0.040**	0.050	**0.043**	**0.071**	**0.113**
Khrushchev	-0.006	-0.013	-0.029	-0.005	0	0.006	**0.019**	**0.034**	0.043	**0.036**	**0.063**	**0.101**
Brezhnev1	-0.012	-0.018	-0.034	-0.010	-0.006	0	0.012	**0.026**	0.034	**0.027**	**0.053**	**0.087**
Brezhnev2	-0.022	-0.029	**-0.045**	-0.021	**-0.017**	-0.011	0	0.012	**0.018**	0.011	**0.035**	**0.062**
Gorbachev	**-0.031**	-0.037	**-0.053**	**-0.029**	**-0.025**	**-0.021**	-0.010	0	**0.006**	-0.002	**0.021**	**0.041**
Yeltsin1	-0.034	-0.041	**-0.057**	-0.033	-0.029	-0.025	-0.014	-0.005	0	-0.008	0.015	0.032
Yeltsin2	**-0.029**	-0.036	**-0.052**	**-0.028**	**-0.024**	**-0.019**	-0.008	0.002	**0.008**	0	**0.023**	**0.045**
Putin1	**-0.043**	-0.049	**-0.065**	**-0.041**	**-0.038**	**-0.034**	**-0.024**	**-0.017**	**-0.013**	**-0.021**	0	**0.012**
Putin2	**-0.048**	**-0.054**	**-0.070**	**-0.046**	**-0.043**	**-0.039**	**-0.030**	**-0.024**	**-0.020**	**-0.029**	**-0.008**	0

Notes: **bold** indicates significant at the 5% level; not bold indicates significant at the 10% level.
Effects for moving a 20th year from the regimes labeling the columns to the regimes labeling the rows.

Appendix E: The estimated effect of age

Figure E.1



Appendix F: Three robustness exercises

Table F.1: Clustering on Families, Respondents in Different Years

Table F.2: Using the original 5-point scale for Abide

Table F.3: Logit regressions

Table F.1: Clustering on Families, Respondents in Different Years

	Dependent variable*: Abide*					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Early	-0.591	0.847	0.943	2.026**	2.026**	2.158**
(1906-34)	(0.439)	(0.769)	(0.769)	(0.774)	(0.774)	(0.792)
Purges	0.739	1.727	1.601	2.295+	2.296+	1.923
(1935-39)	(1.073)	(1.207)	(1.209)	(1.219)	(1.219)	(1.256)
WWII	0.492	1.924+	2.090*	2.983**	2.983**	3.312**
(1940-45)	(0.833)	(0.995)	(0.995)	(1.005)	(1.005)	(1.028)
PostWWII	-0.068	1.002	1.007	1.953**	1.953**	1.914**
(1946-53)	(0.419)	(0.661)	(0.661)	(0.665)	(0.665)	(0.682)
Khrushchev	0.102	1.092*	1.138*	1.755***	1.755***	1.788***
(1954-64)	(0.205)	(0.464)	(0.464)	(0.469)	(0.469)	(0.482)
Brezhnev1	-0.013	0.861*	0.882*	1.515***	1.515***	1.535***
(1965-74)	(0.159)	(0.388)	(0.389)	(0.391)	(0.391)	(0.402)
Brezhnev2	-0.054	0.641*	0.668*	1.072***	1.072***	1.081***
(1975-84)	(0.111)	(0.280)	(0.281)	(0.284)	(0.284)	(0.292)
Gorbachev	-0.341+	0.278	0.289	0.719**	0.719**	0.741**
(1985-91)	(0.197)	(0.273)	(0.273)	(0.274)	(0.274)	(0.281)
Yeltsin1	1.223+	0.503	0.527	0.563	0.563	0.581
(1992-93)	(0.681)	(0.699)	(0.697)	(0.693)	(0.693)	(0.706)
Yeltsin2	-0.433***	0.499*	0.503*	0.781**	0.781**	0.781**
(1994-99)	(0.113)	(0.248)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.247)	(0.255)
Putin1	-0.072*	0.093	0.097	0.201**	0.201**	0.205*
(2000-11)	(0.034)	(0.076)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.080)
Age in decades		-0.132***	-0.134***	-0.229***	-0.229***	-0.233***
		(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.041)
Age in decades, squared		0.003+	0.003	0.004*	0.004*	0.004*
		(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
2012 survey		0.172***	0.145**	0.209***	0.209***	0.208***
		(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.047)
2018 survey		0.292***	0.270**	0.404***	0.404***	0.407***
		(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.090)	(0.090)	(0.093)

Table F.1, continued

	Dependent variable*: Abide*					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender			0.079***	0.072***	0.072***	0.069***
			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Ethnic Russian			-0.003	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
			(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Orthodox			0.036***	0.038***	0.038***	0.035***
			(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Years of school				0.009***	0.009***	0.009***
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Years of technical school				0.004*	0.004*	0.004*
				(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Years of university				0.018***	0.018***	0.018***
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Urban					0.002	0.008
					(0.014)	(0.014)
Wealth ladder						-0.025***
						(0.007)
Power ladder						0.010
						(0.007)
Respect ladder						0.046***
						(0.009)
Constant	0.689***	0.551***	0.514***	0.417***	0.416***	0.392***
	(0.021)	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.056)	(0.057)	(0.059)
Observations	37514	37514	37514	37335	37335	35407

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
+p<0.10 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
omitted variables: *Putin2*, 2006 survey

Table F.2: Using the original 5-point scale for Abide

	Dependent variable*: Abide*, using original 5-point scale					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Early	-1.277	1.257	1.476	4.237*	4.236*	4.722*
(1906-34)	(1.523)	(2.009)	(2.104)	(2.044)	(2.038)	(1.944)
Purges	2.262	4.015	3.674	5.721+	5.722+	4.553
(1935-39)	(2.708)	(3.033)	(2.984)	(3.008)	(3.003)	(3.094)
WWII	0.304	2.872	3.269	5.422*	5.420*	6.595*
(1940-45)	(1.879)	(2.345)	(2.438)	(2.522)	(2.510)	(2.485)
PostWWII	0.333	2.271	2.267	4.770**	4.769**	4.621**
(1946-53)	(1.040)	(1.628)	(1.622)	(1.543)	(1.541)	(1.623)
Khrushchev	-0.146	1.658	1.757	3.370**	3.370**	3.575**
(1954-64)	(0.526)	(1.059)	(1.122)	(1.070)	(1.068)	(1.169)
Brezhnev1	0.019	1.684	1.726	3.409**	3.409**	3.467**
(1965-74)	(0.473)	(1.099)	(1.121)	(1.065)	(1.063)	(1.097)
Brezhnev2	-0.305	1.041	1.096	2.160**	2.160**	2.249**
(1975-84)	(0.280)	(0.657)	(0.689)	(0.650)	(0.648)	(0.710)
Gorbachev	-0.539	0.719	0.741	1.871**	1.870**	1.908**
(1985-91)	(0.421)	(0.590)	(0.600)	(0.550)	(0.545)	(0.582)
Yeltsin1	1.087	-0.334	-0.296	-0.211	-0.212	0.000
(1992-93)	(1.430)	(1.535)	(1.647)	(1.636)	(1.637)	(1.597)
Yeltsin2	-0.746*	1.106+	1.115+	1.852**	1.852**	1.868**
(1994-99)	(0.282)	(0.555)	(0.556)	(0.523)	(0.524)	(0.554)
Putin1	-0.282+	0.101	0.109	0.388*	0.388*	0.412*
(2000-11)	(0.151)	(0.184)	(0.198)	(0.189)	(0.187)	(0.197)
Age in decades		-0.272*	-0.277*	-0.527***	-0.527***	-0.538***
		(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.106)
Age in decades, squared		0.010*	0.008+	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**
		(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)
2012 survey		0.331**	0.270*	0.440***	0.440***	0.447***
		(0.103)	(0.109)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.113)
2018 survey		0.583**	0.532*	0.888***	0.887***	0.907***
		(0.200)	(0.207)	(0.195)	(0.195)	(0.211)

Table F.2, continued

	Dependent variable*: Abide*, using original 5-point scale					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender			0.199***	0.181***	0.181***	0.174***
			(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Ethnic Russian			-0.011	-0.015	-0.015	-0.012
			(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.035)
Orthodox			0.081+	0.085+	0.085*	0.075+
			(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Years of school				0.017*	0.017*	0.018*
				(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Years of technical school				0.015**	0.014**	0.014*
				(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Years of university				0.050***	0.050***	0.049***
				(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Urban					0.004	0.015
					(0.097)	(0.092)
Wealth ladder						-0.064+
						(0.034)
Power ladder						0.023
						(0.035)
Respect ladder						0.068+
						(0.039)
Constant	3.846***	3.542***	3.453***	3.252***	3.249***	3.198***
	(0.114)	(0.109)	(0.123)	(0.149)	(0.170)	(0.175)
Observations	37514	37514	37514	37335	37335	35407

Notes: Standard errors clustered on regions in parentheses.
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001
omitted variables: *Putin2*, 2006 survey

Table F.3: Logit regressions

	Dependent variable*: Abide*					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Early	-3.016	2.737	3.154	8.149*	8.148*	8.913**
(1906-34)	(2.113)	(3.243)	(3.334)	(3.322)	(3.315)	(3.338)
Purges	4.215	8.258	7.722	10.672+	10.673+	8.704
(1935-39)	(4.855)	(5.525)	(5.529)	(5.632)	(5.630)	(5.836)
WWII	2.103	8.143+	8.944*	13.130**	13.128**	14.907***
(1940-45)	(3.562)	(4.218)	(4.429)	(4.518)	(4.498)	(4.493)
PostWWII	-0.245	4.068	4.095	8.380**	8.379**	8.206**
(1946-53)	(1.718)	(2.863)	(2.862)	(2.852)	(2.851)	(3.071)
Khrushchev	0.441	4.593*	4.829*	7.657***	7.656***	7.863***
(1954-64)	(0.759)	(1.831)	(1.933)	(1.873)	(1.868)	(2.132)
Brezhnev1	-0.057	3.605*	3.715*	6.587***	6.586***	6.712***
(1965-74)	(0.683)	(1.810)	(1.852)	(1.823)	(1.817)	(1.948)
Brezhnev2	-0.245	2.720*	2.852*	4.701***	4.700***	4.774***
(1975-84)	(0.452)	(1.160)	(1.207)	(1.161)	(1.158)	(1.303)
Gorbachev	-1.445+	1.187	1.232	3.212**	3.211**	3.321**
(1985-91)	(0.784)	(1.067)	(1.081)	(1.033)	(1.023)	(1.108)
Yeltsin1	5.083+	2.150	2.302	2.426	2.426	2.529
(1992-93)	(2.631)	(2.927)	(3.134)	(3.156)	(3.156)	(3.143)
Yeltsin2	-1.818***	2.155*	2.181*	3.471***	3.471***	3.494***
(1994-99)	(0.470)	(0.992)	(1.011)	(0.968)	(0.970)	(1.043)
Putin1	-0.319	0.374	0.397	0.879**	0.879**	0.900*
(2000-11)	(0.275)	(0.303)	(0.326)	(0.326)	(0.322)	(0.360)
Age in decades		-0.599***	-0.616**	-1.048***	-1.048***	-1.073***
		(0.182)	(0.188)	(0.179)	(0.178)	(0.195)
Age in decades, squared		0.018*	0.016*	0.025***	0.025**	0.025**
		(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
2012 survey		0.729***	0.620**	0.914***	0.914***	0.914***
		(0.195)	(0.218)	(0.212)	(0.211)	(0.226)
2018 survey		1.240***	1.153**	1.768***	1.768***	1.791***
		(0.371)	(0.394)	(0.381)	(0.380)	(0.421)

Table F.3, continued

	Dependent variable*: Abide*					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Gender			0.343***	0.313***	0.312***	0.300***
			(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Ethnic Russian			-0.013	-0.022	-0.023	-0.023
			(0.076)	(0.079)	(0.072)	(0.068)
Orthodox			0.155*	0.164*	0.164*	0.152*
			(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.076)
Years of school				0.042***	0.042***	0.042***
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Years of technical school				0.019	0.019	0.020
				(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)
Years of university				0.080***	0.080***	0.079***
				(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Urban					0.007	0.035
					(0.192)	(0.174)
Wealth ladder						-0.112+
						(0.060)
Power ladder						0.042
						(0.066)
Respect ladder						0.199**
						(0.062)
Constant	0.900***	0.373*	0.207	-0.201	-0.200	-0.243
	(0.213)	(0.185)	(0.211)	(0.245)	(0.241)	(0.275)
Observations	37514	37514	37514	37335	37335	35407

Notes: Standard errors clustered on regions in parentheses.
+p<0.10 *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
omitted variables: *Putin2*, 2006 survey