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Teaching fields: Microeconomic Theory;
International Trade
Research interests: Auctions; Game
Theory; Bargaining; Industrial Organization;
International Trade
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Biography: Professor Daniel R. Vincent received his
Ph.D. in economics from Princeton University
in 1987. He was a Rhodes Scholar and received an M.A. from Oxford
and a B.A. in History from the University
of Toronto. Before joining the University
of Maryland, he taught at the University
of Western Ontario, the
Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences at Northwestern
University and at the California
Institute of Technology. His main area of research is the application of game
theory to trading environments. He has studied dynamic bargaining with
asymmetric information and the theory of auctions. More recently he has
studied multi-dimensional mechanism design and empirical applications of
auction theory. Other research interests include international trade and the
theory of multinational corporations. Publications include "Repeated Signalling
Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships," International Economic
Review, 1998, "Optimal Sequential Auctions' (with R. Preston
McAfee), Games and Economic Behavior, 1997, "Optimal Procurement
Mechanisms" (with Alejandro Manelli) Econometrica, 1995, and "The
Declining Price Anomaly" (with R. Preston McAfee) Journal of Economic
Theory, 1993. Recent working papers can be obtained from this site.
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