Department of Economics
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
Graduate Program:
301-405-3544
Undergraduate Program:
301-405-3266
Research
Institutional
Quality and Foreign Reserves (Job Market Paper)
Global imbalances are composed of foreign-reserve outflows
from fast growing emerging market economies. Three main
explanations for reserve accumulation given in the literature
are precautionary savings, mercantilism and political economy
frictions. None of them can explain by itself the levels of
foreign reserves, and even less, its high cross-country
variation. I develop a DSGE small-open economy model that
comprehends all three motives, and use information from a
panel of 189 countries to discipline the model. The panel will
also document that institutional quality –measured as
declining or low level of expropriation risk– is strongly
correlated with reserve accumulation. The model shows that,
given a certain degree of patience, an increase in
political-economy frictions can bring a level of public
savings of 4 times the output down to a net debt of -20%,
increasing expropriation risk from 0 to up to 45%, which is
consistent with the empirical findings.
Debt
Overhang, Rollover Risk and Investment in Europe
(With
Sebnem Kalemli-Özcan and Luc Laeven)
We find that
debt overhang and rollover risk translate into sluggish
investment in Europe. Using an extensive pan-European
firm-bank matched data set covering public and private
firms, we document that firms with higher debt overhang –
defined as higher corporate indebtedness relative to
earnings – invested less prior to the 2008 European crisis,
and this negative effect intensified during the crisis. In
the run-up to the crisis European firms financed investment
increasingly using debt, including short term debt, exposing
firms to rollover risk in the event of a reversal in lending
conditions. During the crisis period, the investment of
firms with longer maturity debt was less curtailed,
consistent with an in- crease in rollover risk, while
markets for short-term debt collapsed. We document that the
worsening of debt overhang and increasing rollover risk
during the crisis can be linked to an increase in sovereign
risk in peripheral European countries. Rollover risk in
peripheral Europe increased especially for firms with
preexisting borrower relationships with banks whose balance
sheets deteriorated because of large holdings of peripheral
sovereign bonds, highlighting the role of sovereign-bank
linkages in affecting firm investment. A simple back of the
envelope calculation based on our firm-level estimates
suggests that the debt overhang and rollover risk channels
together explain more than half of the actual decline in
aggregate corporate investment in the aftermath of the
crisis.