Working Papers

Daniel Vincent

Downloadable Papers

Daniel R. Vincent

Department of Economics

University of Maryland

College Park, MD


(301)-405 3485

(301)-405-3542 (FAX) (e-mail)

  1. Vincent, Daniel R. "Auction Theory Implications For Antitrust", chapter in Elgar Encyclopedia on the Economics of Competition and Regualation, ed. Michael Noah, forthcoming.
  2. Vincent, Daniel R. "Mixed Bundling and Mergers", January, 2024.
  3. Vincent, Daniel R., "Multilateral Negotiations and Opportunism", May, 2020.
  4. Vincent, Daniel R. and Alejandro Manelli, "Dominant-strategy and Bayesian incentive compatibility in multi-object trading environments", August, 2018.
  5. Vincent, Daniel R. and Marius Schwartz , "Platform Competition With User Rebates Under No Surcharge Rules", November, 2017.
  6. Manelli, Alejandro M. and Daniel R. Vincent, "Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private Values Model" , July, 2008.
  7. Schwartz, Marius and Daniel Vincent,  “Quantity “Forcing” and Exclusion: Bundled Discounts and Nonlinear Pricing”
  8. Manelli, Alejandro M. and Daniel R. Vincent, "Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple Good Monopoly” , January, 2005.
  9. Manelli, Alejandro M. and Daniel R. Vincent, "Bundling as an Optimal Mechanism by a Multiple-Good Monopolist” , June, 2004.
  10. Manelli, Alejandro M. and Daniel R. Vincent, "Duality in Procurement Design” , November, 2003.
  11. Schwartz, Marius and Daniel R. Vincent, "The No Surcharge Rule and Card User Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payment Network", October, 2003.
  12.  Vincent, Daniel R.  "Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships," (Earlier version as "Bilateral Monopoly, Nondurable Goods and Dynamic Trading Relationships," CMSEMS DP No. 832, May 1989.)  International Economic Review(1998),. (Adobe Acrobat (.pdf file))
  13.  McAfee, R. Preston., and Daniel R. Vincent.  "Sequentially Optimal Auctions."  Games and Economic Behavior (1997).(Adobe Acrobat (.pdf file))
  14.  McAfee, R. Preston., Wendy Takacs., and Daniel R. Vincent. "Tarrifying Auctions."   Rand Journal (Spring,1999).(Adobe Acrobat (.pdf file))
  15.  McAfee, R. Preston., Daniel C. Quan., and Daniel R. Vincent. "How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids with an Application to Real Estate Auctions."  Journal of Industrial Economics (2002) (Adobe Acrobat (.pdf file))
  16.  Vincent, Daniel R., and Motty Perry.  "Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations."  International Economic Review (2002).(Adobe Acrobat (.pdf file))
  17.  Vincent, Daniel R.  "Omitted Proof: of Theorem One: Bargaining With Common Values."  Journal of Economic Theory (1989).(Adobe Acrobat (.pdf file))


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