Research
Random Network Consideration: Theory and Experiment (Job Market Paper)
Current Draft
In many settings, it is natural to think of limited consideration exhibiting spillovers: attention paid to a particular alternative may "spill over" to another alternative based on shared characteristics, com- plementarities, features of the choice environment, etc. However, it is not straightforward whether, given choice data, a) preferences among alternatives can be revealed, or b) the network of consideration spillovers can be revealed. Using a novel laboratory experiment, I test a deterministic Network Choice model proposed in previous work and fi nd a plethora of violations thereof, even at the individual level. I then propose a stochastic model, Random Network Choice, and analyze its properties regarding the formation of consideration sets. When applied to the laboratory data, I fi nd considerable consistency with the general Random Network Choice model. Armed with a model of network choice consistent with my experimental data, I consider one application in the realm of advertising to show that such a generalization of so-called "positive spillovers" in attention is necessary to avoid misleading welfare analysis.
Supported by : NSF Doctoral Dissertation Research Improvement Grant, Award ID 1757253
Presented at : 2018 ESA North America Meetings, Antigua, Guatemala
The Relevance of Irrelevant Information
with Emel Filiz-Ozbay and Erkut Ozbayrevise and resubmit, Journal of Economic Theory
Current Draft
This paper experimentally investigates the effect of introducing unavailable alternatives and irrelevant information regarding the alternatives on the optimality of decisions in choice problems. We find that interaction between the unavailable alternatives and irrelevant information regarding the alternatives generates suboptimal decisions. Irrelevant information in any dimension increases the time costs of decisions. We also identify a pure “preference for simplicity” beyond the desire to make optimal decisions or minimize time spent on a decision problem. Our results imply that the presentation set, distinct from the alternative set, needs to be a part of decision making models.
Presented at: WISE, Xiamen University, Xiamen, China, 2016
Risk and Reciprocity
with Erkut OzbayWe experimentally invstigate i) the effects of risk on reciprocal preferences and ii) the determinants of giving and reciprocity in environments with risk. To this end, we present a new game, the General Gift Exhcnage Game (GGE), that extends gift exchange into environments with uncertainty. We find that giving is lower in environments with uncertainty and return rates are higher in the same. Further, our results are inconsistent with simply expected utility extensions of extant models of reciprocal preferences. We suggest directions for future theory research that includes both ex-ante and ex-post reciprocal preferences.
Non-Monetary Incentives and Traffic Congestion
with Erkut Ozbay and Santiago Velez-FerroWe show experimentally that non-monetary incentives, which take the form of "Merit Points", can be an effective and cost-efficient policy intervention for the reduction of traffic congestion. Further, we show that the simultaneous offering of both monetary and non-monetary incentives do not perfectly crowd-out one another, suggesting effective policy interventions with more complex mixtures of the two. Work is ongoing.
Conducted in partnership with: Department of Civil Engineering, University of Maryland, College Park
Funded in part by: US Department of Energy